Days of the week (spelling)

MYTH The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine. FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to force the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than nine million. The British limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine when, in 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some thirty-five thousand square miles—to create a new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine. By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres to Jews. This contradicted Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that “the Administration of Palestine…shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency…close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.”2 Ultimately, the British admitted that the argument about the country’s absorptive capacity was specious. The Peel Commission said, “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled. FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The British restricted Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s “absorptive capacity.” During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease, and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 83,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti-Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one-third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within ten years and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95% of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigration to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936 observed, “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is…due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH The British changed their policy to allow Holocaust survivors to settle in Palestine. FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many smuggled in on dilapidated ships organized by the Haganah. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, sixty-five “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps on Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, and 28,000 remained imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH As the Jewish population grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened. FACT In July 1921, Hasan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa and president of the Muslim National Associations, sent a telegram to the British government in reaction to a delegation of Palestinians that went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Shukri wrote: We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.13 The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non-Jewish population rose by 588,000.14 The permanent Arab population increased by 120% between 1922 and 1947.15 This rapid growth of the Arab population was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37% of the total immigration to pre-state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.16 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.17 The Arab population increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922–1947, the non-Jewish population increased by 290% in Haifa, 131% in Jerusalem, and 158% in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42% in Nablus, 78% in Jenin, and 37% in Bethlehem.18 MYTH Jews stole Arab land. FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. From the beginning of World War I, however, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. About 80% of the Palestinian Arabs were debt-ridden peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins.19 Jews went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap, and—most important—without tenants. In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” He insisted that “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” Instead, he advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”20 Jews only began to purchase cultivated land after buying all the uncultivated territory. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.21 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed, “They [the Jews] paid high prices for the land and, in addition, they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”22 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness for the British government and offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80% were ruled invalid by the government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the government land offer.23 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by local Palestinian leaders who were later joined by Arab volunteers led by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.24 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased…There was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”25 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living, and ample employment opportunities.26 It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original). —Transjordan’s king Abdullah27 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938 (which began in April 1936 with the murder of two Jews by Arabs and the subsequent murder of two Arab workers by members of the Jewish underground28), the British high commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.29 The Jews paid exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”30 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 were acquired from the mandatory government, 30,000 were bought from various churches, and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73% of Jewish plots were purchased from large landowners, not poor fellahin.31 Many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, and the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem, and s sold land to the Jews. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews.32 MYTH The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews. FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini first began to organize fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. El-Husseini hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.33 Arab radicals gained influence because the British administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they began a revolt against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” The British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the military administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with el-Husseini in 1920, a few days before Easter, and told him that “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world…that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine administration but in Whitehall.” He added that “if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General [Louis] Bols [chief administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General [Edmund] Allenby [commander of the Egyptian force, 1917–19, then high commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”34 El-Husseini took the colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of el-Husseini’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. He escaped, however, and was sentenced to ten years in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon el-Husseini and to appoint him Mufti (a cleric in charge of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places). By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years. They were released a few months later.35 Samuel met with el-Husseini on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left forty-three Jews dead.36 El-Husseini consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools, and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute that “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”37 The Mufti’s henchmen also ensured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians who discussed cooperation with the Jews from rival clans. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, el-Husseini did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.38 The Arabs found rioting an effective political tool because of the lax British response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British prevented Jews from protecting themselves but made little effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: The Arabs feared being displaced by the Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs learned they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging riots. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy.”39 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was an excuse for their attacks on Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by economics, the radical Islamic views of the Mufti, and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs convinced the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic still used today to incite violence). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a pretext for rioting by Arabs against Jews, which spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British administration made no effort to prevent the violence, and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, most of Hebron’s Jews had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.40 After the riots, the British ordered an investigation, resulting in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the mandatory government’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy.”41 This meant it was necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. MYTH The Mufti was not a Nazi collaborator. FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler fifteen drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. He also asked the Axis powers to “accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the interest of the Arabs, and by the same method that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”42 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.” He added, “The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely…the Jews.” Hitler told the Mufti he opposed the creation of a Jewish state and that Germany’s objective was destroying the Jewish element in the Arab sphere.43 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting twenty thousand Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut where he died in 1974. MYTH The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a deliberate terror campaign against civilians. FACT British troops seized the Jewish Agency compound on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were arrested. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. In response to the British provocations, and a desire to demonstrate that the Jews’ spirit could not be broken, the United Resistance Movement planned to bomb the King David Hotel, which housed the British military command and the Criminal Investigation Division in addition to hotel guests. The Haganah pulled out of the plot and left it up to the Irgun. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties and the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed on July 22, 1946, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. The call to the hotel was received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying, “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”44 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the main part of the hotel were injured.45 For decades, the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament provided the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.46 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which Arab leaders hailed as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.47 1 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172

