3/30/91 | Quizalize

Riferimenti normativi per il settore residenziale: Art 81: Accesso alla rete viaria—>> il cancello deve essere arretrato di almeno 4,5m dal filo esterno del marciapiede Art 82: Passo carrabile—>> larghezza non inferiore a 4,5m e non superiore a 6,5m Art 83:Pendenza Rampa —>> max 16% Art 97: Superficie minima degli ambienti - cucina —>> min 5mq - studio—>> min 7mq - soggiorno—>> min 14 mq - soggiorno spazi di cottura—>> 17 -camera (1posto letto)—>> 8mq - camera (2posti letto)—>> 12mq Superficie alloggio totale —>> non inferiore a 28 mq Art 95: Altezze minime- cucina, soggiorno, camera e studio—>> min 2,70m -locali accessori—>> min 2,40 m (bagno, lavanderie) - locali di servizio—>> min 2,10m (disimpegni, riposti.) - soppalchi—>> min 2,10m - parapetti—>> non inf. a 1,1m (10 cm cordolo) (92) Art 86: Distanze - negli edifici di nuova costruzione la distanza degli edifici dal confine con proprietà di terzi — nei NAF—>> non inf. a 3 m — altri ambiti —>> non inf. a 5m Art 89: Scale (R.E. ) —alzate—>> max 12 consecutive — a chiocciola—>> consentite solo all’interno di un’unità abit. — illuminazione—>> se collegano più di due piani devono . essere areati con lucernario. Dim: 0,3 mq . per ogni piano servito (R.I.: 0,4 mq x piano) — areazione —>> non ci può essere areazione verso i vani scala . ( Lo dice anche il regolamento d’igiene ) (R.I) —>> superficie non inferiore a 1mq per piano servi. — larghezza (R.I.) —>> deve garantire la possibilità di soccorso e . trasporto di persone Art 88: Locali sotterranei —>> non possono MAI essere adibiti ad abitazione Locali seminterrati—>> possono ma devono rispettare determinati . requisiti - l’altezza media deve essere > di 2,7m Art 91: Copertura—>> istallazione di apparati tecnici non deve essere visibile . dalle pubbliche vie Art 98: Bagni —>> ambiente contenente il vaso deve essere disimpegnato . dalla cucina (R.I: disimpegnato dai locali abitabili, esclusione Secondo bagno se è a servizio esclusivo di una camera) (R.I)—>> deve essere dotato di vaso, lavabo, bidet doccia o vasca —>> il lavabo può essere ubicato nell’antibagno Art 100: Areazione —>> riscontro d’aria deve essere garantito su aperture . perpendicolari o contrapposte.(non inf. a 1\10) —>> appartamenti inf. a 60mq possono essere . monoaffaccio ( ma non esposti a nord) Art 125: Raccolta rifiuti (R.E)—>> non meno di 0,18mq per ogni abitante . virtuale —>> non meno di 5 mq —>> altezza minima 2,4m (R.I: 2 m) —>> deve avere un punto di allacciamento d’acqua Regolamento d’igiene —>> dimensione tale da poter contenere 4,5l Di rifiuti per abitante.( in ogni caso > di 2mq) —>> scarichi sifonati dall’acqua di lavaggio —>> accorgimenti che assicurino un’adeguata Difesa antimurina e antinsetti Norma UNI 10750: superficie commerciale (ciò che compriamo) , cioè la somma delle superfici coperte—>> 100% delle superfici calpestatili —>>100% delle superfici su cui poggiano . Le pareti divisorie interne non portanti —>> 50% delle pareti portanti interne perimetrali —>> 25% delle aree non abitabili Superfici scoperte—>> 25% dei balconi e delle terrazze scoperte —>> 35% dei balconi e dei terrazzi coperti (3 lati) —>> 35% dei pati e dei porticati —>> 60% delle verande —>> 15% dei giardini di appartamento —>> 10% dei giardini di ville e villini (Se un muro è al confine con un altro appartamento lo considero dalla mezzeria, se confina con uno spazio comune idem, lo considero tutto invece se da sull’esterno ) Regolamento d’igiene (su esso prevale il Re) : norme che discipilinano degli aspetti della vita quotidiana al fine di tutelare la salute dei fruitori Si occupa di : Rumori , odori , fumi, vapori. Scarichi nel sottosuolo Pulizia e decoro Malattie infettive Igenicità degli ambienti Pareti trasparenti (tenendo conto di telai e infissi)—>> deve avere un area pari a 1\8 (nazionale), 1\10 (Milano ) della superficie di pavimento Profondità di pavimento—>> non deve superare i 2,5m dalla finestra Bagno cieco solo se la superficie lorda di pavimento è inferiore ai 70mq e se è presente una sola camera da letto , oppure se è un secondo bagno (altrimenti finestra > 0,5 apribile). Superficie illuminante—>> superficie totale dell’apertura meno - superficie finale non utile (C): 60 cm - superficie superiore non utile (A) A= va considerato per intero se non ci sono aggetti o se questi sono inferiori a 150 cm. Al contrario ne considero solo un terzo. Es: con aggetto, b+ 1\3a . Se il rapporto illuminante è rispettato la profondità del locale non può essere più di 2,5 volte l’altezza del voltino . Se non è rispettato (inferiore a 1\8) allora deve essere 3,5 volte Alloggi devono essere dotati— per 1\2 perone—>> 1 spazio cottura,1 servizio igienico , 1 ripostiglio — per 3\4 persone—>> 1 cucina indipendente, 1 servizio igienico , 1 ripostiglio — per 4\5 persone —>> 1 cucina indipendente, 2 servizi igienici, 1 ripostiglio (per il secondo servizio è richiesta una superficie minima di 2mq e un lato minimo di 1,2m) Dotazione dei servizi: Cucina—>> pavimenti e pareti con superficie Di materiale impermeabile, liscio, lavabile,resist. —>> soffitto materiale traspirante —>> cappa collegata a ogni punto di cottura (Vedi bagno su) Prevenzione incendi : definisce —dimensionamenti—accessi all’area (locali di intrattenimento e di pubblico Spettacolo —>> larghezza 3,5 —>> h libera 4m —>> raggio di svolta 13m —>> pendenza non sup al 10% —>> resist al carico almeno 20t —profondità locali —>> i locali al chiuso non possono Essere ubicati oltre il secondo piano Interrato (non oltre i 10m) . Questi se Sono tra i 7,5 e i 10 m devono essere Protetti da un’impianto sprinkler e Essere dotati di uscite sicure. — carichi d’incendio — comunicazione (locali di intrattenimento e di pubb. Spettacolo —>> locali possono comunicare con altre Attività purché dotate di filtri a prova di Fumo e di porte REI (ameno 30) (queste Non vanno cont nel comp. delle vie d’uscit) — compartimentazioni — autorimesse — comportamento al fuoco

