What is meant by the term 'balance of trade'?

The difference in value between a country's exports and imports.

The number of trade agreements a country has.

The total amount of foreign investment in a country.

The rate at which currency is exchanged internationally.

What is the primary effect of exchange rate fluctuations on international trade?

They affect the relative prices of exports and imports.

They determine the quantity of natural resources available.

They standardize international trade agreements.

How do tariffs impact international trade?

They increase the prices of imported goods.

They lower the cost of domestic goods.

They eliminate competition from foreign markets.

They guarantee quality for imported products.

Which of the following economic factors can lead to trade imbalances between countries?

Differences in National Income Levels

Standardized Production Techniques

Which of the following factors is most likely to lead to an increase in international trade?

Strengthening of Local Regulations

Which of the following factors can most directly enhance a country's competitiveness in international trade?

Investment in Technology and Innovation

What is the impact of globalization on international trade?

It increases the volume and diversity of goods traded between nations.

It standardizes global cultures.

It restricts market access for developing countries.

It decreases competition among countries.

What role does comparative advantage play in international trade?

It encourages countries to specialize in the production of goods they can produce more efficiently.

It promotes trade only among developed nations.

It standardizes prices globally.

It eliminates trade barriers between countries.

What is the primary goal of a trade embargo?

To restrict trade with a specific country

To encourage foreign investment

What is a major effect of globalization on international trade?

Increased interconnectedness of economies

Uniformity in cultural practices

Decreased competition among nations

What is one primary reason countries engage in international trade?

To obtain goods not available domestically

Which of the following best describes protectionism?

Policies that restrict imports to protect domestic industries

An agreement between countries to share resources

What is the impact of GDP growth on international trade?

It typically increases demand for imports

It reduces competition among countries

What role does exchange rate play in international trade?