Why and How Managers Plan Importance of planning The planing process Benefits of planning Planning and time management Types of PLans used by managers Long term and short term plans Strageic and tactical plans Operational plans Planning Tools and Techiqunes Forecasting Contrigency planning Scenario planning Benchmaking Use of staff planners Implementing Plans to Achive Results Goal setting Goal management Goal alignment Participation and involvement Planning Def: The process of setting objectives and determining how best to accomplish them Planning at Eaton Corporation “Making the hard decision before events force them upon you, an anticipating the future needs of the market before the demand asset itself Objectives and goals Identifity the specific results or desired outcomes that one intends to achieve Plan Def: A statement of action steps to be taken in order to accomplish the objectives (goals) Steps in the planning process: Define your objectives Determine where you stand vis-a-vis objectives Develpo premises reagrdsing future conditions Analyze alternatives and make a plan Implement the plan and evaluate results What are the benefits of planning Improves focus and flexibility Imporves action orteitation Imporves coordination and control Imporves time management Time Managment Personal time management tips Do say “no” to request that distract you form what you should be doing Dont get bogged down inn details that can be addressed later Do screen telephone calls, emails and meeting request Dont let drop in visitors, text messaging use up your time Do prioritize your important and urgent work Dont become calendar bound by letting other control your schedule Do follow priorities; do most important and urgent work first Some 77% of mangers in one survey said that digital age has increased th number of decisions they have to make 43% said there was less time available to make these decisions Types of plans used by Managers What is teh time horizon Long term vs Short term Long term Look three or more years into teh future Short term plans Typically cover one year or less However: the increasing environmental complexity and dynamism of recent years has severely tested the concept of “long-term” planning Plans are subject to frequent revisions Most executives would likely agree that these complexities adn uncertainties challenge how er actually go about planning and how far ahead we can really plan At the very least we can conclude that there is a lot less permanency to long term plans today and that tey are subject to frequent revision Managment reaeracher Eillot Jaques believes tha people vary in their capability to think with different time horizons Types of Plans used by Managers (3 of 5) Strategic plans Set broad, comprehensive and linger term action directions for teh entire organization or major division Vision Clarifies purpose of the organization and what it hopes to be on the future Typical plans Specify how the organizations resources are used to implement strategy Tactical plans in business often take the form of functional plans Functional plans Incidate how different component within the organiztion will help accompnlish the overall strategy Production plans Finacial plans Facilites Plans Logisitc plans Marketing plans Human Resource Plans Operation plans Describe short-term activities to implement strategic plans Policies: Are standing plans that communicate guidelines for decisions Ex: Policies on office romances: The media is quick to report when a top executive or public figures runs into trouble over an office affair. Are there ant policies on office romances? Employer polices on office raltioshiis vary. One survey find teh following: 24% prohibit relationships among employees in the same department 13% prohibit relationships among employees who have the smae supervisor 80% prohibit relationships between supervisors and subordinates 5% have no restrictions on office romances Procedures: Are rules that describe actions to be taken in specific situations Budgets: are single use plans that commit resources to projects or activities Zero based budgets: allocate resources as if each budget were brand new There is no guarantee that any past funding will be renwer. All propsales, old and new, must compete for available funds at teh start of each new budget cycle Forcasting Attempts to predict the future Qualitaive forecasting uses expert opinions Quantitative forecasting uses mathematical models and statiscal aanylsis of historical data dna surveys Contingency planning Identify alternative course of action to take when things go wrong Anticipate changing conditions Contain trigger points to indicate when to activate plan (or a specific course of action) Scenario planning A long term version of contingency planning Identifying alternative future scenarios Plans made for each future scenario Increases organizations flexibility and preparation for future shocks Benchmarking Use of external and internal comparisons to better evaluate current performance Adopting best practices: things people adn