MYTH The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine. FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to force the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than nine million. The British limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine when, in 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some thirty-five thousand square miles—to create a new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine. By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres to Jews. This contradicted Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that “the Administration of Palestine…shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency…close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.”2 Ultimately, the British admitted that the argument about the country’s absorptive capacity was specious. The Peel Commission said, “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled. FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The British restricted Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s “absorptive capacity.” During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease, and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 83,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti-Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one-third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within ten years and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95% of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigration to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936 observed, “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is…due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH The British changed their policy to allow Holocaust survivors to settle in Palestine. FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many smuggled in on dilapidated ships organized by the Haganah. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, sixty-five “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps on Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, and 28,000 remained imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH As the Jewish population grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened. FACT In July 1921, Hasan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa and president of the Muslim National Associations, sent a telegram to the British government in reaction to a delegation of Palestinians that went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Shukri wrote: We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.13 The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non-Jewish population rose by 588,000.14 The permanent Arab population increased by 120% between 1922 and 1947.15 This rapid growth of the Arab population was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37% of the total immigration to pre-state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.16 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.17 The Arab population increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922–1947, the non-Jewish population increased by 290% in Haifa, 131% in Jerusalem, and 158% in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42% in Nablus, 78% in Jenin, and 37% in Bethlehem.18 MYTH Jews stole Arab land. FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. From the beginning of World War I, however, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. About 80% of the Palestinian Arabs were debt-ridden peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins.19 Jews went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap, and—most important—without tenants. In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” He insisted that “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” Instead, he advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”20 Jews only began to purchase cultivated land after buying all the uncultivated territory. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.21 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed, “They [the Jews] paid high prices for the land and, in addition, they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”22 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness for the British government and offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80% were ruled invalid by the government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the government land offer.23 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by local Palestinian leaders who were later joined by Arab volunteers led by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.24 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased…There was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”25 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living, and