It determines the relative value of currencies between countries

It affects the weather conditions for agriculture

It influences population growth rates

It regulates local business hours

Fundamental economic factor affecting international trade

Introduction to Hedging Instruments: Forwards, Futures, Options, and Swaps Hedging instruments are financial tools used by businesses and investors to mitigate risk. These instruments help protect against adverse price movements in assets such as commodities, currencies, interest rates, or securities. The four main hedging instruments are forwards, futures, options, and swaps. 1. Forwards A forward contract is a customised agreement between two parties to buy or sell an asset at a predetermined price on a specified future date. Key Characteristics: Over-the-counter (OTC): Traded directly between parties, not on an exchange. Customisation: Can be tailored to suit the needs of the parties involved. Settlement: Occurs at the end of the contract, which may involve physical delivery or cash settlement. Risk: Forwards carry counter-party risk, as there is a possibility one party may default. Example: A company that needs to import raw materials in six months may enter into a forward contract to lock in the current price, avoiding the risk of price increases. 2. Futures A futures contract is similar to a forward, but it is standardised and traded on an exchange. This standardisation eliminates counter-party risk. Key Characteristics: Standardised: Contract size, expiration, and other terms are fixed by the exchange. Mark-to-market: Gains and losses are settled daily. Liquidity: Futures are highly liquid because they are traded on exchanges. Regulation: As they are traded on formal exchanges, they are more regulated than forwards. Example: A wheat farmer may sell futures contracts to hedge against a possible decline in wheat prices before harvest. 3. Options Options provide the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a specified price on or before a certain date. There are two types of options: call options and put options. Call Option: Gives the holder the right to buy an asset at a predetermined price. Put Option: Gives the holder the right to sell an asset at a predetermined price. Key Characteristics: Premium: The buyer pays a premium upfront to obtain the option. Limited Risk: The maximum loss is limited to the premium paid. Flexibility: Options can be used for speculative or hedging purposes. Example: An investor holding stocks may buy a put option to protect against potential declines in the stock's price. 4. Swaps A swap is a contract in which two parties agree to exchange cash flows or liabilities over a specific period. The most common types are interest rate swaps and currency swaps. Key Characteristics: Customizable: Like forwards, swaps are often tailored to meet the needs of the parties involved. Counterparty Risk: Swaps are typically OTC instruments, exposing parties to default risk. Common Uses: Used to manage interest rate risk or currency risk. Example: A company with a variablerate loan may enter into an interest rate swap to exchange its variable payments for fixedrate payments, thus locking in stable costs. Hedging instruments are essential for managing financial risk in volatile markets. Each instrument serves different purposes, with varying levels of complexity, risk, and customization. Whether through forwards, futures, options, or swaps, businesses can better plan for the future by reducing exposure to uncertain price fluctuations. Hedging Strategies for Market Risk, Credit Risk, and Currency Risk 1. Hedging Strategies for Market Risk Market risk (also known as systematic risk) arises from fluctuations in asset prices, such as stocks, bonds, commodities, and interest rates, due to economic factors or market volatility. Key Hedging Instruments for Market Risk: Derivatives (Options, Futures, and Forwards): These instruments allow investors to hedge against unfavorable price movements in stocks, commodities, or interest rates. Example: An investor holding a large stock portfolio might buy a put option to protect against a potential market downturn. If the market declines, the put option increases in value, offsetting losses in the portfolio. Short Selling: Investors can sell borrowed assets with the expectation of buying them back at a lower price, profiting from the decline. Example: A fund manager expecting a market decline may short sell stocks to hedge a portfolio against losses. Common Hedging Strategies: Portfolio Diversification: Reducing market risk by spreading investments across various asset classes (stocks, bonds, commodities) and sectors. Using Index Futures: Large portfolios can be hedged using index futures that track the performance of the overall market. If the market declines, profits from the short position in the futures contract will offset losses in the portfolio. Risk Parity: Allocating assets based on the level of risk rather than the dollar amount invested, balancing risk exposure across asset classes. 2. Hedging Strategies for Credit Risk Credit risk refers to the possibility that a borrower will default on a debt obligation. This is especially important for banks, lenders, and institutions dealing with bonds and loans. Key Hedging Instruments for Credit Risk: Credit Default Swaps (CDS): A financial derivative where the buyer of a CDS pays a premium to the seller in exchange for protection against a default on a loan or bond. Example: A bank holding corporate bonds can buy a CDS to ensure they are compensated if the issuing company defaults. Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs): These instruments pool together various debt instruments and allow risk to be distributed among multiple investors. Credit Insurance: Companies may use insurance to protect against the risk of a customer defaulting on payments. Common Hedging Strategies: Diversification of Loan Portfolio: Spreading out credit exposures across various industries, geographies, and borrower profiles reduces the overall risk of default. Tightening Lending Standards: Limiting exposure to highrisk borrowers by implementing stringent credit assessments. AssetBacked Securities: Banks can sell loans or bonds packaged as assetbacked securities to reduce their exposure to credit risk. 3. Hedging Strategies for Currency Risk Currency risk (or exchange rate risk) arises from fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, which can affect companies involved in international trade or with investments in foreign countries. Key Hedging Instruments for Currency Risk: Forward Contracts: A firm agrees to exchange a specified amount of currency at a predetermined exchange rate on a future date. Example: A U.S. exporter expecting payment in euros might enter into a forward contract to sell euros and lock in a favorable exchange rate. Currency Options: These give the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell currency at a specific price. Example: A U.S.based company buying goods from