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Industrialization in US 1800s
Quiz by Maria Tejera
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Key Terms for Industrialization in the USTEKS Social Studies Grade 8 - 8.28.B: Identify Examples Of How Industrialization Changed Life In The U.S.1.1945-1949: The immediate years after the Second World War ● At the end of 1945, Mao Zedong had come to see the USA as the greatest threat to his aspirations. a. He understood that East Asians were looking to the USA as the true liberator from Japanese imperialism. b. The USA’s support for the Kuomintang(KMT) and the restoration of U.S. authority in formerly Japanese Manchuria clashed with the CCP’s plans to use the region for its own needs in the impending civil war between the CCP and the GMD. ■To compound matters, while the KMT was recognised internationally as the official government in China, Mao and the CCP saw the party as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. ● While Mao saw the USA as the greater threat to the CCP’s plans, Soviet actions also frustrated him. a. The USSR provided minimal and incoherent support for the Chinese Communists in Yan’an and Manchuria. b. Stalin also attempted to extract territorial and economic concessions from the Guomindang government in the Friendship and Alliance Treaty China signed in August 1945 under American and Soviet pressure in exchange for Soviet entry into the Second World War against Japan. ● The emerging superpower conflict over Europe and over American intervention in the impending civil war in China led to Mao’s ideological perception of the 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 8 USA as an aggressive imperialist power that was hostile towards other countries, especially the USSR and China. ● In 1946, Mao promoted the theory of the intermediate zone, which envisioned a global united front against American imperialism. a. Mao saw the emerging superpower conflict as an American-Soviet contest for the intermediate zones, the capitalist, colonial and semi- colonial countries of West Europe, Africa, and Asia. b. Mao believed that the USSR was the defender of world peace. c. The intermediate zone, which included China, would not be part of the socialist camp. d. Despite the tremendous potential that U.S. aid held for China’s reconstruction, Mao’s ideological worldview and the impending civil war against the Guomindang prevented him from seeking normalised relations with the USA. In 1949, Mao decided to lean towards the side of the USSR despite two decades of unreliable support from them. e. Mao saw the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East Europe as evidence that China should isolate capitalist-bourgeois forces within it.2 f. Stalin had expelled Yugoslavia from the socialist camp as its leader, Tito was seen to have directly challenged Stalin’s authority. ■Mao thus saw it as imperative to stress close unity to the USSR lest he was seen as a second Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, Mao sought a loose partnership with the USSR because Mao believed that China should preserve a high measure of self- reliance and zili gengsheng (自力更生) (regeneration through one’s own efforts). ● When the People’s Republic of China was formed on 1 October, 1949, relations between China’s and the USSR’s communists had improved substantially. a. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was also aware that the USSR never treated Chinese interests as a priority. What the CCP failed to fully understand was that Stalin ruled East Europe much like it was his empire and how this would have implications for China. b. In Mao’s first visit to the USSR in December 1949, Stalin was non- committal regarding the interests raised by the Chinese, and treated Mao as an underling as he feared that closer relations with the PRC would cause the USSR to lose privileges gained from the KMT. _________________________ 2 What Mao did not realise at that point was that the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East European countries were part of Stalin’s intentional design to consolidate the power of communists in them. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 9 A note on Sino-American relations 2. Early 1950: The USA’s hands-off policy towards Taiwan begins to change ● By early 1950, the Truman administration had written off Taiwan and believed it was only a matter of time before the island fell to the PLA. ● Two events in early 1950 changed the USA’s position on East Asia. ○ The formation of the USSR-PRC alliance in February 1950 ○ The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 3. 1950: The Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty ● Signed on 14 February, 1950. 3.1Implications for Sino-Soviet relations ● Stalin saw it as a means to get concessions that he had failed to get from the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1945. ● For Mao and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC), the alliance would provide security against U.S. imperialism and allow the PRC to get economic aid for reconstruction from the USSR. ● The Chinese realised soon after the 1950 treaty had been signed that the Soviet Union was intent on exploiting the agreement in its own favour. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 10 ● The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially directed against Japanese militarism and its allies, especially the USA. ● The Sino-Soviet alliance comprised three elements: party, military and economic relations. ○ Party: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was included in the customs of communist party internationalism, such as regular exchange of party delegations to congresses of the fraternal parties in Stalin’s socialist camp. ■This move was meant to bring the PRC’s ideological beliefs about communism into greater alignment with the USSR’s. ○ Military: The alliance was supposed to provide the newly formed and weak PRC with a strategic deterrent and military aid against the USA on three fronts: Guomindang-held Taiwan, divided Korea, and Vietnam where France attempted to reestablish its colonial control. ■Convinced that the USA would aggressively seek ways to undermine the CCP-led PRC through Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam, Mao sought an active defence. ● While in Moscow, Mao unsuccessfully asked Stalin to provide military assistance for the liberation of Taiwan. ● At the beginning of 1950, the PRC delivered large-scale military aid to Hanoi. The PRC was the first country to grant the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam diplomatic recognition on 18 January 1950; Mao persuaded Stalin to do so on 30 January 1950. ● The PRC committed itself to North Korea, where Mao saw the commitment to North Korea both as a defence against U.S. imperialism and as support for a fellow communist country. ○ Economic: During Mao’s first stay in Moscow, Stalin had personally promised the delivery of fifty projects for primary industrialisation. ■The agreement also led to a series of supplementary ones, such as a US$ 300 million loan that the PRC would repay with a mixture of strategic materials, rubber, agricultural products, goods for daily use and hard currency. ■Significantly, Stalin used Soviet military and economic aid to extract concessions similar to those he failed to get from the Guomindang government in 1945. ■The USSR and PRC would disagree on the pace and extent of the PRC’s planned development. ● In the last five weeks of Stalin’s life in early 1953, he attempted to pressure the PRC to reduce the planned 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 11 development speed to a mere annual growth of 13-14 percent, and to plan individual projects in detail beforehand. These moves would potentially result in the PRC’s economy growing at a slower rate than initially projected. ● However, after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the PRC’s Zhou Enlai decided to use his visit of condolence to the USSR to press forward negotiations. ○ When talks resumed in 1 April 1953, Beijing pressed for 150 Soviet industrial projects, but Moscow reduced them to 91 on the basis of insufficient data provided by the Chinese. ■The economic disarray after China’s civil war and the economic pressures that came with the Korean War influenced recovery and reconstruction in the early years of the PRC. ● Despite the PRC being unable to tap into Soviet economic assistance immediately, mutual trade between China and the USSR nevertheless increased 6.5 times from 1950 to 1956. ● Together with the 50 projects promised by Stalin in 1950, the final version of the First FYP for the PRC included 141 Soviet and 68 East European projects in a total of 649 planned. Three thousand Soviet advisers sent to China in subsequent years were directly linked to the First FYP. ● By 1955, over 60 percent of China’s goods exchange was with the USSR. ● Soviet economic assistance to China added up to the largest foreign development venture in the socialist camp ever. ○ The total number of planned projects amounted to between 300 and 360 projects. ○ However, the number of total finished projects ranged between 134 and 150. ● Transfers of knowledge and expertise were important to China’s economic development. ○ A study on Soviet experts counts 1,445 political advisers and 9,313 technical specialists sent to China until their sudden withdrawal in mid-1960. ■For political reasons, the gradual withdrawal of advisers began after late 1956.Industrialization in the New South - Exit QuizIndustrialization in the Late 19th CenturyIndustrialization in the New South - Starter QuizIndustry of Southeast Asia Industrialization in Southeast Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon, much of the development having occurred only since the early 1960s. As mentioned above, industrialization policies have been critical goals in the market economies of the ASEAN countries; and, in all of them except Brunei, industry’s share of the GDP has grown considerably. The most significant increases have occurred in Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Manufacturing in particular has accounted for the greatest changes, with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand making especially large gains during the 1980s. Small factories dominate, both in terms of the number of companies and the number of workers employed. Agricultural processing is most important in virtually all nations. The notable exception is Singapore, where the manufacture of a variety of products, headed by electrical and electronic and transport equipment, is dominant. In Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines, textiles and clothing are significant, as is the chemical industry in Thailand and Indonesia. Light, labour-intensive goods, such as electrical and electronic products, are increasingly important. It is in the manufacture of these products and textiles that the most employment has been gained. Tin is the most important metallic mineral in the region in terms of value, and Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia account for more than half of world production. In Malaysia and elsewhere, however, alluvial lodes are becoming depleted, and the remaining concentrations are less economical to mine. Fluctuating market prices have also discouraged tin production. Nickel, copper, and chromite are also mined, although the quantities produced in the region are minor in terms of world production. Southeast Asia has considerable reserves of oil and natural gas, notably in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Trade Given Southeast Asia’s strategic location and the early development of trade there, it is not surprising that trade is especially important to all nations in the region. The value of regional