FINALS IN FUNDAMENTALS OF FABM 2: PART I

Reading Passage: The Anatomy of a Kill Chain In the lexicon of modern warfare, the term "kill chain" describes the end-to-end process of a military attack, from the initial identification of a target to its eventual destruction and the subsequent evaluation of the strike's effectiveness. Conceptually, the kill chain is a structural model used to understand and optimize the speed and precision of military operations. The fundamental principle of this model is that an attack functions as a sequence of interdependent stages; if any single link in the chain is broken, the entire operation fails. For strategic planners, this creates a dual objective: to accelerate one's own kill chain while simultaneously finding ways to disrupt the adversary's. Strategic Concept: The Kinetic Model (F2T2EA) The traditional military kill chain is often summarized by the acronym F2T2EA, representing a continuous cycle of find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. The kinetic kill chain begins with Find, the reconnaissance phase where intelligence assets identify a potential target within a theater of operations. Once found, the process moves to Fix, which involves pinning down the target's specific location and ensuring it can be distinguished from friendly forces or non-combatants. Track follows, maintaining a persistent watch on the target's movements to prevent its escape. In the Target phase, commanders select the appropriate weapon system and verify the legality and strategic value of the strike. Engage is the kinetic moment—the actual deployment of ordnance against the objective. Finally, Assess involves battle damage assessment (BDA) to determine if the desired effects were achieved or if further engagement is required. This model emphasizes "compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline," meaning the faster a military can move through these steps, the more lethal it becomes. The Evolution: The Cyber Kill Chain® As warfare expanded into the digital domain, Lockheed Martin adapted the kinetic model into the Cyber Kill Chain. This framework assists defenders in identifying and stopping Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Unlike a physical missile, a cyberattack often unfolds over weeks or months, but the sequential logic remains the same. The model consists of seven distinct stages: Stage Description of Attacker Activity 1. Reconnaissance The harvesting of information. Attackers research targets via social media, public records, and technical scanning to find vulnerabilities. 2. Weaponization Coupling a remote access trojan with an exploit into a deliverable payload (e.g., a malicious PDF or Microsoft Office document). 3. Delivery Transmission of the weapon to the target environment. Common vectors include email attachments, malicious websites, or USB drives. 4. Exploitation The weapon triggers. The code executes on the victim's system, typically by taking advantage of a software or operating system vulnerability. 5. Installation The attacker installs a persistent backdoor or malware on the victim's system, allowing them to maintain access even after a reboot. 6. Command & Control (C2) The compromised system opens a communication channel back to the attacker's server, allowing the intruder to give manual instructions. 7. Actions on Objective The final stage where the attacker achieves their goal, such as data exfiltration, encryption for ransom, or destruction of critical infrastructure. Strategic Implications for Defense The strategic value of the Cyber Kill Chain lies in its ability to provide a roadmap for "proactive defense." By understanding the sequence, security professionals can implement controls at every stage. For instance, robust email filtering can break the chain at the Delivery stage, while endpoint detection can stop the Installation phase. Crucially, the earlier a defender breaks the chain, the lower the cost of mitigation and the lower the risk of damage. If an attacker is stopped during Reconnaissance, they have gained nothing. If they are stopped during Actions on Objective, the damage may already be catastrophic. In both kinetic and cyber environments, the goal is the same: to create a "defensive depth" that makes the cost of a successful attack prohibitively high for the adversary.