Japan might buy a call option on the yen to hedge against the risk of yen appreciation. Currency Swaps: Two parties exchange interest payments and principal in different currencies to hedge against exchange rate fluctuations. Common Hedging Strategies: Natural Hedging: Companies can offset currency risk by balancing foreign revenue with costs in the same currency. For example, if a company generates revenue in euros, it can also incur expenses in euros, reducing exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. Multi-Currency Invoicing: Firms can invoice in their home currency, shifting the currency risk to the buyer. Currency Diversification: Holding a diversified basket of currencies can reduce exposure to large fluctuations in any one currency. Effective hedging strategies are crucial for managing various types of risks in financial markets. Market risk can be managed using instruments like futures and options, while credit risk can be mitigated through diversification and credit derivatives. Currency risk, often faced by multinational firms, can be hedged using forward contracts, options, or swaps. Each strategy helps firms and investors protect their portfolios, ensure financial stability, and reduce the impact of adverse movements in the financial markets. Portfolio Risk Management Techniques: Diversification, Asset Allocation, and Risk Budgeting Managing risk is a fundamental aspect of portfolio management. Investors use various techniques to control and reduce the risks inherent in investing. Three key techniques used in portfolio risk management are diversification, asset allocation, and risk budgeting. Each of these techniques helps in mitigating potential losses while aiming to achieve the desired return. 1. Diversification Diversification is a risk management strategy that involves spreading investments across different assets, sectors, or geographic regions to reduce exposure to any single risk. The idea is that different assets perform differently under various market conditions, so losses in one investment can be offset by gains in others. Key Benefits of Diversification: Reduction of Unsystematic Risk: Unsystematic risk, which is unique to a specific company or industry, can be reduced by holding a variety of investments that respond differently to market conditions. Improved Stability: A diversified portfolio is less volatile, as the negative performance of one asset can be balanced by the positive performance of others. Methods of Diversification: Across Asset Classes: Investing in a mix of asset classes such as stocks, bonds, commodities, and real estate. Example: A portfolio with 60% equities, 30% bonds, and 10% commodities is more diversified than one solely consisting of stocks. Within Asset Classes: Diversifying within a single asset class (e.g., holding stocks from different sectors like technology, healthcare, and energy). Geographic Diversification: Investing in assets across various countries or regions to mitigate country-specific risks. Example: Holding U.S. stocks along with emerging market equities can reduce risks related to a downturn in one country's economy. 2. Asset Allocation Asset allocation refers to the process of dividing investments among different asset classes (such as stocks, bonds, and cash) to align with an investor's risk tolerance, time horizon, and financial goals. Asset allocation plays a crucial role in portfolio risk management by determining the overall risk-return profile of the portfolio. Key Elements of Asset Allocation: Strategic Asset Allocation: A longterm approach that involves setting target allocations for different asset classes based on financial goals and risk tolerance. Example: A young investor with a longterm horizon might allocate 70% to stocks, 20% to bonds, and 10% to cash. Tactical Asset Allocation: A more active approach that involves adjusting the asset mix in response to short-term market conditions. Example: If the investor expects an economic downturn, they might temporarily reduce exposure to equities and increase exposure to bonds. Types of Asset Allocation Models: Conservative: Focuses on preserving capital with a larger allocation to bonds and cash (e.g., 20% stocks, 80% bonds). Balanced: A moderate risk approach with an equal focus on growth and income (e.g., 50% stocks, 50% bonds). Aggressive: Targets higher returns by investing predominantly in equities, accepting higher risk (e.g., 80% stocks, 20% bonds). Example of Asset Allocation: A 40 year old investor with moderate risk tolerance may allocate their portfolio as follows: 50% equities, 40% bonds, and 10% in alternative investments such as real estate or commodities. The equities provide growth potential, while the bonds and alternative assets offer stability and income. 3. Risk Budgeting Risk budgeting is a method of allocating risk across different components of a portfolio, rather than focusing solely on returns. The goal is to optimise the portfolio’s risk-return profile by distributing risk in a way that aligns with the investor’s objectives and risk tolerance. Key Concepts of Risk Budgeting: Risk Contribution: Each asset class or investment in the portfolio contributes a certain amount of risk (measured by metrics such as volatility or Value at Risk). Risk budgeting ensures that no single asset class dominates the overall risk of the portfolio. Example: A portfolio may contain 60% stocks and 40% bonds, but if the stocks are highly volatile, they may contribute 90% of the portfolio's risk. Target Risk: Investors set a maximum acceptable level of risk (e.g., a portfolio volatility of 10%) and allocate investments so that the total risk remains within this target. Techniques in Risk Budgeting: Risk Parity: Allocates risk evenly across asset classes, rather than allocating capital based solely on return expectations. Example: In a risk-parity portfolio, both bonds and stocks might be balanced in such a way that they contribute equally to the overall portfolio risk, even though the dollar investment in bonds may be larger due to their lower volatility. Value at Risk (VaR): This technique measures the potential loss in a portfolio over a specific time period, under normal market conditions, at a given confidence level. The risk budget ensures that the potential loss stays within acceptable limits. Example of Risk Budgeting: An investor targets an overall portfolio risk of 8% volatility. After analyzing the risk contribution of each asset class, they determine that equities, which currently make up 60% of the portfolio, contribute 70% of the risk. To adhere to the risk budget, the investor may reduce their equity exposure and increase their allocation to bonds or other less volatile assets. Diversification, asset allocation, and risk budgeting are complementary techniques used in portfolio risk management. Diversification reduces unsystematic risk by spreading investments across various assets. Asset allocation ensures that investments align with an investor's goals and risk tolerance. Risk budgeting focuses on managing the contribution of risk from each asset class to create a balanced and efficient portfolio. Together, these strategies help investors achieve a balance between risk and return, ensuring longterm portfolio stability. Risk Mitigation Through Insurance, Securitisation, and Other Financial Engineering Techniques Risk mitigation is a core objective in financial management, and various strategies can be employed to reduce or manage risks. Three major approaches are insurance, securitisation, and financial engineering techniques. Each of these methods helps firms and individuals transfer, reduce, or eliminate certain financial risks. 