organization do that lead to superior performance Staff Planners Experts who assist in all steps of the planning process They help bring focus and expertise to a wide variety of planning tasks Important: Communication between staff planers landline managers is essential for teh success of teh planning process Goal Setting - Always set SMART goal The solution: Goal Aligment Between Team Leader and Team Member Jonintly plan: Set objectives, set standards, choose actions Individually acy: Perform tasks (member), provide support (leader) Jointly control: Review results, discuss implications, renew cycle x4 Collective effort and commitment Participatroy planning Includes in all planning steps that people who will be affected by the plans adn askedd to help implement them Unloacks motivational potential of goal setting Management by objective (MBO) promotes participation Participation increases understanding and acceptance of plan and commitment to success Participatory planning - Number of people involved in teh decision making process Amazon is intensely focused on what it does. It believes in creating tight single-threaded teams, also known as “2 pizza team.” Data and Decision Making What are some of the important competencies managers must have today? Delegate Marketing and technology Manager must have Technological competency Ability to understand new technologies and to use them to their best advantage Information competency Ability to locate, gather, organize and display information for decision-making and problem solving Analytical competency Ability to evaluate and analyze information to make actual decisions and solve real problems What is the difference between Data and Information Data Raw facts and observation Information Data made useful and meaningful for decision-making Important concepts Big data Exists in huge quantities and is difficult to process without sophisticated mathematical and analytical techniques Data production today Bernard Marr is an internationally best-selling author. He helps organizations improve their business performance, use data more intelligently Data mining The process of analyzing data to produce useful information for decision-makers Management Analytics The systematic evaluation and analysis of data to make informed decision Information drives management Bad Data Refers to information that can be erroneous, misleading, and without general formatting The challenge: Can er use the data that is available in the “Big Data” Needs to be valid Can not trust everything out there Being ethical Look at the trends Data is structured and unstructured Data BIg Data = Structured + Unstructured Information Drive Management decision making What are the characteristics of useful information Easy to access If its credible Accurate Characteristics of useful information: Timely High quality Complete Relevant Understandable What about bad data It's not credible Miss information If it is not structured/ organized Bias based on opinions Confusing If its updated Bad data Refers to information that can be erroneous miss What are some examples of Management information system Business intelligence -BI Information systems to extract and report data in organized ways that are useful to decision-makers Executive dashboards Visually update and display key performance metrics (or Key Performance Indicators -KPIs) and information on a real-time basis Information needs in organization External Environment Information exchanges with the external environment Gather intelligence information Provide public information Information needs within the organizations (internal Enviroement) Information exchange within the organization Facilitate decision making Facilitate problem-solving Managers as information processors Continually gather, share and receive information Now as much electronic as it is face-to-face Always on, always connected How many people telecommute at least once a week 70% of people globally work remotely at least once a week, Work at home after covid 19 our forecast Our best estimate it that 25-30% of the workforce will be working form home multiple days a week by the end of 2021 As of 2023, 12.7% of full time employees work from home, while 28.2% work a hybrid model Managers as problem solvers Problem-solving The process of identifying a discrepancy between actual and desired performance and taking action to resolve it Ishikawa Fishbone diagram To identify the cause of problems Decision A choice among possible alternative courses of action Performance threat Something is wrong or has the potential to go wrong Performance opportunity The situation offers the chance for a better future if the right steps are taken Problem-solving approaches or style - from textbook Problem avoiders Inactive in information gathering and solving problems Problem seekers Proactive in anticipation of problems and opportunities and taking appropriate action to gain an advantage Problem solvers Reactive in gathering information and solving problem Managers - can approach problems in a systematic or intuitive manner