MYTH The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine. FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to force the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than nine million. The British limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine when, in 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some thirty-five thousand square miles—to create a new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine. By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres to Jews. This contradicted Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that “the Administration of Palestine…shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency…close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.”2 Ultimately, the British admitted that the argument about the country’s absorptive capacity was specious. The Peel Commission said, “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled. FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The British restricted Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s “absorptive capacity.” During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease, and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 83,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti-Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one-third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within ten years and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95% of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigration to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936 observed, “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is…due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH The British changed their policy to allow Holocaust survivors to settle in Palestine. FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many smuggled in on dilapidated ships organized by the Haganah. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, sixty-five “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps on Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, and 28,000 remained imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH As the Jewish population grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened. FACT In July 1921, Hasan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa and president of the Muslim National Associations, sent a telegram to the British government in reaction to a delegation of Palestinians that went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Shukri wrote: We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.13 The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non-Jewish population rose by 588,000.14 The permanent Arab population increased by 120% between 1922 and 1947.15 This rapid growth of the Arab population was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37% of the total immigration to pre-state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.16 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.17 The Arab population increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922–1947, the non-Jewish population increased by 290% in Haifa, 131% in Jerusalem, and 158% in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42% in Nablus, 78% in Jenin, and 37% in Bethlehem.18 MYTH Jews stole Arab land. FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. From the beginning of World War I, however, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. About 80% of the Palestinian Arabs were debt-ridden peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins.19 Jews went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap, and—most important—without tenants. In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” He insisted that “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” Instead, he advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”20 Jews only began to purchase cultivated land after buying all the uncultivated territory. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.21 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed, “They [the Jews] paid high prices for the land and, in addition, they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”22 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness for the British government and offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80% were ruled invalid by the government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the government land offer.23 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by local Palestinian leaders who were later joined by Arab volunteers led by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.24 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased…There was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”25 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living, and ample employment opportunities.26 It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original). —Transjordan’s king Abdullah27 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938 (which began in April 1936 with the murder of two Jews by Arabs and the subsequent murder of two Arab workers by members of the Jewish underground28), the British high commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.29 The Jews paid exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”30 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 were acquired from the mandatory government, 30,000 were bought from various churches, and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73% of Jewish plots were purchased from large landowners, not poor fellahin.31 Many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, and the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem, and s sold land to the Jews. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews.32 MYTH The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews. FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini first began to organize fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. El-Husseini hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.33 Arab radicals gained influence because the British administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they began a revolt against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” The British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the military administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with el-Husseini in 1920, a few days before Easter, and told him that “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world…that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine administration but in Whitehall.” He added that “if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General [Louis] Bols [chief administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General [Edmund] Allenby [commander of the Egyptian force, 1917–19, then high commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”34 El-Husseini took the colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of el-Husseini’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. He escaped, however, and was sentenced to ten years in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon el-Husseini and to appoint him Mufti (a cleric in charge of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places). By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years. They were released a few months later.35 Samuel met with el-Husseini on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left forty-three Jews dead.36 El-Husseini consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools, and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute that “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”37 The Mufti’s henchmen also ensured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians who discussed cooperation with the Jews from rival clans. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, el-Husseini did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.38 The Arabs found rioting an effective political tool because of the lax British response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British prevented Jews from protecting themselves but made little effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: The Arabs feared being displaced by the Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs learned they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging riots. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy.”39 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was an excuse for their attacks on Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by economics, the radical Islamic views of the Mufti, and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs convinced the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic still used today to incite violence). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a pretext for rioting by Arabs against Jews, which spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British administration made no effort to prevent the violence, and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, most of Hebron’s Jews had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.40 After the riots, the British ordered an investigation, resulting in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the mandatory government’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy.”41 This meant it was necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. MYTH The Mufti was not a Nazi collaborator. FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler fifteen drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. He also asked the Axis powers to “accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the interest of the Arabs, and by the same method that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”42 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.” He added, “The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely…the Jews.” Hitler told the Mufti he opposed the creation of a Jewish state and that Germany’s objective was destroying the Jewish element in the Arab sphere.43 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting twenty thousand Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut where he died in 1974. MYTH The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a deliberate terror campaign against civilians. FACT British troops seized the Jewish Agency compound on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were arrested. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. In response to the British provocations, and a desire to demonstrate that the Jews’ spirit could not be broken, the United Resistance Movement planned to bomb the King David Hotel, which housed the British military command and the Criminal Investigation Division in addition to hotel guests. The Haganah pulled out of the plot and left it up to the Irgun. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties and the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed on July 22, 1946, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. The call to the hotel was received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying, “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”44 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the main part of the hotel were injured.45 For decades, the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament provided the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.46 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which Arab leaders hailed as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.47 1 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172

rural- (adj) relating to farm areas and life in the country syn- countrified, pastoral 16. substantial- (adj) large, important; major, significant; prosperous; not imaginary, material syn- considerable, tangible, big 17. tactful- (adj) skilled in handling difficult situations or people, polite syn- skillful, discrete 18. tamper- (v) to interfere with; to handle in a secret and improper way syn- monkey with, fool with, mess with 19. ultimate- (adj) last, final; most important or extreme; eventual; basic, fundamental syn- farthest, furthest, terminal 20. uncertainty- (n) doubt, the state of being unsure syn- doubtfulness, unsurenessanecdote- (n) a short account of an incident in someone’s life syn- tale, sketch, vignette, yarn 2. consolidate- (v) to combine, unite; to make solid or firm syn- strengthen, firm up, merge 3. counterfeit- (n) an imitation designed to deceive; (adj) not genuine, fake; (v) to make an illegal copy syn- (adj) fake, phony, bogus 4. docile- (adj) easily taught, led, or managed; obedient syn- manageable, teachable, pliant 5. dominate- (v) to rule over by strength or power, control; to tower over, command due to height syn- govern, overlook 6. entreat- (v) to beg, implore, ask earnestly syn- plead, appeal to 7. fallible- (adj) capable of being wrong, mistaken, or inaccurate syn- errant, flawedfickle- (adj) liable to change very rapidly, erratic, marked by a lack of constancy or steadiness, inconsistent syn- inconstant, faithless 9. fugitive- (n) one who flees or runs away; (adj) fleeting, lasting a very short time; difficult to grasp syn- (n) deserter; (adj) elusive 10. grimy- (adj) very dirty, covered with dirt or soot syn- filthy, sooty, soiled, dirt-encrusted 11. iota- (n) a very small part or quantity syn- speck, dab, job, bit, smidgen 12. maul- (v) to beat or knock about, handle roughly; to mangle; (n) a heavy hammer syn- (v) manhandle, batter 13. potential- (adj) possible, able to happen; (n) something that can develop or become a reality syn- (n) possibility, capability 14. radiant- (adj) shining, bright; giving forth light or energy syn- glowing, brilliant, dazzling, resplendent

Il produttore che decide di usare degli intermediari per organizzare la distribuzione dei suoi prodotti, deve decidere quanti usarne per ciascun livello, Esistono 3 possibili strategie di copertura: La distribuzione intensiva ➠ l'impresa cerca il maggior numero possibile di punti vendita per il proprio prodotto e tende a moltiplicare i centri di stoccaggio per assicurare la massima copertura dell'area di vendita e la massima esposizione per la marca; si adatta ai prodotti di acquisto corrente e ai servizi di facile esecuzione. es. i Pocket Coffee che sono venduti ovunque sia possibile. Vantaggi: massimizza la disponibilità del prodotto e consente di generare una quota di mercato consistente grazie all'elevata esposizione della marca ai potenziali clienti. Rischi: il volume d'affari può differire da un distributore all'altro, mentre il costo di contatto è identico per ogni intermediario, l'aumento del costo di distribuzione può compromettere la redditività. Quando il prodotto è distribuito in larga misura in punti vendita molteplici e differenziati, l'impresa rischia di: perdere il controllo della sua strategia di marketing, non riuscire a prevenire la concorrenza sleale in fatto di prezzi, una riduzione della qualità del servizio e la mancanza di collaborazione. Infine questa distribuzione è spesso incompatibile con la salvaguardia di un'immagine di marca coerente e di un posizionamento preciso nel mercato. La distribuzione selettiva ➠ Il produttore ricorre, in una determinata area geografica, a un numero