1. Insurance as a Risk Mitigation Tool Insurance is a traditional risk transfer method that protects against financial losses by shifting the risk to an insurance company in exchange for premium payments. It is widely used to mitigate various forms of risk, such as operational, liability, and property risks. Key Aspects of Insurance for Risk Mitigation: Risk Transfer: The insurer takes on the risk in exchange for a premium, thus protecting the insured party from unexpected financial losses. Indemnity: In the event of a loss, the insurance policy compensates the insured based on the terms of the contract. Customisable Coverage: Insurance policies can be tailored to address specific risks, such as property damage, business interruption, liability, or cyber risks. Types of Insurance for Businesses: Property and Casualty Insurance: Covers physical assets like buildings, machinery, and inventory from risks like fire, theft, or natural disasters. Liability Insurance: Protects businesses against legal liabilities arising from accidents, negligence, or professional errors. Business Interruption Insurance: Compensates for lost income if a business has to halt operations due to unforeseen events. Credit Insurance: Shields companies from losses due to the nonpayment of trade receivables. 2. Securitisation as a Risk Mitigation Technique Securitisation is a financial engineering process that involves pooling various financial assets (such as loans, mortgages, or receivables) and converting them into marketable securities. This process allows firms to transfer risk to investors, thereby reducing their exposure. Key Elements of Securitisation: Risk Transfer: By securitising assets, companies can transfer the risk of default or nonpayment to investors who purchase the securities. Liquidity Creation: Securitisation converts illiquid assets (like mortgages or loans) into liquid, tradeable securities, improving cash flow for the originating firm. Diversification of Risk: Pooling assets with different risk profiles reduces the impact of individual defaults, spreading the risk across multiple investors. Common Forms of Securitisation: MortgageBacked Securities (MBS): Pools of mortgages are bundled and sold as securities to investors, transferring the risk of mortgage defaults. Example: A bank that issues home loans can bundle those loans into MBS and sell them to investors, transferring the credit risk of potential defaults. Asset-Backed Securities (ABS): Similar to MBS, but backed by other types of assets like credit card receivables, auto loans, or student loans. Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs): Structured financial products that pool different types of debt, such as loans and bonds, and sell them as securities with varying risk levels. Example: A bank may issue a portfolio of auto loans and then pool these loans into an assetbacked security (ABS). The ABS is sold to investors, who take on the risk of loan defaults. By securitising the loans, the bank reduces its exposure to credit risk and generates immediate cash flow. 3. Financial Engineering Techniques for Risk Mitigation Financial engineering involves the use of complex financial instruments, derivatives, and structured products to manage or mitigate financial risks. These techniques allow firms to hedge against specific risks, optimize capital structure, and improve financial stability. Common Financial Engineering Techniques: Derivatives: Financial instruments like futures, forwards, options, and swaps are used to hedge against price fluctuations, interest rate changes, or currency movements. Example: A company with significant foreign exchange exposure may use currency forwards or options to hedge against exchange rate fluctuations, ensuring predictable cash flows. Options and Futures: Options: Provides the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell an asset at a predetermined price, allowing firms to hedge against unfavorable price movements. Example: An airline company can buy options on jet fuel to hedge against rising fuel prices. Futures: Standardized contracts to buy or sell an asset at a set price on a future date, commonly used to hedge commodities or financial assets. Example: A wheat producer may use futures contracts to lock in a favorable price for its crop, hedging against a potential price drop. Swaps: These involve the exchange of cash flows between two parties, often used to manage interest rate risk or currency risk. Interest Rate Swaps: Firms can exchange floatingrate interest payments for fixedrate payments to hedge against rising interest rates. Currency Swaps: Used to hedge exchange rate risk in crossborder transactions by exchanging principal and interest payments in different currencies. Example: A company with a variablerate loan may enter into an interest rate swap to exchange its variable payments for fixedrate payments, locking in stable costs. Structured Products: These are customised financial instruments designed to achieve specific riskreturn objectives. They often combine derivatives with other securities to create tailored risk exposures. Example: A structured note that combines a bond with an embedded option, offering downside protection while allowing for potential upside linked to the performance of an equity index. Credit Derivatives: Tools like credit default swaps (CDS) allow investors to transfer credit risk to other parties. Example: A bondholder worried about a company’s potential default may purchase a CDS, which pays out in case of a default event. Example: A company may issue a bond with an embedded call option, allowing it to repurchase the bond if interest rates decline. This financial engineering tool enables the company to mitigate the risk of rising interest rates, reducing future borrowing costs. Risk mitigation through insurance, securitisation, and financial engineering offers businesses a variety of tools to manage and transfer risks. Insurance allows for the direct transfer of risk to an insurer, while securitisation helps companies offload risk by packaging and selling assets as securities. Financial engineering techniques, including derivatives, swaps, and structured products, provide sophisticated ways to hedge market, interest rate, and currency risks. Each approach helps organizations improve financial stability, enhance liquidity, and manage potential losses in a volatile market environment.

