French Commands - Imperative

Chapter 7 - Review Data and Decision Making *Glow bus due at midnight, name and student number: answer questions using content in class People have created wonderful things for centuries, and management Management can be traced as far back as 500 bc when the ancient Sumerians used written records to improve government and business activities Why is it important to lean from the past Not to repeat our mistakes Classical management approaches Scientific management Administrative Principles Bureaucratic organisation Behavioural Management Approaches Follett’s Organizations as communities The Hawthorne studies Maslow’s theory of human needs Mcgregor’s Theory x and Theory Y Argyris Personality and organisation Modern Management foundations Organises as systems Contingency thinking Quality management Quantitative and analysis and tools Evidence-based management Contributions Frederick Taylor - Father of Scientific management He noticed that workers often did their jobs with wasted motions and without a constant approach. His resulted in inefficiency and low performance He believed the problem could be fixed if workers were taught to do their jobs in the best ways and ten were helped and guided by supervisors Four guiding principles of scientific management Rules of motion, standardized work and proper working conditions Select workers with the right abilities Train workers and give them incentives Support workers by planning and smoothing the way as they do their work Frank and Lillian Gilbreth Pioneered use of motitono studies as a management tool In one famous case, the gilbreaths cut down the number of motions used by bricklayers adn tripled their productivity Contributions from scientific management Make results-based compensation a performance incentive Carefully design jobs with efficient work methods Carefully select workers with the ability to perform the job Trian workers to execute activities to the best of their abilities Train supervisors to support workers so they can perform jobs to the best of their abilities Classical Management Adiminstative principle (Henro Fayol) 1919, after a career in French industry, Henri F published “adminisration Industrielle et Generale” (General and industrial management) in which we out like his views on the management of organiztion and workers Rules and duties in management Foresight - to complete a plan of action for the future Organization - To provide and mobilize resources to implement the plan Common- to lead, select and evaluate workers to get the best work toward the plan Coordination- to fit diverse efforts together and ensure information is shared and problems solved Control- to make sure things happen according to plan and to take necessary corrective action Classical management Bureacratic organiztion (Max Weber) Max weber (Bureaucrativ organization) - late 19th century German political economist who had a major impact in the fields of management and sociology Bureaucratic Organization An ideal, intentionally rational adn very efficient form of organization Based on the principles of logic, order and legitimate authority Characteristics of BO Clear division of labour Clear hierarchy of authority Formal rules and procedure Impersonality Careers based on merit What are some disadvantages of bureaucracy Takes a long time for problems to become solved bec there are procedures and there is a chain of people in command Having the power Rules have to follow Excessive paperwork or “red tape” Slowness in handling problems Rigidity in the face of shifting needs Resistance to change Employee apathy Behavioural Management Approaches (focus on understanding the elements that affect human behaviour in organisations) Follett’s Organizations as communites Mary park follett contributed to the transition from classical thinking inot behavioural management Groups and human cooperation Groups allow individuales too combine their talents for a greater good Organizations are cooperating “communites” of managers adn workers Managers job is to help people copperate and achive an integration of goals and intrests Forward-looking managment insight: Making every emploee an owner creates a sense of collective responsibility Prescursor of employrr ownership, profit sharing and gain sharing Buniess problems invovle a varity of inter realted factors Prescursor of systems thinking Private profits realtive to public good Precursor of managerial ethics and social respinsibility Hawthorne studies Took place at western electric chicago plan, a tran led by Harvards Elton Mayo set out to learn how econmic incentives and workplace conditions affected workers output Maing objective Intial study examined how ecomoin incentives adn physical conditions affected worker output (productivity) No consistent relationship found During experientmetn they had 2 groups The expertiant groups (impoved wokring ocnditions ) The control group ( no changes to original working