di intermediari inferiore rispetto al numero di intermediari disponibili; è indicata per i prodotti il cui acquisto è ponderato e non frequente (shopping good), e per I quali il cliente procede a un confronto tra i vari prezzi e tra le varie caratteristiche delle offerte presenti sul mercato.es. Burberry distribuisce i suoi prodotti di abbigliamento in negozi specializzati, accuratamente selezionati. Questa distribuzione può scaturire dal rifiuto di una parte di dettaglianti di accettare il prodotto nel proprio assortimento, perché si abbia distribuzione selettiva voluta dal produttore, deve essere quest'ultimo a selezionare i propri intermediari; esistono diversi possibili criteri di scelta: La dimensione del distributore, misurata dal suo volume d'affari, costituisce il criterio più usato. La qualità del servizio offerto; alcuni distributori sono in grado di svolgere alcune funzioni in modo più efficace di altri. La competenza tecnica e l'attrezzatura aggiornata del distributore sono criteri importanti soprattutto nel caso dei prodotti complessi, per i quali la qualità dell'assistenza post vendita è fondamentale. Optando per questa distribuzione si accetta di limitare la disponibilità della propria offerta, onde ridurre i costi di distribuzione e ottenere una migliore collaborazione da parte degli intermediari, questa collaborazione ha diverse forme: la partecipazione alle spese di pubblicità e di promozione; l'inserimento di prodotti nuovi o non richiesti, il mantenimento di un livello minimo di scorte ecc.. Rischi: non garantire una copertura sufficiente del mercato, il produttore deve assicurarsi che il cliente finale sia in grado di identificare facilmente il distributore, altrimenti la ridotta disponibilità conduce a perdite di opportunità di vendita; l'impresa è praticamente obbligata a scegliere un canale di tipo indiretto breve. La distribuzione esclusiva e I sisterni di franchising ➠ in una zona predeterminata, un solo distributore ottiene il diritto esclusivo di vendere la marca e s'impegna a non vendere marche concorrenti della stessa categoria di prodotti.es. Louis Vuitton distribuisce i suoi prodotti in negozi esclusivi: a ogni punto vendita viene assegnata una zona in cui nessun altro è autorizzato a rappresentare la marca. Vantaggi: differenzia il proprio prodotto con una politica di alta qualità, di prestigio, la collaborazione con distributori esclusivi facilita la realizzazione dei programmi di servizio al cliente del produttore. Vantaggi e inconvenienti sono gli stessi della distribuzione selettiva, ma accentuati. Una forma particolare è il franchising ➠forma di marketing verticale contrattuale integrato che fa riferimento a un sistema completo di distribuzione dei beni e dei servizi. Esso implica una relazione contrattuale continua in cui l'impresa affiliante (franchisor) dà ai suoi affiliati (franchisee) il privilegio di vendere il proprio prodotto o servizio che è molto conosciuto. Il franchisee accetta di pagare una quota iniziale e/o royalties calcolate sulle vendite e di ricevere assistenza e servizi dal franchisor;Il franchisee acquista il diritto di utilizzare una formula di successo e beneficia del supporto e delle conoscenze del franchisor. Caratteristiche di un franchising efficace: si commercializza un prodotto o servizio di alta qualità,la domanda del prodotto o servizio è universale,viene offerto servizio ed assistenza iniziale e continuativi, vengono specificati il canone iniziale e le royalty, coinvolge il franchisee nella gestione e sviluppo del sistema, specifica procedure di rinnovo, annullamento e proroga del contratto. La classificazione dei beni di consumo La scelta della strategia migliore per un dato prodotto dipende dalle caratteristiche del prodotto stesso e dall'obiettivo perseguito dall'impresa nell'ambiente competitivo in cui opera, si stabilisce una distinzione fra 4 sottogruppi: 1) I prodotti d'acquisto corrente (convenience good) sono i beni che il consumatore acquista con il minimo sforzo possibile, di frequente e in piccole quantità, adottando un comportamento d'acquisto abitudinario. Questa categoria può essere suddivisa in: prodotti di prima necessità: sono acquistati regolarmente e includono la maggior parte dei prodotti alimentari, l'acquisto è facilitato dalla fedeltà alla marca e dalla pubblicità ripetitiva. prodotti d'impulso: vengono acquistati senza alcuna premeditazione (patatine);devono essere disponibili in più negozi; la confezione e gli espositori sono importanti per la loro vendita. prodotti d'urgenza: vengono acquistati per soddisfare un bisogno inaspettato e urgente, vanno acquistati nel momento del bisogno quindi devono essere disponibili in diversi tipi di punti vendita (cerotti, disinfettanti ecc.); per questi prodotti, l'impresa non ha scelta: è necessaria la massima copertura del mercato perché, se il cliente non trova il prodotto o la marca desiderata nel momento e nel luogo in cui vuole acquistarla, sceglierà un'altra marca. 