MYTH The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine. FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to force the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than nine million. The British limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine when, in 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some thirty-five thousand square miles—to create a new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine. By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres to Jews. This contradicted Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that “the Administration of Palestine…shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency…close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.”2 Ultimately, the British admitted that the argument about the country’s absorptive capacity was specious. The Peel Commission said, “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled. FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The British restricted Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s “absorptive capacity.” During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease, and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 83,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti-Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one-third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within ten years and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95% of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigration to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936 observed, “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is…due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH The British changed their policy to allow Holocaust survivors to settle in Palestine. FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many smuggled in on dilapidated ships organized by the Haganah. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, sixty-five “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps on Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, and 28,000 remained imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH As the Jewish population grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened. FACT In July 1921, Hasan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa and president of the Muslim National Associations, sent a telegram to the British government in reaction to a delegation of Palestinians that went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Shukri wrote: We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.13 The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non-Jewish population rose by 588,000.14 The permanent Arab population increased by 120% between 1922 and 1947.15 This rapid growth of the Arab population was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37% of the total immigration to pre-state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.16 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.17 The Arab population increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922–1947, the non-Jewish population increased by 290% in Haifa, 131% in Jerusalem, and 158% in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42% in Nablus, 78% in Jenin, and 37% in Bethlehem.18 MYTH Jews stole Arab land. FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. From the beginning of World War I, however, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. About 80% of the Palestinian Arabs were debt-ridden peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins.19 Jews went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap, and—most important—without tenants. In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” He insisted that “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” Instead, he advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”20 Jews only began to purchase cultivated land after buying all the uncultivated territory. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.21 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed, “They [the Jews] paid high prices for the land and, in addition, they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”22 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness for the British government and offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80% were ruled invalid by the government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the government land offer.23 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by local Palestinian leaders who were later joined by Arab volunteers led by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.24 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased…There was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”25 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living, and ample employment opportunities.26 It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original). —Transjordan’s king Abdullah27 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938 (which began in April 1936 with the murder of two Jews by Arabs and the subsequent murder of two Arab workers by members of the Jewish underground28), the British high commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.29 The Jews paid exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”30 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 were acquired from the mandatory government, 30,000 were bought from various churches, and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73% of Jewish plots were purchased from large landowners, not poor fellahin.31 Many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, and the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem, and s sold land to the Jews. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews.32 MYTH The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews. FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini first began to organize fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. El-Husseini hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.33 Arab radicals gained influence because the British administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they began a revolt against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” The British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the military administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with el-Husseini in 1920, a few days before Easter, and told him that “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world…that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine administration but in Whitehall.” He added that “if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General [Louis] Bols [chief administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General [Edmund] Allenby [commander of the Egyptian force, 1917–19, then high commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”34 El-Husseini took the colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of el-Husseini’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. He escaped, however, and was sentenced to ten years in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon el-Husseini and to appoint him Mufti (a cleric in charge of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places). By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years. They were released a few months later.35 Samuel met with el-Husseini on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left forty-three Jews dead.36 El-Husseini consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools, and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute that “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”37 The Mufti’s henchmen also ensured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians who discussed cooperation with the Jews from rival clans. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, el-Husseini did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.38 The Arabs found rioting an effective political tool because of the lax British response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British prevented Jews from protecting themselves but made little effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: The Arabs feared being displaced by the Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs learned they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging riots. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy.”39 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was an excuse for their attacks on Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by economics, the radical Islamic views of the Mufti, and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs convinced the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic still used today to incite violence). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a pretext for rioting by Arabs against Jews, which spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British administration made no effort to prevent the violence, and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, most of Hebron’s Jews had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.40 After the riots, the British ordered an investigation, resulting in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the mandatory government’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy.”41 This meant it was necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. MYTH The Mufti was not a Nazi collaborator. FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler fifteen drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. He also asked the Axis powers to “accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the interest of the Arabs, and by the same method that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”42 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.” He added, “The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely…the Jews.” Hitler told the Mufti he opposed the creation of a Jewish state and that Germany’s objective was destroying the Jewish element in the Arab sphere.43 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting twenty thousand Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut where he died in 1974. MYTH The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a deliberate terror campaign against civilians. FACT British troops seized the Jewish Agency compound on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were arrested. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. In response to the British provocations, and a desire to demonstrate that the Jews’ spirit could not be broken, the United Resistance Movement planned to bomb the King David Hotel, which housed the British military command and the Criminal Investigation Division in addition to hotel guests. The Haganah pulled out of the plot and left it up to the Irgun. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties and the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed on July 22, 1946, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. The call to the hotel was received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying, “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”44 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the main part of the hotel were injured.45 For decades, the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament provided the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.46 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which Arab leaders hailed as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.47 1 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172