ample employment opportunities.26 It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original). —Transjordan’s king Abdullah27 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938 (which began in April 1936 with the murder of two Jews by Arabs and the subsequent murder of two Arab workers by members of the Jewish underground28), the British high commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.29 The Jews paid exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”30 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 were acquired from the mandatory government, 30,000 were bought from various churches, and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73% of Jewish plots were purchased from large landowners, not poor fellahin.31 Many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, and the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem, and s sold land to the Jews. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews.32 MYTH The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews. FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini first began to organize fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. El-Husseini hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.33 Arab radicals gained influence because the British administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they began a revolt against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” The British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the military administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with el-Husseini in 1920, a few days before Easter, and told him that “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world…that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine administration but in Whitehall.” He added that “if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General [Louis] Bols [chief administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General [Edmund] Allenby [commander of the Egyptian force, 1917–19, then high commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”34 El-Husseini took the colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of el-Husseini’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. He escaped, however, and was sentenced to ten years in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon el-Husseini and to appoint him Mufti (a cleric in charge of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places). By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years. They were released a few months later.35 Samuel met with el-Husseini on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left forty-three Jews dead.36 El-Husseini consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools, and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute that “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”37 The Mufti’s henchmen also ensured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians who discussed cooperation with the Jews from rival clans. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, el-Husseini did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.38 The Arabs found rioting an effective political tool because of the lax British response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British prevented Jews from protecting themselves but made little effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: The Arabs feared being displaced by the Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs learned they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging riots. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy.”39 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was an excuse for their attacks on Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by economics, the radical Islamic views of the Mufti, and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs convinced the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic still used today to incite violence). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a pretext for rioting by Arabs against Jews, which spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British administration made no effort to prevent the violence, and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, most of Hebron’s Jews had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.40 After the riots, the British ordered an investigation, resulting in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the mandatory government’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy.”41 This meant it was necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. MYTH The Mufti was not a Nazi collaborator. FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler fifteen drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. He also asked the Axis powers to “accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the interest of the Arabs, and by the same method that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”42 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.” He added, “The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely…the Jews.” Hitler told the Mufti he opposed the creation of a Jewish state and that Germany’s objective was destroying the Jewish element in the Arab sphere.43 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting twenty thousand Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut where he died in 1974. MYTH The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a deliberate terror campaign against civilians. FACT British troops seized the Jewish Agency compound on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were arrested. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. In response to the British provocations, and a desire to demonstrate that the Jews’ spirit could not be broken, the United Resistance Movement planned to bomb the King David Hotel, which housed the British military command and the Criminal Investigation Division in addition to hotel guests. The Haganah pulled out of the plot and left it up to the Irgun. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties and the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed on July 22, 1946, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. The call to the hotel was received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying, “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”44 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the main part of the hotel were injured.45 For decades, the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament provided the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.46 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which Arab leaders hailed as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.47 1 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172

1.1945-1949: The immediate years after the Second World War ● At the end of 1945, Mao Zedong had come to see the USA as the greatest threat to his aspirations. a. He understood that East Asians were looking to the USA as the true liberator from Japanese imperialism. b. The USA’s support for the Kuomintang(KMT) and the restoration of U.S. authority in formerly Japanese Manchuria clashed with the CCP’s plans to use the region for its own needs in the impending civil war between the CCP and the GMD. ■ To compound matters, while the KMT was recognised internationally as the official government in China, Mao and the CCP saw the party as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. ● While Mao saw the USA as the greater threat to the CCP’s plans, Soviet actions also frustrated him. a. The USSR provided minimal and incoherent support for the Chinese Communists in Yan’an and Manchuria. b. Stalin also attempted to extract territorial and economic concessions from the Guomindang government in the Friendship and Alliance Treaty China signed in August 1945 under American and Soviet pressure in exchange for Soviet entry into the Second World War against Japan. ● The emerging superpower conflict over Europe and over American intervention in the impending civil war in China led to Mao’s ideological perception of the 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 8 USA as an aggressive imperialist power that was hostile towards other countries, especially the USSR and China. ● In 1946, Mao promoted the theory of the intermediate zone, which envisioned a global united front against American imperialism. a. Mao saw the emerging superpower conflict as an American-Soviet contest for the intermediate zones, the capitalist, colonial and semi- colonial countries of West Europe, Africa, and Asia. b. Mao believed that the USSR was the defender of world peace. c. The intermediate zone, which included China, would not be part of the socialist camp. d. Despite the tremendous potential that U.S. aid held for China’s reconstruction, Mao’s ideological worldview and the impending civil war against the Guomindang prevented him from seeking normalised relations with the USA. In 1949, Mao decided to lean towards the side of the USSR despite two decades of unreliable support from them. e. Mao saw the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East Europe as evidence that China should isolate capitalist-bourgeois forces within it.2 f. Stalin had expelled Yugoslavia from the socialist camp as its leader, Tito was seen to have directly challenged Stalin’s authority. ■ Mao thus saw it as imperative to stress close unity to the USSR lest he was seen as a second Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, Mao sought a loose partnership with the USSR because Mao believed that China should preserve a high measure of self- reliance and zili gengsheng (自力更生) (regeneration through one’s own efforts). ● When the People’s Republic of China was formed on 1 October, 1949, relations between China’s and the USSR’s communists had improved substantially. a. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was also aware that the USSR never treated Chinese interests as a priority. What the CCP failed to fully understand was that Stalin ruled East Europe much like it was his empire and how this would have implications for China. b. In Mao’s first visit to the USSR in December 1949, Stalin was non- committal regarding the interests raised by the Chinese, and treated Mao as an underling as he feared that closer relations with the PRC would cause the USSR to lose privileges gained from the KMT. _________________________ 2 What Mao did not realise at that point was that the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East European countries were part of Stalin’s intentional design to consolidate the power of communists in them. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 9 A note on Sino-American relations 2. Early 1950: The USA’s hands-off policy towards Taiwan begins to change ● By early 1950, the Truman administration had written off Taiwan and believed it was only a matter of time before the island fell to the PLA. ● Two events in early 1950 changed the USA’s position on East Asia. ○ The formation of the USSR-PRC alliance in February 1950 ○ The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 3. 1950: The Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty ● Signed on 14 February, 1950. 3.1Implications for Sino-Soviet relations ● Stalin saw it as a means to get concessions that he had failed to get from the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1945. ● For Mao and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC), the alliance would provide security against U.S. imperialism and allow the PRC to get economic aid for reconstruction from the USSR. ● The Chinese realised soon after the 1950 treaty had been signed that the Soviet Union was intent on exploiting the agreement in its own favour. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 10 ● The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially directed against Japanese militarism and its allies, especially the USA. ● The Sino-Soviet alliance comprised three elements: party, military and economic relations. ○ Party: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was included in the customs of communist party internationalism, such as regular exchange of party delegations to congresses of the fraternal parties in Stalin’s socialist camp. ■ This move was meant to bring the PRC’s ideological beliefs about communism into greater alignment with the USSR’s. ○ Military: The alliance was supposed to provide the newly formed and weak PRC with a strategic deterrent and military aid against the USA on three fronts: Guomindang-held Taiwan, divided Korea, and Vietnam where France attempted to reestablish its colonial control. ■ Convinced that the USA would aggressively seek ways to undermine the CCP-led PRC through Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam, Mao sought an active defence. ● While in Moscow, Mao unsuccessfully asked Stalin to provide military assistance for the liberation of Taiwan. ● At the beginning of 1950, the PRC delivered large-scale military aid to Hanoi. The PRC was the first country to grant the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam diplomatic recognition on 18 January 1950; Mao persuaded Stalin to do so on 30 January 1950. ● The PRC committed itself to North Korea, where Mao saw the commitment to North Korea both as a defence against U.S. imperialism and as support for a fellow communist country. ○ Economic: During Mao’s first stay in Moscow, Stalin had personally promised the delivery of fifty projects for primary industrialisation. ■ The agreement also led to a series of supplementary ones, such as a US$ 300 million loan that the PRC would repay with a mixture of strategic materials, rubber, agricultural products, goods for daily use and hard currency. ■ Significantly, Stalin used Soviet military and economic aid to extract concessions similar to those he failed to get from the Guomindang government in 1945. ■ The USSR and PRC would disagree on the pace and extent of the PRC’s planned development. ● In the last five weeks of Stalin’s life in early 1953, he attempted to pressure the PRC to reduce the planned 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 11 development speed to a mere annual growth of 13-14 percent, and to plan individual projects in detail beforehand. These moves would potentially result in the PRC’s economy growing at a slower rate than initially projected. ● However, after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the PRC’s Zhou Enlai decided to use his visit of condolence to the USSR to press forward negotiations. ○ When talks resumed in 1 April 1953, Beijing pressed for 150 Soviet industrial projects, but Moscow reduced them to 91 on the basis of insufficient data provided by the Chinese. ■ The economic disarray after China’s civil war and the economic pressures that came with the Korean War influenced recovery and reconstruction in the early years of the PRC. ● Despite the PRC being unable to tap into Soviet economic assistance immediately, mutual trade between China and the USSR nevertheless increased 6.5 times from 1950 to 1956. ● Together with the 50 projects promised by Stalin in 1950, the final version of the First FYP for the PRC included 141 Soviet and 68 East European projects in a total of 649 planned. Three thousand Soviet advisers sent to China in subsequent years were directly linked to the First FYP. ● By 1955, over 60 percent of China’s goods exchange was with the USSR. ● Soviet economic assistance to China added up to the largest foreign development venture in the socialist camp ever. ○ The total number of planned projects amounted to between 300 and 360 projects. ○ However, the number of total finished projects ranged between 134 and 150. ● Transfers of knowledge and expertise were important to China’s economic development. ○ A study on Soviet experts counts 1,445 political advisers and 9,313 technical specialists sent to China until their sudden withdrawal in mid-1960. ■ For political reasons, the gradual withdrawal of advisers began after late 1956.

