Imperativ in der deutschen Sprache

imperative verbs in procedure text lesson

Imperative Practice: Type each verb in the imperative for the pronoun given.

Short Quiz in English 3 Identify an imperative sentence

Le chef : voir, boire, croire and faire in present, the imperative

One of the best ways of ensuring a long life is by staying active, both physically and mentally. Ha~f an ho~r of vigor~us stretching in the morning will help to keep your muscles supple. whilst runnl~g for a kl lome~re or [wo will improve your cardiovascular fitness. Asyou get older. you might find It easier to go for a walk, but any kind of exercise is positive. It is also imperative to tax our brains. Sitting down with a book or a crossword is a useful way of exercising our minds and helps to keep us mentally flexible.

Non è un caso che l’Antico Testamento si apra con il gesto atroce e ingiustificabile di Caino. II punto scabroso e che uccidere il proprio fratello non appartiene a un mondo animale, ma a un mondo umano. É un aspetto terrificante dell’umano sul quale non bisogna chiudere gli occhi. II crimine non è infatti la regressione dell’uomo all’animale come una cattiva cultura moralistica vorrebbe farci credere, ma esprime una tendenza propriamente umana. Questo è il dramma che il moltiplicarsi recente di atti efferati di violenza ci costringe ad affrontare. Se l’umanizzazione della vita avviene come un attraversamento della violenza che ci abita – della nostra ombra più scura -, essa non può mai cancellare la violenza, ma decidere casomai, ogni volta, per la sua rinuncia. É questo uno dei compiti più difficili che incombe sugli esseri umani: saper rinunciare alla violenza in nome me del riconoscimento dell’Altro come prossimo, come essere singolare. Si tratta di un riconoscimento che non è mai indolore perchè ci obbliga ad accettare che “Io non sono tutto”, che la mia vita non esaurisce quella del mondo e quella degli altri. Significa sopportare quella che Freud considerava una “frustrazione narcisistica” necessaria per riconoscersi appartenere ad una comunità umana. II problema è che questa difficoltà soggettiva a simbolizzare la violenza viene oggi drammaticamente amplificata da quelli che mi paiono i due nuovi comandamenti sociali che sembrano dominare il nostro tempo e che l’attuale crisi economica rende a sua volta ancora più tossici. Il primo comandamento è quello del Nuovo. E la spinta a ricercare sempre altro da quello che si ha, a scambiare quello che si ha con quello che ancora non si ha nell’illusione che sia quello che non si ha a custodire la felicita. L’esperienza clinica della psicoanalisi mostra invece che il Nuovo – al cui miraggio molti consacrano la loro esistenza – anziché rendere la vita soddisfatta, non fa altro che riprodurre la stessa identica insoddisfazione. ll secondo comandamento è quello del Successo. Nessun tempo come il nostro sembra togliere diritto di cittadinanza al fallimento, all’errore, al ripiegamento, all’insuccesso. Nessun tempo come il nostro ha enfatizzato come una questione di vita o di morte la realizzazione del proprio successo personale. Ebbene la violenza su di sé 0 sugli altri viene al posto di questo lavoro di simbolizzazione del proprio fallimento. Accade, per esempio, nei rapporti tra uomo e donna quando uno dei due non sopporta il tradimento o l’allontanamento dell’altro e si sente autorizzato ad agire violentemente per ristabilire l’autorevolezza della propria immagine narcisistica infangata e umiliata dalla libertà dell’Altro. Il femminicidio non ha altra ragione psichica – ne ha altre e profonde di origine culturale – se non questa: utilizzare la violenza, l’atto brutale, al posto di assumere su di sé il peso della propria solitudine e del proprio fallimento. Una miscela esplosiva di narcisismo e depressione. Siamo di fronte a quella che Pasolini avrebbe probabilmente chiamato una “mutazione antropologica: l’uomo è divenuto una macchina di godimento. E quando questa macchina funziona meno, non è oliata sufficientemente, non ha più benzina, o, più semplicemente, si guasta, si rompe, c’e la caduta nel vuoto. Per questa ragione l’attuale diffusione epidemica della depressione si può intendere solo dall’intreccio di questi due nuovi comandamenti sociali. Non è più una depressione che sorge dall’esperienza”filosofica”ed esistenziale del vuoto e dell’insensatezza dell’esistenza (Leopardi, Schopenhauer), ma si genera per un difetto di adattamento all’imperativo del Nuovo e a quello del successo: chi resta indietro, chi resta tagliato fuori, chi non partecipa a questa “mobilitazione totale” della vita verso la sua affermazione positiva, si vive come superfluo, inutile alla società, precipita nel tunnel della depressione. E non si deve dimenticare come questa”diagnosi” sia usata ogni qualvolta ci si trovi di fronte ad atti di violenza ingiustificabili. Non si tratta di un alibi, al contrario. Non a caso Lacan affermava – suscitando scandalo – che la depressione è una vera e propria “viltà etica”, non del tutto estranea al giudizio di condanna che i padri della Chiesa esprimevano sul’accidia e ha l’obiettivo di mostrare che nella depressione c’è sempre una responsabilità del soggetto che non va mai dimenticata. Essa coincide con la difficoltà ad essere, ad elaborare simbolicamente, il proprio fallimento, il proprio insuccesso, la ferita narcisistica subita dalla propria immagine. Se non sono l’Io che credevo di essere (narcisismo), nulla ha più senso di esistere (depressione). Di fronte ad una cultura che sembra rigettare il valore formativo dell’esperienza del fallimento e che insegue i miraggi del successo, il ricorso alla violenza sembra apparire allora come un talismano malefico per esorcizzare l’appuntamento fatale con la nostra vulnerabilità e insufficienza dalla quale, poiché – come canta il poeta – dai diamanti non nasce niente, potrebbero sorgere invece fiori nuovi.