Southeast Asia, vast region of Asia situated east of the Indian subcontinent and south of China. It consists of two dissimilar portions: a continental projection (commonly called mainland Southeast Asia) and a string of archipelagoes to the south and east of the mainland (insular Southeast Asia). Extending some 700 miles (1,100 km) southward from the mainland into insular Southeast Asia is the Malay Peninsula; this peninsula structurally is part of the mainland, but it also shares many ecological and cultural affinities with the surrounding islands and thus functions as a bridge between the two regions. Mainland Southeast Asia is divided into the countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Vietnam, and the small city-state of Singapore at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula; Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, which occupy the eastern portion of the mainland, often are collectively called the Indochinese Peninsula. Malaysia is both mainland and insular, with a western portion on the Malay Peninsula and an eastern part on the island of Borneo. Except for the small sultanate of Brunei (also on Borneo), the remainder of insular Southeast Asia consists of the archipelagic nations of Indonesia and the Philippines. Southeast Asia stretches some 4,000 miles at its greatest extent (roughly from northwest to southeast) and encompasses some 5,000,000 square miles (13,000,000 square km) of land and sea, of which about 1,736,000 square miles is land. Mount Hkakabo in northern Myanmar on the border with China, at 19,295 feet (5,881 meters), is the highest peak of mainland Southeast Asia. Although the modern nations of the region are sometimes thought of as being small, they are—with the exceptions of Singapore and Brunei—comparatively large. Indonesia, for example, is more than 3,000 miles from west to east (exceeding the west-east extent of the continental United States) and more than 1,000 miles from north to south; the area of Laos is only slightly smaller than that of the United Kingdom; and Myanmar is considerably larger than France. All of Southeast Asia falls within the tropical and subtropical climatic zones, and much of it receives considerable annual precipitation. It is subject to an extensive and regular monsoonal weather system (i.e., one in which the prevailing winds reverse direction every six months) that produces marked wet and dry periods in most of the region. Southeast Asia’s landscape is characterized by three intermingled physical elements: mountain ranges, plains and plateaus, and water in the form of both shallow seas and extensive drainage systems. Of these, the rivers probably have been of the greatest historical and cultural significance, for waterways have decisively shaped forms of settlement and agriculture, determined fundamental political and economic patterns, and helped define the nature of Southeast Asians’ worldview and distinctive cultural syncretism. It also has been of great importance that Southeast Asia, which is the most easily accessible tropical region in the world, lies strategically astride the sea passage between East Asia and the Middle Eastern–Mediterranean world. Within this broad outline, Southeast Asia is perhaps the most diverse region on Earth. The number of large and small ecological niches is more than matched by a staggering variety of economic, social, and cultural niches Southeast Asians have developed for themselves; hundreds of ethnic groups and languages have been identified. Under these circumstances, it often is difficult to keep in mind the region’s underlying unity, and it is understandable that Southeast Asia should so often be treated as a miscellaneous collection of cultures that simply do not quite fit anywhere else. Roofs of the Forbidden City, Beijing, China Britannica Quiz All About Asia Yet from ancient times Southeast Asia has been considered by its neighbors to be a region in its own right and not merely an extension of their own lands. The Chinese called it Nanyang and the Japanese Nan’yō, both names meaning “South Seas,” and South Asians used such terms as Suvarnabhūmi (Sanskrit: “Land of Gold”) to describe the area. Modern scholarship increasingly has yielded evidence of broad commonalities uniting the peoples of the region across time. Studies in historical linguistics, for example, have suggested that the vast majority of Southeast Asian languages—even many of those previously considered to have separate origins—either sprang from common roots or have been long and inseparably intertwined. Despite inevitable variation among societies, common views of gender, family structure, and social hierarchy and mobility may be discerned throughout mainland and insular Southeast Asia, and a broadly common commercial and cultural inheritance has continued to affect the entire region for several millennia. These and other commonalities have yet to produce a conscious or precise Southeast Asian identity, but they have given substance to the idea of Southeast Asia as a definable world region and have provided a framework for the comparative study of its components.