conidtions) No consitant relationship found, perfomance in both groups increased even after removing incentives Social setting and human relations Concluded New “social setting” led workers to do good job Good “Human relations” = higher productivity The contect - The Great Depression (1929-1940) Employee attitudes and groups processes Osme thinsf satisifed some workers but not others People resticited output to adhere to groups norms (Avoid layoffs) Lessons from he hawthrone stufirs Social and human concerns are keys to prductivity Hawthrone effect - People who are singled out for special attention perform as expected Maslow’s Theory of human needs Human needs The work of psychologist Abraham Maslow in the area if human “needs,” also has had a major impact in the behavioual apporach to management Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs Self actualization needs Higherst level: need foe self fulfillment to grow and use abilites to fullest and most creative extent Esteem needs Needs fro esteem in eyes of others need for respect, prestige, recognition; need for self esteem, personal sense of competence, mastery Social needs Need for love, affection, sense of belongingness in ones relationship either other people Safett needs Need for security, protection and stability in teh events of day to day life Physiological needs Most basic of all human needs: need for biological maintence; food, water and phydical well being Principles Defict principle: A satidifed need is not a motivator of behaviour Progress principles: A need becomes a motivator once the preceding lower-level need is satisfied Both principles cease to operate at self actulilzation level McGregor’s Theories Thepry x assumes that workers; Dislike work Lack ambition Are irresponsible Resist change Prefer to be led Theoyry y assumes that workers are Willing to work Willing to accept responsibility Capable of self control Capable of self direction Imaginative and creative According to McGregor, Managers create: Self fulfilling prophecies Implications of Theory x and y Theory x managers: Create situations where workers become dependent, passive and reluctant Theory y managers create situations where workers respond with initiative and high performance Central to notions of empowerment and self management Argyris’s theory of adult personality Classical management principles and practices inhibit worker maturation and are inconsistent with the mature adult personality Management practices should accommodate the mature personality: Increasing task responsibility Increasing task variety Using participative decision making Modern Management Foundation Quantitative analysis and Tools Analytics: the use of large data bases and mathematics to solve problems and make informed decision using systematic analysis Organization as systems System Collection of interrelated parts that function together to achieve a common purpose Subsystem A smaller component of a larger system Open systems Organisations that interact with their environment Contingency thinking Tires to maths managerial responses with problem (situation) No “one best way” to manage The “appropriate way to to manage depends on the situations Quality management Qality anc competitive advantafe are linked Total quality managment (TQM) Comprehensive approach to contiou impovment on teh entire organization ISO certification Gloval quality management standards Refine and upgrade quality to meet ISO requirments Evidednce Based Managment Making management decision on “hard facts” about what really works

Land warfare is a complex domain that involves the application of military power on the ground to achieve political and strategic objectives. Modern military doctrine, such as that used by the U.S. Army and the Indian Army, categorizes these elements into Combat Power and the Principles of War. 1. The 8 Elements of Combat Power Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit can apply. It is typically broken down into eight key elements: ElementDescriptionLeadershipThe "multiplier" of all other elements. It provides purpose, direction, and motivation to soldiers.InformationEnables commanders to make informed decisions and creates opportunities to achieve results.Mission CommandThe system used to integrate the other elements. It focuses on decentralized execution based on the commander's intent.Movement & ManeuverThe movement of forces to gain a positional advantage over the enemy to deliver lethal or non-lethal effects.IntelligenceThe understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.FiresThe use of weapon systems (artillery, mortars, air support) to create specific lethal or non-lethal effects.SustainmentThe logistics required to maintain operations, including ammunition, fuel, food, and medical support.ProtectionThe preservation of the force so that the commander can apply maximum combat power.2. The Principles of War These are the enduring "rules of thumb" that guide how land forces are employed strategically and tactically: Objective: Direct every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable goal. Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. You cannot win by defending alone. Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time. Economy of Force: Allocate the minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts so you can "mass" elsewhere. Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible movement. Unity of Command: Ensure all forces operate under a single responsible commander toward a common objective. Security: Prevent the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage. Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, place, or in a manner for which they are unprepared. Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans to minimize confusion in the "fog of war." 3. The Modern Legal Framework Land warfare is also governed by the Law of Land Warfare (International Humanitarian Law), which rests on four pillars: Military Necessity: Actions must be necessary to achieve a legitimate military goal. Distinction: Forces must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (civilians). Proportionality: The anticipated harm to civilians must not be excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage gained. Unnecessary Suffering: Weapons and methods must not cause gratuitous or superfluous injury. Note: Contemporary land warfare is increasingly "Multi-Domain," meaning land forces must now integrate with cyber, space, and electronic warfare to be effective. , While land warfare uses many tools, the two primary "philosophies" of how to win a war are Attrition and Maneuver. Most modern conflicts are a spectrum of both, but understanding the pure form of each helps explain military strategy. 1. Attrition Warfare: The "Sledgehammer" Attrition warfare is a strategy where one side attempts to win by wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel, equipment, and supplies. Core Logic: "I have more than you." It assumes that if you can destroy the enemy’s resources faster than they can replace them, you will eventually win. Focus: Firepower and mass. Success is measured by "body counts," equipment destroyed, and the steady seizing of terrain. Command Style: Usually centralized and methodical. It requires strict synchronization of massive resources (artillery, logistics, manpower). Historical Example: The Battle of Verdun (WWI). German Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn famously stated his goal was to "bleed France white" by forcing them to defend a position they could not afford to lose, regardless of the cost in lives. 2. Maneuver Warfare: The "Scalpel" Maneuver warfare seeks to shatter the enemy’s moral and physical cohesion—their ability to act as a unified force—rather than simply destroying every soldier. Core Logic: "I am faster and more unpredictable than you." It aims to create a state of chaos where the enemy's leadership can no longer make effective decisions. Focus: Speed, surprise, and dislocation (forcing the enemy to be in the wrong place at the wrong time). The OODA Loop: Developed by Col. John Boyd, this is the heart of maneuver theory. It stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. The goal is to cycle through these steps faster than the enemy, essentially "getting inside" their decision-making process until they collapse from confusion. Historical Example: The 1940 Invasion of France (Blitzkrieg). Instead of fighting a line-by-line battle of attrition, German forces used speed and concentrated armor to bypass strongpoints, cut communication lines, and cause a total systemic collapse of the French military in weeks. 3. Key Differences at a Glance FeatureAttrition WarfareManeuver WarfareObjectivePhysical destruction of the enemy army.Functional/Psychological collapse of the enemy.TargetThe enemy's strength (mass).The enemy's weakness (vulnerability).Primary ToolMassed Firepower.Movement and Tempo.Command"Command Push" (Top-down, rigid)."Recon Pull" (Decentralized, flexible).Success MetricExchange ratios (Kill counts).Disruption and loss of enemy control.4. The Modern Synthesis: "Schwerpunkt" In practice, no army is purely "maneuver" or "attrition." To maneuver successfully, you often need a period of attrition to punch a hole in the enemy's line. A critical concept here is the Schwerpunkt (Center of Gravity/Focus of Effort). A commander identifies the single most important place to strike and concentrates all available "elements of power" there. While the rest of the front might look like attrition, the Schwerpunkt is where the maneuver happens to achieve a breakthrough. Modern Reality: In high-intensity conflicts today (like the war in Ukraine), we see a "return to attrition" because modern sensors (drones, satellites) make it very difficult to achieve the surprise needed for pure maneuver warfare. When you can see everything, it's hard to be "unexpected."