1.1945-1949: The immediate years after the Second World War ● At the end of 1945, Mao Zedong had come to see the USA as the greatest threat to his aspirations. a. He understood that East Asians were looking to the USA as the true liberator from Japanese imperialism. b. The USA’s support for the Kuomintang(KMT) and the restoration of U.S. authority in formerly Japanese Manchuria clashed with the CCP’s plans to use the region for its own needs in the impending civil war between the CCP and the GMD. ■ To compound matters, while the KMT was recognised internationally as the official government in China, Mao and the CCP saw the party as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. ● While Mao saw the USA as the greater threat to the CCP’s plans, Soviet actions also frustrated him. a. The USSR provided minimal and incoherent support for the Chinese Communists in Yan’an and Manchuria. b. Stalin also attempted to extract territorial and economic concessions from the Guomindang government in the Friendship and Alliance Treaty China signed in August 1945 under American and Soviet pressure in exchange for Soviet entry into the Second World War against Japan. ● The emerging superpower conflict over Europe and over American intervention in the impending civil war in China led to Mao’s ideological perception of the 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 8 USA as an aggressive imperialist power that was hostile towards other countries, especially the USSR and China. ● In 1946, Mao promoted the theory of the intermediate zone, which envisioned a global united front against American imperialism. a. Mao saw the emerging superpower conflict as an American-Soviet contest for the intermediate zones, the capitalist, colonial and semi- colonial countries of West Europe, Africa, and Asia. b. Mao believed that the USSR was the defender of world peace. c. The intermediate zone, which included China, would not be part of the socialist camp. d. Despite the tremendous potential that U.S. aid held for China’s reconstruction, Mao’s ideological worldview and the impending civil war against the Guomindang prevented him from seeking normalised relations with the USA. In 1949, Mao decided to lean towards the side of the USSR despite two decades of unreliable support from them. e. Mao saw the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East Europe as evidence that China should isolate capitalist-bourgeois forces within it.2 f. Stalin had expelled Yugoslavia from the socialist camp as its leader, Tito was seen to have directly challenged Stalin’s authority. ■ Mao thus saw it as imperative to stress close unity to the USSR lest he was seen as a second Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, Mao sought a loose partnership with the USSR because Mao believed that China should preserve a high measure of self- reliance and zili gengsheng (自力更生) (regeneration through one’s own efforts). ● When the People’s Republic of China was formed on 1 October, 1949, relations between China’s and the USSR’s communists had improved substantially. a. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was also aware that the USSR never treated Chinese interests as a priority. What the CCP failed to fully understand was that Stalin ruled East Europe much like it was his empire and how this would have implications for China. b. In Mao’s first visit to the USSR in December 1949, Stalin was non- committal regarding the interests raised by the Chinese, and treated Mao as an underling as he feared that closer relations with the PRC would cause the USSR to lose privileges gained from the KMT. _________________________ 2 What Mao did not realise at that point was that the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East European countries were part of Stalin’s intentional design to consolidate the power of communists in them. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 9 A note on Sino-American relations 2. Early 1950: The USA’s hands-off policy towards Taiwan begins to change ● By early 1950, the Truman administration had written off Taiwan and believed it was only a matter of time before the island fell to the PLA. ● Two events in early 1950 changed the USA’s position on East Asia. ○ The formation of the USSR-PRC alliance in February 1950 ○ The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 3. 1950: The Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty ● Signed on 14 February, 1950. 