If Clause and Wish 1 by Kai

I beg to move, That this House welcomes the formation of a Government representing the united and inflexible resolve of the nation to prosecute the war with Germany to a victorious conclusion. On Friday evening last I received His Majesty's commission to form a new Administration. It as the evident wish and will of Parliament and the nation that this should be conceived on the broadest possible basis and that it should include all parties, both those who supported the late Government and also the parties of the Opposition. I have completed the most important part of this task. A War Cabinet has been formed of five Members, representing, with the Opposition Liberals, the unity of the nation. The three party Leaders have agreed to serve, either in the War Cabinet or in high executive office. The three Fighting Services have been filled. It was necessary that this should be done in one single day, on account of the extreme urgency and rigour of events. A number of other positions, key positions, were filled yesterday, and I am submitting a further list to His Majesty to-night. I hope to complete the appointment of the principal Ministers during to-morrow. the appointment of the other Ministers usually takes a little longer, but I trust that, when Parliament meets again, this part of my task will be completed, and that the administration will be complete in all respects. I considered it in the public interest to suggest that the House should be summoned to meet today. Mr. Speaker agreed, and took the necessary steps, in accordance with the powers conferred upon him by the Resolution of the House. At the end of the proceedings today, the Adjournment of the House will be proposed until Tuesday, 21st May, with, of course, provision for earlier meeting, if need be. The business to be considered during that week will be notified to Members at the earliest opportunity. I now invite the House, by the Motion which stands in my name, to record its approval of the steps taken and to declare its confidence in the new Government. To form an Administration of this scale and complexity is a serious undertaking in itself, but it must be remembered that we are in the preliminary stage of one of the greatest battles in history, that we are in action at many other points in Norway and in Holland, that we have to be prepared in the Mediterranean, that the air battle is continuous and that many preparations, such as have been indicated by my hon. Friend below the Gangway, have to be made here at home. In this crisis I hope I may be pardoned if I do not address the House at any length today. I hope that any of my friends and colleagues, or former colleagues, who are affected by the political reconstruction, will make allowance, all allowance, for any lack of ceremony with which it has been necessary to act. I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined this government: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat." 2 We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what is our policy? I can say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. Let that be realised; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal. But I take up my task with buoyancy and hope. I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men. At this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all, and I say, "come then, let us go forward together with our united strength."

Fed. 51: To the People of the State of New York: TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE. PUBLIUS.

If clause type 1 for 7 grades, use photos and optical tools

Legislative Structure: Congress -- two houses: Senate (2 senators from each state, 6 year terms, must be at least 30 years old and have been a citizen for at least nine years) -- Constitution originally allowed state legislatures to choose the two senators but now elected by popular vote House of Representatives (number based on population of state, determined every ten years in a census -- number now set at 435; 2 year terms, must be at least 25 years old and have been a citizen for 7 years) Legislative Powers: Makes the laws -- any senator or representative can propose a bill -- if majority in one house favors it, bill goes to other house for debate -- if approved by both -- goes to the president to be signed into law -- President can veto any proposed law but can then be overruled if there is a two thirds majority in both houses favoring the law Elastic Clause -- can make all laws “necessary and proper” to carry out its other powers Only the House of Representatives can propose new taxes Only Congress can decide on how to spend the money raised through taxes Power to raise (pay for) an army and navy To declare war Approves treaties and executive appointments -- Senate How was the debate over how the president should be chosen resolved? The Electoral College System -- made up of electors who cast votes to elect the president and vice-president every four years Each state has as many electors in the Electoral College as the number of senators and reps it sends to Congress. The votes cast by electors are called electoral votes. Delegates left the method of choosing electors up to each state. Before 1820, state legislatures chose electors in most states. Today, people choose their state’s electors when they vote in presidential elections. The electors then cast their ballots for president and vice-president on a date chosen by Congress. Today must win at least 270 of the 538 total electoral votes