Caratteristiche e funzionalità degli standard europei per la posta elettronica certificata Con oltre 14 milioni e 600 mila caselle attive nel terzo bimestre 2022 (fonte AgID), la posta elettronica certificata continua a dimostrarsi uno strumento chiave per l’innovazione digitale in Italia. Ecco perché si guarda alla PEC europea come a un ulteriore traguardo per creare un sistema di comunicazione qualificata tra cittadini e imprese e anche tra privati e Pubblica Amministrazione. La nuova PEC europea ha iniziato il suo iter a gennaio 2022 e nel corso dello stesso anno ha visto il rilascio dello standard ETSI (Istituto Europeo per le norme di Telecomunicazioni), fondamentale per la realizzazione di un servizio di posta elettronica conforme al Regolamento europeo n. 910/2014 – eIDAS. Adesso, la parola d’ordine nel settore è interoperabilità, ovvero la possibilità di scambiare in modo sicuro comunicazioni elettroniche di valore probatorio, attraverso un processo di standardizzazione europeo. Dal 2024 la PEC in Italia lascerà quindi il posto alla Registered Electronic Mail (REM), la PEC europea. Nuovo standard PEC europea: quali sono i principi? Lo standard europeo ETSI EN 319 532-4 specifica le caratteristiche della CSI (Common Service Interface): l’interfaccia tecnologica condivisa che permette lo scambio sicuro tra i gestori e tra gli utilizzatori di servizi di recapito qualificato. Tale infrastruttura si basa su due elementi: • ERDS (Electronic Registered Delivery Services) • REM (Registered Electronic Mail) Le funzionalità di ERDS e REM hanno come obiettivo il settaggio di requisiti tecnici necessari per verificare e certificare: Identità del cittadino UE possessore di un indirizzo di posta certificata; Integrità del contenuto; Data e ora d’invio e di ricezione del messaggio. In sintesi, lo standard ETSI EN 319 532-4 amplia i confini della PEC che diventa un sistema di comunicazione qualificata a livello europeo. Posta certificata europea: cosa cambia? Il cambiamento più sostanziale che riguarda le caselle PEC attivate in Italia è l’integrazione dei requisiti SERC (Servizio Elettronico di Recapito Certificato) con quelli SERCQ (Servizio Elettronico di Recapito Certificato Qualificato). In altre parole, la PEC italiana come è oggi conferisce alle comunicazioni requisiti di valore legale, tanto da essere equiparabile alla tradizionale raccomandata con avviso di ricezione, ma non certifica l’identità del titolare della casella. Motivo per cui è necessario adeguare la casella PEC agli standard europei attraverso due step: il riconoscimento del titolare della casella e l’attivazione della verifica in 2 passaggi. Come funziona l’adeguamento PEC agli standard europei? Per allinearsi ai requisiti sanciti dallo standard ETSI sul servizio di recapito certificato qualificato, il titolare di una casella PEC dovrà procedere in questo modo. 1. Riconoscimento dell’identità Tale passaggio è necessario per garantire l’attendibilità del mittente, persona fisica o rappresentante legale di una persona giuridica. La verifica dell’identità può essere fatta attraverso uno degli strumenti di identificazione elettronica riconosciuti dalla Commissione europea: Identità digitale SPID; Tessera Sanitaria / Carta Nazionale dei Servizi; Firma digitale anche remota; Carta d’Identità Elettronica (CIE 3.0); Piattaforma DVO (De Visu Online) con operatore. 2. Verifica in 2 passaggi (2FA) L’autenticazione a 2 fattori rafforza il livello di sicurezza dell’account di posta attraverso il doppio controllo di accesso al servizio: inserimento delle credenziali (indirizzo PEC e password) e codice di autenticazione. Il codice viene inviato su un dispositivo precedentemente verificato e secondo la modalità di ricezione che si è scelta: Notifica PUSH tramite app su dispositivo mobile; Token OTP tramite app; Token OTP via SMS. Dopo che la verifica in 2 passaggi è stata attivata, per consultare la casella PEC sarà necessario inserire la password e autorizzare l’accesso o con la conferma della notifica PUSH, o con l’inserimento dell’OTP (One Time Password). Come si attiva la PEC europea obbligatoria? Le fasi di implementazione del processo sono ancora in attesa del DPCM normativo, ma nel frattempo i provider di PEC Legalmail stanno già cominciando ad abilitare i sistemi di verifica. Fra i gestori riconosciuti da AgID, Infocert PEC permette già adesso di effettuare l’upgrade della casella Legalmail identificando il titolare in pochi semplici step e mantenendo integre tutte le funzionalità del servizio.

3/30/2020 potted plants day 4

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