Systematic thinking approaches problem in rational, step-by-step and analytical fashion Intuitive thinking approaches problems in a flexible and spontaneous fashion Multidimensional thinking- applies both intuitive and systematic thinking Managers face structured and unstructured problems Structure problems Are ones that are familiar, straight forward, and clear with respect to information needs Program decisions apply solutions that are readily available from past experiences to solve structured problems Know how to solve them Familiar Know what we are dealing with Unstructured problems Are ones that are full of ambiguities and information deficiencies Nonprogrammed decisions apply a specific solution to meet the demands of a unique problem Commonly faced by higher-level management Crisis decision making A crisis involves an unexpected problem that can lead to disaster if not resolved quickly and appropriately Ruled for crisis management Figure out what is going on Remember that speed matters Remember that slow counts, too Respect the danger of the unfamiliar Value the skeptic Be ready to “fight fire with fire” Managers make decisions with various amounts of information Certain environment Offers complete information on possible action alternatives and their consequences Risk environment Lacks complete information but offers probabilities of the likely outcomes for possible action alternatives Uncertain environment Lacks so much information that it is difficult to assign probabilities to the likely outcomes of alternative Ex: Certain and uncertain environments: The worldwide Governance Indicators for over 200 countries, comparing distinct environments (Canada-Brazil) Step 1-Identify and define the problem Focuses on information gathering information processing and deliberation Decision objectives should be established What are some common mistakes in definding problems? Common mistakes in defining problems Defining the problem too broadly or too narrowly Focusing on symptoms instead of causes Choosing the wrong problem to deal with Step 2- Generate and Evaluate Alternative Courses of Action Potential solutions are formulated and more information is gathered, data are analyzed, the advantages and disadvantages of alternative solutions are identified Common mistakes: Abandoning the search for alternatives too quickly Step 3- Decide on a preferred course of Action Two different approaches Behavioural model leads to satisficing decisions Classical model les to optimising decisions Behavioural Model Rationality is bounded because: There are limits our thinks capacity Available information (incomplete) Time constraints Step 4-Implement the decision Involves taking action to make sure the solution decided upon becomes a reality Managers need to have the willingness and ability to implement action plans Problems: Lack of participation error should be avoided Step 5 - Evaluate Results Involves comparing actual and desired results The positive and negative consequences of the chosen course of action should be examined If actual results fall short desire results, the manager returns to earlier steps in the decision-making process At all steps, check ethical reasoning Ask these spotlight questions Utility Does teh decision satisfy all constituents or stakeholders Rights Does the description respect the rights and duties of everyone? Justice Is the decision consistent with the canons of justice Caring Is the decision consistent with my responsibilities to care? Issues in decision-making How do errors happen? Heuristics: are strategies for simplifying decision-making Availability Bias: Bases a decision on recent information or events Representativeness bias: Bases a decision on similarity to other situations Anchoring and Adjustment Bias: Bases a decision on incremental adjustment from a prior decision point Framing error: Tring to solve a problem in the context perceived, positive or negative Confirmation Error: Focusing on information that confirms a decision already made Escalating commitment: Continuing a course of action even though it is not working Creative Decision making Creativity is the generation of a novel idea or unique approach that solves a problem or crafts an opportunity Big C: Creativity occurs when extraordinary things are done by exceptional people Little C: Creativity occurs when average people come up with unique ways to deal with daily events and situations The three types of situational creativity drivers Chapter review What are objectives and goals? The specific results or desired outcomes What are the 5 characteristics of great (SMART) goals? Forecasting - Attempts Qualitative forecasting uses options Quantitative forecasting uses mathematical models and statistical analysis of historical data and surveys Scenarios-Oracle’s crystal ball combines qualitative and quantitative methods

Days of the week

days of the week!

Days of the week

110.31.b.17.C

Topic: Reading/Vocabulary Development

STAAR English II High School 2014 - Past Paper

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