Etymology explains the origin of the word itself. Example: Using the example term “arbitration”: Arbitration comes from the Latin judicium which means “judgment”. 2. History discusses the history of the term, its use, and controversies associated with it. Example: The use of arbitration as third-party mediation dates from the 1630s. 3. Cause and Effect discusses how the situation came about and what effects it may have. Example: An arbitration clause is considered to be ambiguous when the parties do not express clearly, that in case of conflict, the method to use to settle the disagreements will be arbitration. Hence, parties are compelled to refrain from signing confusing agreements to arbitrate, because the general rule is that arbitration is prompted out of the contract, and if there is not an explicit arbitration clause within the contract it would not be an agreement to arbitrate. 4. Description lists and defines the term. Example: Arbitration is the process of solving an argument between people by helping them to agree to an acceptable solution. It is the formal process of having an outside person, chosen by both sides to a disagreement to end the disagreement. 5. Principles of Operation discusses how something functions, including any special materials or conditions required. Example: Arbitration is conducted by a trained arbiter who sets down the rules that the parties must abide by. The object of arbitration is to obtain a fair resolution of disputes by an impartial third party without unnecessary expense or delay. Parties should be free to agree on how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary for the public interest. Courts should not interfere. 5 6. Classification shows how the topic fits into a larger category. Example: Arbitration is one of the alternatives to going into a formal court to settle disputes. 7. Contrast shows how the topic differs from others in the same class. Example: In an arbitration proceeding, no lawyers are present. The main difference between arbitration and litigation law is that the court is involved in the case of litigation, as it is a lawsuit, whereas, in arbitration, a settlement between the parties is done outside of court. 8. Comparison shows how the topic is similar to others in the class. Example: As with lawsuits or other court proceedings, the decision in an arbitration proceeding is legally binding on the parties. 9. Analogy explains and compares two dissimilar topics, where the second is familiar to the audience. Example: An arbiter is like a referee–he or she listens to both sides and decides as to who is at fault, without the intervention of outside parties. 10.Examples represent other things because they have all the main qualities or characteristics that the thing they represent also have. Examples: Arbitration was used to settle the dispute between the labor union and management. Two people who are divorcing cannot agree on terms and allow a third party to come in to help them negotiate

Extradition (International law), Political Offence Exception, The Political Offense Exception (POE) serves as a critical safeguard in international extradition law, allowing a requested state to refuse the surrender of a fugitive if their alleged crime is of a "political character." These offenses are categorized into two types: **pure political offenses**, such as treason or espionage, which target the state's political organization without harming individuals; and **relative political offenses**, which are common crimes like robbery committed with a political motive. To distinguish between these, courts apply various judicial tests. For instance, the **Political Incidence Test** (established in *In re Castioni*) focuses on whether the act was incidental to a political disturbance, while the **Swiss Proportionality Test** weighs the political end against the criminal means used, denying the exception if the harm caused is disproportionate. In the context of **state succession**, the application of extradition treaties depends largely on the underlying legal theory adopted by the new sovereign. Under **Universal Succession**, the new state inherits all prior treaties and obligations, ensuring legal continuity. Conversely, the **Clean Slate (Tabula Rasa) Theory**, often seen in decolonization, suggests that new states are not bound by the predecessor’s treaties, potentially creating "safe havens" for fugitives until new agreements are reached. Practical examples include the **Dissolution of the USSR**, where Russia acted as the "continuator" state inheriting treaties, and the **Partition of India and Pakistan**, where a devolution agreement ensured that colonial-era treaties remained in effect. Despite its protective intent, the POE faces **modern erosion** to ensure that heinous acts do not go unpunished. Specific limitations, such as the **Attentat Clause**, explicitly exclude the assassination of a head of state from being considered a political offense. Similarly, modern treaties and conventions (like the *Meunier* ruling) exclude **terrorism**, hijacking, and crimes against humanity from the exception, viewing these acts as attacks on the general social order rather than legitimate political dissent. This evolution reflects a growing international consensus that the gravity of certain crimes—such as those seen in the **Rainbow Warrior case study**—far outweighs any claimed political motivation, shifting the legal focus toward human rights and the prevention of torture.

Future in time clauses and if clauses

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