trade is about one-third that of the United States. Most striking is the almost total dominance of trade by the market economies. Exports, as a percentage of the GDP, are small in Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos and moderately so in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Countries with a relatively large proportion of export trade are Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei. Composition of exports is important. In this respect, Indonesia—the trade structure of which long has been dominated by oil—has been relatively successful in diversifying its exports toward plywood, rattan, coffee, rubber, and textiles. Conversely, Malaysia, with a trade pattern of exporting palm oil, tropical hardwoods, and tin, now derives the majority of its export income from petroleum products. This revenue has been used to build up the country’s industrial base. Thailand exhibits a much less diverse export structure, where food and manufactured goods account for nearly all of its total trade. Likewise, Brunei relies almost entirely on its petroleum exports. Singapore, however, has utilized its unique geographic position and highly educated labour force to attract multinational corporations. As a result, investment in the manufacturing and, increasingly, service sectors has greatly expanded. Intraregional trade among the ASEAN members, while important, accounts for only about one-fifth of Southeast Asia’s total trade. Philippine trade within the region is especially small, reflecting its long-term orientation toward the United States. Far more important, therefore, is the trade with countries outside the region, dominated by that with Japan, Europe, and the United States; increasingly significant, however, is the trade with Taiwan, China (especially Hong Kong), and South Korea.Economy of Southeast Asia Even prior to the penetration of European interests, Southeast Asia was a critical part of the world trading system. A wide range of commodities originated in the region, but especially important were such spices as pepper, ginger, cloves, and nutmeg. The spice trade initially was developed by Indian and Arab merchants, but it also brought Europeans to the region. First the Portuguese, then the Dutch, and finally the British and French became involved in this enterprise in various countries. The penetration of European commercial interests gradually evolved into annexation of territories, as traders lobbied for an extension of control to protect and expand their activities. As a result, the Dutch moved into Indonesia, the British into Malaya, and the French into Indochina. Europe’s interest and activity in the region was further enhanced by the opening of the Suez Canal, the development of telegraphic communications, the adoption of steam shipping, and the prospects for trade with China. In the case of Malaya, the gradual diffusion of British administration provided systems of law and order and of taxation and allowed for the gradual development of infrastructure, principally reliable transport systems. This environment attracted Chinese immigrants, and the growth of the tin mining industry soon followed. Later rubber plantations were established, which brought about still further immigration. Similar developments took place in Burma (Myanmar), Vietnam, and Indonesia. In Siam (Thailand) during the second half of the 19th century, a rapid expansion of Western enterprise occurred, though not by colonization. Both British and American firms began trading in the region. The impact of the Western activity was essentially to remove trade from what had been a Chinese monopoly and to emphasize the export of a single commodity, rice. Established indigenous textile and sugar-processing industries were replaced by imports, and the economy slowly became dependent on rice exports. The Philippines gradually developed a plantation farming system under Spanish and later American influence, although rice, sugar, and tobacco continued to be produced by small-scale growers and processed by Chinese enterprises until the mid-19th century. The incorporation of Southeast Asia into the world economy had a major impact on the distribution of the region’s economic development, and it created more uneven patterns of population growth and economic activity. It also brought about a stronger sense of class distinction and resulted in a larger discrepancy between the wealthy and poor. The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s severely affected the commercialized areas most dependent on the world economy. Unemployment rose, and the period produced the seeds of political change and activism that culminated in the independence of most of the region’s countries after World War II. Since the 1950s the economic development strategies of virtually all the capitalist Southeast Asian states have emphasized urban industrialization, while agricultural development generally has been viewed as subsidiary to industrial growth. These strategies have met with mixed success. Indeed, the trading pattern of the region by and large has continued to be one of producing and exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Only Singapore has reached an advanced level of industrialization, in the process becoming one of the world’s great centers of industry and commerce. There is great disparity in development rates within the region, especially between the member and nonmember countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Those belonging to this grouping—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—generally have experienced significant economic development since the mid-1960s; the exception has been the Philippines, the economy of which has grown at a much slower rate. Development has been extremely slow or nonexistent in the non-ASEAN countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, and these are among the poorest nations in the world.