3.1Implications for Sino-Soviet relations ● Stalin saw it as a means to get concessions that he had failed to get from the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1945. ● For Mao and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC), the alliance would provide security against U.S. imperialism and allow the PRC to get economic aid for reconstruction from the USSR. ● The Chinese realised soon after the 1950 treaty had been signed that the Soviet Union was intent on exploiting the agreement in its own favour. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 10 ● The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially directed against Japanese militarism and its allies, especially the USA. ● The Sino-Soviet alliance comprised three elements: party, military and economic relations. ○ Party: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was included in the customs of communist party internationalism, such as regular exchange of party delegations to congresses of the fraternal parties in Stalin’s socialist camp. ■ This move was meant to bring the PRC’s ideological beliefs about communism into greater alignment with the USSR’s. ○ Military: The alliance was supposed to provide the newly formed and weak PRC with a strategic deterrent and military aid against the USA on three fronts: Guomindang-held Taiwan, divided Korea, and Vietnam where France attempted to reestablish its colonial control. ■ Convinced that the USA would aggressively seek ways to undermine the CCP-led PRC through Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam, Mao sought an active defence. ● While in Moscow, Mao unsuccessfully asked Stalin to provide military assistance for the liberation of Taiwan. ● At the beginning of 1950, the PRC delivered large-scale military aid to Hanoi. The PRC was the first country to grant the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam diplomatic recognition on 18 January 1950; Mao persuaded Stalin to do so on 30 January 1950. ● The PRC committed itself to North Korea, where Mao saw the commitment to North Korea both as a defence against U.S. imperialism and as support for a fellow communist country. ○ Economic: During Mao’s first stay in Moscow, Stalin had personally promised the delivery of fifty projects for primary industrialisation. ■ The agreement also led to a series of supplementary ones, such as a US$ 300 million loan that the PRC would repay with a mixture of strategic materials, rubber, agricultural products, goods for daily use and hard currency. ■ Significantly, Stalin used Soviet military and economic aid to extract concessions similar to those he failed to get from the Guomindang government in 1945. ■ The USSR and PRC would disagree on the pace and extent of the PRC’s planned development. ● In the last five weeks of Stalin’s life in early 1953, he attempted to pressure the PRC to reduce the planned 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 11 development speed to a mere annual growth of 13-14 percent, and to plan individual projects in detail beforehand. These moves would potentially result in the PRC’s economy growing at a slower rate than initially projected. ● However, after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the PRC’s Zhou Enlai decided to use his visit of condolence to the USSR to press forward negotiations. ○ When talks resumed in 1 April 1953, Beijing pressed for 150 Soviet industrial projects, but Moscow reduced them to 91 on the basis of insufficient data provided by the Chinese. ■ The economic disarray after China’s civil war and the economic pressures that came with the Korean War influenced recovery and reconstruction in the early years of the PRC. ● Despite the PRC being unable to tap into Soviet economic assistance immediately, mutual trade between China and the USSR nevertheless increased 6.5 times from 1950 to 1956. ● Together with the 50 projects promised by Stalin in 1950, the final version of the First FYP for the PRC included 141 Soviet and 68 East European projects in a total of 649 planned. Three thousand Soviet advisers sent to China in subsequent years were directly linked to the First FYP. ● By 1955, over 60 percent of China’s goods exchange was with the USSR. ● Soviet economic assistance to China added up to the largest foreign development venture in the socialist camp ever. ○ The total number of planned projects amounted to between 300 and 360 projects. ○ However, the number of total finished projects ranged between 134 and 150. ● Transfers of knowledge and expertise were important to China’s economic development. ○ A study on Soviet experts counts 1,445 political advisers and 9,313 technical specialists sent to China until their sudden withdrawal in mid-1960. ■ For political reasons, the gradual withdrawal of advisers began after late 1956.

Eng7 Q4 L2 Using imperatives and prepositions in giving instructions

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