“There’s No Such Thing as Sound Science” by By Christie Aschwanden was a lead science writer for FiveThirtyEight. FiveThirtyEight, Science, Dec. 6, 2017 Science is being turned against itself. For decades, its twin ideals of transparency and rigor have been weaponized by those who disagree with results produced by the scientific method. Under the Trump administration, that fight has ramped up again. In a move ostensibly meant to reduce conflicts of interest, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt has removed a number of scientists from advisory panels and replaced some of them with representatives from industries that the agency regulates. Like many in the Trump administration, Pruitt has also cast doubt on the reliability of climate science. For instance, in an interview with CNBC, Pruitt said that “measuring with precision human activity on the climate is something very challenging to do.” Similarly, Trump’s pick to head NASA, an agency that oversees a large portion the nation’s climate research, has insisted that research into human influence on climate lacks certainty, and he falsely claimed that “global temperatures stopped rising 10 years ago.” Kathleen Hartnett White, Trump’s nominee to head the White House Council on Environmental Quality, said in a Senate hearing last month that she thinks we “need to have more precise explanations of the human role and the natural role” in climate change. The same entreaties crop up again and again: We need to root out conflicts. We need more precise evidence. What makes these arguments so powerful is that they sound quite similar to the points raised by proponents of a very different call for change that’s coming from within science. This other movement strives to produce more robust, reproducible findings. Despite having dissimilar goals, the two forces espouse principles that look surprisingly alike: Science needs to be transparent. Results and methods should be openly shared so that outside researchers can independently reproduce and validate them. The methods used to collect and analyze data should be rigorous and clear, and conclusions must be supported by evidence. These are the arguments underlying an “open science” reform movement that was created, in part, as a response to a “reproducibility crisis” that has struck some fields of science.1 But they’re also used as talking points by politicians who are working to make it more difficult for the EPA and other federal agencies to use science in their regulatory decision-making, under the guise of basing policy on “sound science.” Science’s virtues are being wielded against it. What distinguishes the two calls for transparency is intent: Whereas the “open science” movement aims to make science more reliable, reproducible and robust, proponents of “sound science” have historically worked to amplify uncertainty, create doubt and undermine scientific discoveries that threaten their interests. “Our criticisms are founded in a confidence in science,” said Steven Goodman, co-director of the Meta-Research Innovation Center at Stanford and a proponent of open science. “That’s a fundamental difference — we’re critiquing science to make it better. Others are critiquing it to devalue the approach itself.” Calls to base public policy on “sound science” seem unassailable if you don’t know the term’s history. The phrase was adopted by the tobacco industry in the 1990s to counteract mounting evidence linking secondhand smoke to cancer. A 1992 Environmental Protection Agency report identified secondhand smoke as a human carcinogen, and Philip Morris responded by launching an initiative to promote what it called “sound science.” In an internal memo, Philip Morris vice president of corporate affairs Ellen Merlo wrote that the program was designed to “discredit the EPA report,” “prevent states and cities, as well as businesses from passing smoking bans” and “proactively” pass legislation to help their cause. The sound science tactic exploits a fundamental feature of the scientific process: Science does not produce absolute certainty. Contrary to how it’s sometimes represented to the public, science is not a magic wand that turns everything it touches to truth. Instead, it’s a process of uncertainty reduction, much like a game of 20 Questions. Any given study can rarely answer more than one question at a time, and each study usually raises a bunch of new questions in the process of answering old ones. “Science is a process rather than an answer,” said psychologist Alison Ledgerwood of the University of California, Davis. Every answer is provisional and subject to change in the face of new evidence. It’s not entirely correct to say that “this study proves this fact,” Ledgerwood said. “We should be talking instead about how science increases or decreases our confidence in something.” The tobacco industry’s brilliant tactic was to turn this baked-in uncertainty against the scientific enterprise itself. While insisting that they merely wanted to ensure that public policy was based on sound science, tobacco companies defined the term in a way that ensured that no science could ever be sound enough. The only sound science was certain science, which is an impossible standard to achieve. “Doubt is our product,” wrote one employee of the Brown & Williamson tobacco company in a 1969 internal memo. The note went on to say that doubt “is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’” and “establishing a controversy.” These strategies for undermining inconvenient science were so effective that they’ve served as a sort of playbook for industry interests ever since, said Stanford University science historian Robert Proctor. The sound science push is no longer just Philip Morris sowing doubt about the links between cigarettes and cancer. It’s also a 1998 action plan by the American Petroleum Institute, Chevron and Exxon Mobil to “install uncertainty” about the link between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. It’s industry-funded groups’ late-1990s effort to question the science the EPA was using to set fine-particle-pollution air-quality standards that the industry didn’t want. And then there was the more recent effort by Dow Chemical to insist on more scientific certainty before banning a pesticide that the EPA’s scientists had deemed risky to children. Now comes a move by the Trump administration’s EPA to repeal a 2015 rule on wetlands protection by disregarding particular studies. (To name just a few examples.) Doubt merchants aren’t pushing for knowledge, they’re practicing what Proctor has dubbed “agnogenesis” — the intentional manufacture of ignorance. This ignorance isn’t simply the absence of knowing something; it’s a lack of comprehension deliberately created by agents who don’t want you to know, Proctor said.2 In the hands of doubt-makers, transparency becomes a rhetorical move. “It’s really difficult as a scientist or policy maker to make a stand against transparency and openness, because well, who would be against it?” said Karen Levy, researcher on information science at Cornell University. But at the same time, “you can couch everything in the language of transparency and it becomes a powerful weapon.” For instance, when the EPA was preparing to set new limits on particulate pollution in the 