2) I prodotti di acquisto ragionato (shopping good) sono prodotti per i qualí si percepisce un livello elevato di rischio, per cui i consumatori investono tempo e impegno per confrontare le caratteristiche di prodotti alternativi, in base a criteri come la qualità, il prezzo, lo stile ecc. es. mobili, abiti... prodotti a prezzo elevato e a bassa frequenza d'acquisto. In questi casi, i clienti potenziali si recano in vari punti vendita prima di decidere l'acquisto e il personale di vendita esercita un'influenza notevole sulla decisione finale. Per questi prodotti è indicata la distribuzione selettiva, in quanto serve la collaborazione del dettagliante e l'ubicazione adeguata del punto vendita. 3) I prodotti esclusivi (specialty good) sono prodotti con caratteristiche uniche; all'acquisto di tali beni il consumatore è pronto a dedicare molti sforzi, si tratta di marche di prodotti di lusso es. auto, alta moda ecc. Per questi prodotti, i clienti non procedono a confronti tra le marche: cercano il punto vendita dove è disponibile il prodotto o la marca desiderata. Il fattore determinante è la fedeltà al prodotto o alla marca, per il produttore di un bene specifico, la distribuzione esclusiva rappresenta la migliore soluzione. 4) I prodotti non ricercati sono quelli che i clienti non conoscono, o quelli che sono noti ma non c'è interesse spontaneo, rientrano, per esempio, apparecchiature per il controllo della temperatura o assicurazioni sulla vita. Questi prodotti non ricercati richiedono sforzi di vendita notevoli e la collaborazione dell'intermediario è indispensabile. 16.6 Le politiche di comunicazione nella rete distributiva Per conseguire gli obiettivi di marketing dell'impresa, è necessaria la collaborazione dei distributori. Per ottenere tale impegno da parte degli intermediari, l'impresa può scegliere 2 politichecomunicative: Le politiche push Consiste nel concentrare gli sforzi di comunicazione e di promozione sugli intermediari, in modo da stimolarli a collaborare con l'azienda, inserire il prodotto nei loro assortimenti, immagazzinarlo in quantità consistenti e garantirgli lo spazio di vendita adeguato. L'obiettivo è quello di sollecitare la collaborazione volontaria del distributore che, a seconda degli incentivi e delle condizioni di vendita che gli vengono proposti (margini elevati, sconti sulle quantità, pubblicità nel punto vendita, budget promozionali, distribuzioni gratuite), tenderà a privilegiare il nostro prodotto, quindi è indispensabile un programma di incentivi. Il rischio di questa strategia è che potrebbe rendere l'impresa dipendente dall'intermediario, che ne controlla l'accesso al mercato. Le politiche pull Consiste nel tagliare fuori gli intermediari e cercare di costruire la domanda dell'impresa rivolgendosi direttamente ai potenziali consumatori nel segmento target. L'obiettivo comunicativo è quello di creare una forte domanda da parte del consumatore finale e di sviluppare la fedeltà alla marca in modo che il distributore sia costretto a inserirla nel proprio assortimento, per soddisfare le richieste del consumatore. Sono necessarie spese sulla comunicazione in pubblicità sui media, promozioni ai consumatori e altri mezzi di mkt diretto, se si ha successo, il produttore avrà il potere d'influenzare i partecipanti al canale distributivo e di indurli a prendere in carico la marca.. Procter & Gamble adotta una politica pull per lanciare i nuovi prodotti. Però questa politica richiede ingenti risorse finanziarie per coprire i costi delle campagne pubblicitarie, si tratta di costi fissi mentre adottando una politica push, i costi sono proporzionali ai volumi di vendita e diventano più sostenibili, in particolare per le piccole imprese. Una politica pull va considerata un investimento a lungo termine: l'obiettivo dell'impresa è quello di creare un capitale di reputazione, il cosiddetto "brand equity". In pratica le due politiche di comunicazione sono utilizzate insieme. 16.7 L'analisi dei costi di distribuzione I costi di distribuzione sono misurati dalla differenza tra il prezzo unitario di vendita pagato dal consumatore finale e il prezzo pagato al produttore dal primo acquirente. Il margine di distribuzione s'identifica dunque con il concetto di valore aggiunto del canale distributivo. Laddove più intermediari intervengono nel processo distributivo, il margine di distribuzione è costituito dalla somma dei margini del diversi Intermediari. I margini di distribuzione Si esprime in termini percentuali, si calcola sia in rapporto al costo d'acquisto (C), sia in rapporto al prezzo di vendita (P). Si parla di margine di distribuzione (D) come di mark-up (o "ricarico") e di"sconto". Abbiamo diverse formule di calcolo: Costi di distribuzione (CD) ➨ CD = Pcf - Ppa Pcf = prezzo pagato dal consumatore finale Ppa = prezzo pagato al produttore dal primo acquirente Margine di distribuzione (MD) = volume d’affari del canale (VA) MD = ∑ md n md = Pv - Pa n = margini dei diversi intermediari In un sistema di distribuzione indiretto, il margine di distribuzione è uguale alla somma dei margini dei distributori IL MARGINE DEL DISTRIBUTORE (D) = prezzo di vendita - costo d'acquisto = D = P - C IL MARGINE DI DISTRIBUZIONE IN PERCENTUALE sul prezzo di vendita (sconto): D* = P-C / P sul costo di acquisto (mark-up): D° = P-C / C REGOLE DI EQUIVALENZA D*= D° /1 + D° D° = D* /1 - D* Calcolo del prezzo di vendita al cliente Costo di acquisto = 90€; Sconto = 25% Prezzo di vendita al dettaglio = 90€/ (1 - 0,25) = 90€/0,75 = 120€ I margini di distribuzione sono espressi in relazione al prezzo di vendita, ma la prassi può variare fra un settore e l'altro e fra un'impresa e l'altra, inoltre dipende dalla posizione occupata dall'intermediario nella rete e remunera la funzione o le funzioni esercitate. In alcuni casi, l'intermediario beneficia di più margini. Confronto tra prezzo di listino, di fattura e finale I margini di distribuzione costituiscono solo una parte del margine totale, bisogna distinguere tra; ➤prezzo di listino è il prezzo ufficiale, pubblicato nel tariffario o nel listino dell'azienda. ➤prezzo di fattura è il prezzo di listino al netto delle deduzioni "in fattura" che andrebbero conteggiate in aggiunta allo sconto standard per il distributore, per esempio, di sconti speciali al distributore, sconti all'utente finale e promozioni in fattura. ➤prezzo finale è il prezzo di fattura senza le deduzioni "aggiunte fuori fattura", come lo sconto per i pagamenti in contanti, i costi del conto clienti, le indennità, i rimborsi, i programmi promozionali fuori fattura e le spese di spedizione, inoltre confezioni speciali o supporto tecnico.. sottraendo dal prezzo finale il costo di questi servizi si ottiene il margine finale, ossia la misura della redditività del prodotto. Confronto fra costi di distribuzione Il margine di distribuzione remunera le funzioni e i compiti della distribuzione assunti dagli intermediari. Nel canale indiretto lungo, la maggior parte dei compiti fisici di distribuzione (stoccaggio e trasporto) sono svolti dai grossisti e i costi sono proporzionali al volume d'affari del fabbricante e coperti dal margine del grossista e del distributore. Il produttore deve mantenere un servizio commerciale minimo, con spese fisse a suo carico ridotte però l'impresa esercita un controllo scarso sull'organizzazione di vendita. Nel canale indiretto breve, la quota di spese fisse diventa preponderante rispetto al costo totale di distribuzione; il fabbricante deve sostenere le spese della distribuzione fisica, organizzare una rete di magazzini e un'amministrazione delle vendite, sugli oneri finanziari prodotti dalla gestione delle scorte e del conto vendita della clientela, come pure la funzione di vendita. L'adozione di questo canale implica per il fabbricante, un rischio finanziario maggiore, però l'impresa è in grado di esercitare un miglior controllo sulla propria organizzazione commerciale, essendo in contatto diretto con la domanda finale. L'indice di redditività di ciascuno di essi si calcolerà nel modo seguente: R = volume d'affari - costi di distribuzione /costi di distribuzione dove R rappresenta una valutazione dell'indice di redditività previsto, tenendo conto dell'insieme dei costi che ogni canale comporta.

Quiz su questo testo: L’induismo, con i suoi 900 milioni di fedeli, è la terza religione del mondo, dopo il cristianesimo e l’islam. Il termine induismo è stato inventato dagli europei per designare la religione degli indù, i quali invece definiscono le loro tradizioni religiose con il termine sanatana dharma, “il dharma eterno”. Più che una religione, infatti, l’induismo è un insieme di tante tradizioni religiose, nate intorno al XX a.C. e accomunate da alcune credenze fondamentali. • Brahman (Dio) è lo spirito supremo, eterno, immutabile e impersonale, che si manifesta nel mondo attraverso molte divinità, in particolare quelle che formano la Trimurti: Brahma, che crea il mondo, Vishnu, che lo conserva, e Shiva, che lo distrugge e lo ricrea. La vita del mondo, infatti, come la vita dell’uomo, attraversa varie fasi: nascita, morte e rinascita. • Atman (anima) è una particella del Brahman presente negli uomini, negli animali e nelle cose. • Dharma (ordine) è la legge eterna che garantisce l’armonia nell’universo, nella natura, nella società e nella morale. Ognuno deve obbedire al proprio dharma, che corrisponde all’insieme dei doveri della propria casta. • Karma (azione) indica sia l’azione sia la conseguenza dell’azione. Secondo la legge del karma, ogni azione, come ogni parola o pensiero, è la conseguenza di un’azione precedente e la causa di una successiva. Le azioni positive, cioè che rispettano il dharma, producono effetti positivi e quelle negative, cioè contrarie al dharma, producono effetti negativi nella vita attuale o in quella successiva. • Samsara (trasmigrazione) è il ciclo di morte e rinascita. Quando l’uomo muore, il suo atman s’introduce in un feto e rinasce in un’altra persona. La reincarnazione avviene sulla base delle azioni compiute nella vita precedente: chi si è comportato bene rinasce in una casta superiore, chi si è comportato male in una casta inferiore oppure in un animale. • Moksha (liberazione) è la salvezza finale, che si realizza quando l’atman, invece di trasmigrare in un altro corpo, si libera dal ciclo delle rinascite e si ricongiunge con il Brahman.

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