MYTH The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine. FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to force the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than nine million. The British limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine when, in 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some thirty-five thousand square miles—to create a new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine. By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres to Jews. This contradicted Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that “the Administration of Palestine…shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency…close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.”2 Ultimately, the British admitted that the argument about the country’s absorptive capacity was specious. The Peel Commission said, “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled. FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The British restricted Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s “absorptive capacity.” During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease, and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 83,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti-Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one-third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within ten years and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95% of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigration to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936 observed, “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is…due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH The British changed their policy to allow Holocaust survivors to settle in Palestine. FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many smuggled in on dilapidated ships organized by the Haganah. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, sixty-five “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps on Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, and 28,000 remained imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH As the Jewish population grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened. FACT In July 1921, Hasan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa and president of the Muslim National Associations, sent a telegram to the British government in reaction to a delegation of Palestinians that went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Shukri wrote: We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.13 The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non-Jewish population rose by 588,000.14 The permanent Arab population increased by 120% between 1922 and 1947.15 This rapid growth of the Arab population was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37% of the total immigration to pre-state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.16 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.17 The Arab population increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922–1947, the non-Jewish population increased by 290% in Haifa, 131% in Jerusalem, and 158% in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42% in Nablus, 78% in Jenin, and 37% in Bethlehem.18 MYTH Jews stole Arab land. FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. From the beginning of World War I, however, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. About 80% of the Palestinian Arabs were debt-ridden peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins.19 Jews went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap, and—most important—without tenants. In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” He insisted that “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” Instead, he advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”20 Jews only began to purchase cultivated land after buying all the uncultivated territory. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.21 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed, “They [the Jews] paid high prices for the land and, in addition, they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”22 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness for the British government and offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80% were ruled invalid by the government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the government land offer.23 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by local Palestinian leaders who were later joined by Arab volunteers led by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.24 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased…There was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”25 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living, and ample employment opportunities.26 It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original). —Transjordan’s king Abdullah27 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938 (which began in April 1936 with the murder of two Jews by Arabs and the subsequent murder of two Arab workers by members of the Jewish underground28), the British high commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.29 The Jews paid exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”30 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 were acquired from the mandatory government, 30,000 were bought from various churches, and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73% of Jewish plots were purchased from large landowners, not poor fellahin.31 Many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, and the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem, and s sold land to the Jews. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews.32 MYTH The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews. FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini first began to organize fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. El-Husseini hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.33 Arab radicals gained influence because the British administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they began a revolt against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” The British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the military administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with el-Husseini in 1920, a few days before Easter, and told him that “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world…that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine administration but in Whitehall.” He added that “if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General [Louis] Bols [chief administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General [Edmund] Allenby [commander of the Egyptian force, 1917–19, then high commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”34 El-Husseini took the colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of el-Husseini’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. He escaped, however, and was sentenced to ten years in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon el-Husseini and to appoint him Mufti (a cleric in charge of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places). By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years. They were released a few months later.35 Samuel met with el-Husseini on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left forty-three Jews dead.36 El-Husseini consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools, and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute that “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”37 The Mufti’s henchmen also ensured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians who discussed cooperation with the Jews from rival clans. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, el-Husseini did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.38 The Arabs found rioting an effective political tool because of the lax British response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British prevented Jews from protecting themselves but made little effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: The Arabs feared being displaced by the Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs learned they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging riots. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy.”39 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was an excuse for their attacks on Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by economics, the radical Islamic views of the Mufti, and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs convinced the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic still used today to incite violence). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a pretext for rioting by Arabs against Jews, which spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British administration made no effort to prevent the violence, and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, most of Hebron’s Jews had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.40 After the riots, the British ordered an investigation, resulting in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the mandatory government’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy.”41 This meant it was necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. MYTH The Mufti was not a Nazi collaborator. FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler fifteen drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. He also asked the Axis powers to “accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the interest of the Arabs, and by the same method that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”42 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.” He added, “The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely…the Jews.” Hitler told the Mufti he opposed the creation of a Jewish state and that Germany’s objective was destroying the Jewish element in the Arab sphere.43 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting twenty thousand Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut where he died in 1974. MYTH The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a deliberate terror campaign against civilians. FACT British troops seized the Jewish Agency compound on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were arrested. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. In response to the British provocations, and a desire to demonstrate that the Jews’ spirit could not be broken, the United Resistance Movement planned to bomb the King David Hotel, which housed the British military command and the Criminal Investigation Division in addition to hotel guests. The Haganah pulled out of the plot and left it up to the Irgun. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties and the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed on July 22, 1946, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. The call to the hotel was received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying, “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”44 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the main part of the hotel were injured.45 For decades, the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament provided the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.46 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which Arab leaders hailed as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.47 1 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172

French

110.31.b.17.C

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