1990s, industry groups pushed back against the research and demanded access to primary data (including records that researchers had promised participants would remain confidential) and a reanalysis of the evidence. Their calls succeeded and a new analysis was performed. The reanalysis essentially confirmed the original conclusions, but the process of conducting it delayed the implementation of regulations and cost researchers time and money. Delay is a time-tested strategy. “Gridlock is the greatest friend a global warming skeptic has,” said Marc Morano, a prominent critic of global warming research and the executive director of ClimateDepot.com, in the documentary “Merchants of Doubt” (based on the book by the same name). Morano’s site is a project of the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, which has received funding from the oil and gas industry. “We’re the negative force. We’re just trying to stop stuff.” Some of these ploys are getting a fresh boost from Congress. The Data Quality Act (also known as the Information Quality Act) was reportedly written by an industry lobbyist and quietly passed as part of an appropriations bill in 2000. The rule mandates that federal agencies ensure the “quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information” that they disseminate, though it does little to define what these terms mean. The law also provides a mechanism for citizens and groups to challenge information that they deem inaccurate, including science that they disagree with. “It was passed in this very quiet way with no explicit debate about it — that should tell you a lot about the real goals,” Levy said. But what’s most telling about the Data Quality Act is how it’s been used, Levy said. A 2004 Washington Post analysis found that in the 20 months following its implementation, the act was repeatedly used by industry groups to push back against proposed regulations and bog down the decision-making process. Instead of deploying transparency as a fundamental principle that applies to all science, these interests have used transparency as a weapon to attack very particular findings that they would like to eradicate. Now Congress is considering another way to legislate how science is used. The Honest Act, a bill sponsored by Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas,3 is another example of what Levy calls a “Trojan horse” law that uses the language of transparency as a cover to achieve other political goals. Smith’s legislation would severely limit the kind of evidence the EPA could use for decision-making. Only studies whose raw data and computer codes were publicly available would be allowed for consideration. That might sound perfectly reasonable, and in many cases it is, Goodman said. But sometimes there are good reasons why researchers can’t conform to these rules, like when the data contains confidential or sensitive medical information.4 Critics, which include more than a dozen scientific organizations, argue that, in practice, the rules would prevent many studies from being considered in EPA reviews.5 It might seem like an easy task to sort good science from bad, but in reality it’s not so simple. “There’s a misplaced idea that we can definitively distinguish the good from the not-good science, but it’s all a matter of degree,” said Brian Nosek, executive director of the Center for Open Science. “There is no perfect study.” Requiring regulators to wait until they have (nonexistent) perfect evidence is essentially “a way of saying, ‘We don’t want to use evidence for our decision-making,’” Nosek said. Most scientific controversies aren’t about science at all, and once the sides are drawn, more data is unlikely to bring opponents into agreement. Michael Carolan, who researches the sociology of technology and scientific knowledge at Colorado State University, wrote in a 2008 paper about why objective knowledge is not enough to resolve environmental controversies. “While these controversies may appear on the surface to rest on disputed questions of fact, beneath often reside differing positions of value; values that can give shape to differing understandings of what ‘the facts’ are.” What’s needed in these cases isn’t more or better science, but mechanisms to bring those hidden values to the forefront of the discussion so that they can be debated transparently. “As long as we continue down this unabashedly naive road about what science is, and what it is capable of doing, we will continue to fail to reach any sort of meaningful consensus on these matters,” Carolan writes. The dispute over tobacco was never about the science of cigarettes’ link to cancer. It was about whether companies have the right to sell dangerous products and, if so, what obligations they have to the consumers who purchased them. Similarly, the debate over climate change isn’t about whether our planet is heating, but about how much responsibility each country and person bears for stopping it. While researching her book “Merchants of Doubt,” science historian Naomi Oreskes found that some of the same people who were defending the tobacco industry as scientific experts were also receiving industry money to deny the role of human activity in global warming. What these issues had in common, she realized, was that they all involved the need for government action. “None of this is about the science. All of this is a political debate about the role of government,” she said in the documentary. These controversies are really about values, not scientific facts, and acknowledging that would allow us to have more truthful and productive debates. What would that look like in practice? Instead of cherry-picking evidence to support a particular view (and insisting that the science points to a desired action), the various sides could lay out the values they are using to assess the evidence. For instance, in Europe, many decisions are guided by the precautionary principle — a system that values caution in the face of uncertainty and says that when the risks are unclear, it should be up to industries to show that their products and processes are not harmful, rather than requiring the government to prove that they are harmful before they can be regulated. By contrast, U.S. agencies tend to wait for strong evidence of harm before issuing regulations. Both approaches have critics, but the difference between them comes down to priorities: Is it better to exercise caution at the risk of burdening companies and perhaps the economy, or is it more important to avoid potential economic downsides even if it means that sometimes a harmful product or industrial process goes unregulated? In other words, under what circumstances do we agree to act on a risk? How certain do we need to be that the risk is real, and how many people would need to be at risk, and how costly is it to reduce that risk? Those are moral questions, not scientific ones, and openly discussing and identifying these kinds of judgment calls would lead to a more honest debate. Science matters, and we need to do it as rigorously as possible. But science can’t tell us how risky is too risky to allow products like cigarettes or potentially harmful pesticides to be sold — those are value judgements that only humans can make.

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