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Late Cold War Unit
Quiz by Deborah Gonzales
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1.1945-1949: The immediate years after the Second World War ● At the end of 1945, Mao Zedong had come to see the USA as the greatest threat to his aspirations. a. He understood that East Asians were looking to the USA as the true liberator from Japanese imperialism. b. The USA’s support for the Kuomintang(KMT) and the restoration of U.S. authority in formerly Japanese Manchuria clashed with the CCP’s plans to use the region for its own needs in the impending civil war between the CCP and the GMD. ■To compound matters, while the KMT was recognised internationally as the official government in China, Mao and the CCP saw the party as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. ● While Mao saw the USA as the greater threat to the CCP’s plans, Soviet actions also frustrated him. a. The USSR provided minimal and incoherent support for the Chinese Communists in Yan’an and Manchuria. b. Stalin also attempted to extract territorial and economic concessions from the Guomindang government in the Friendship and Alliance Treaty China signed in August 1945 under American and Soviet pressure in exchange for Soviet entry into the Second World War against Japan. ● The emerging superpower conflict over Europe and over American intervention in the impending civil war in China led to Mao’s ideological perception of the 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 8 USA as an aggressive imperialist power that was hostile towards other countries, especially the USSR and China. ● In 1946, Mao promoted the theory of the intermediate zone, which envisioned a global united front against American imperialism. a. Mao saw the emerging superpower conflict as an American-Soviet contest for the intermediate zones, the capitalist, colonial and semi- colonial countries of West Europe, Africa, and Asia. b. Mao believed that the USSR was the defender of world peace. c. The intermediate zone, which included China, would not be part of the socialist camp. d. Despite the tremendous potential that U.S. aid held for China’s reconstruction, Mao’s ideological worldview and the impending civil war against the Guomindang prevented him from seeking normalised relations with the USA. In 1949, Mao decided to lean towards the side of the USSR despite two decades of unreliable support from them. e. Mao saw the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East Europe as evidence that China should isolate capitalist-bourgeois forces within it.2 f. Stalin had expelled Yugoslavia from the socialist camp as its leader, Tito was seen to have directly challenged Stalin’s authority. ■Mao thus saw it as imperative to stress close unity to the USSR lest he was seen as a second Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, Mao sought a loose partnership with the USSR because Mao believed that China should preserve a high measure of self- reliance and zili gengsheng (自力更生) (regeneration through one’s own efforts). ● When the People’s Republic of China was formed on 1 October, 1949, relations between China’s and the USSR’s communists had improved substantially. a. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was also aware that the USSR never treated Chinese interests as a priority. What the CCP failed to fully understand was that Stalin ruled East Europe much like it was his empire and how this would have implications for China. b. In Mao’s first visit to the USSR in December 1949, Stalin was non- committal regarding the interests raised by the Chinese, and treated Mao as an underling as he feared that closer relations with the PRC would cause the USSR to lose privileges gained from the KMT. _________________________ 2 What Mao did not realise at that point was that the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East European countries were part of Stalin’s intentional design to consolidate the power of communists in them. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 9 A note on Sino-American relations 2. Early 1950: The USA’s hands-off policy towards Taiwan begins to change ● By early 1950, the Truman administration had written off Taiwan and believed it was only a matter of time before the island fell to the PLA. ● Two events in early 1950 changed the USA’s position on East Asia. ○ The formation of the USSR-PRC alliance in February 1950 ○ The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 3. 1950: The Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty ● Signed on 14 February, 1950. 3.1Implications for Sino-Soviet relations ● Stalin saw it as a means to get concessions that he had failed to get from the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1945. ● For Mao and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC), the alliance would provide security against U.S. imperialism and allow the PRC to get economic aid for reconstruction from the USSR. ● The Chinese realised soon after the 1950 treaty had been signed that the Soviet Union was intent on exploiting the agreement in its own favour. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 10 ● The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially directed against Japanese militarism and its allies, especially the USA. ● The Sino-Soviet alliance comprised three elements: party, military and economic relations. ○ Party: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was included in the customs of communist party internationalism, such as regular exchange of party delegations to congresses of the fraternal parties in Stalin’s socialist camp. ■This move was meant to bring the PRC’s ideological beliefs about communism into greater alignment with the USSR’s. ○ Military: The alliance was supposed to provide the newly formed and weak PRC with a strategic deterrent and military aid against the USA on three fronts: Guomindang-held Taiwan, divided Korea, and Vietnam where France attempted to reestablish its colonial control. ■Convinced that the USA would aggressively seek ways to undermine the CCP-led PRC through Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam, Mao sought an active defence. ● While in Moscow, Mao unsuccessfully asked Stalin to provide military assistance for the liberation of Taiwan. ● At the beginning of 1950, the PRC delivered large-scale military aid to Hanoi. The PRC was the first country to grant the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam diplomatic recognition on 18 January 1950; Mao persuaded Stalin to do so on 30 January 1950. ● The PRC committed itself to North Korea, where Mao saw the commitment to North Korea both as a defence against U.S. imperialism and as support for a fellow communist country. ○ Economic: During Mao’s first stay in Moscow, Stalin had personally promised the delivery of fifty projects for primary industrialisation. ■The agreement also led to a series of supplementary ones, such as a US$ 300 million loan that the PRC would repay with a mixture of strategic materials, rubber, agricultural products, goods for daily use and hard currency. ■Significantly, Stalin used Soviet military and economic aid to extract concessions similar to those he failed to get from the Guomindang government in 1945. ■The USSR and PRC would disagree on the pace and extent of the PRC’s planned development. ● In the last five weeks of Stalin’s life in early 1953, he attempted to pressure the PRC to reduce the planned 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 11 development speed to a mere annual growth of 13-14 percent, and to plan individual projects in detail beforehand. These moves would potentially result in the PRC’s economy growing at a slower rate than initially projected. ● However, after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the PRC’s Zhou Enlai decided to use his visit of condolence to the USSR to press forward negotiations. ○ When talks resumed in 1 April 1953, Beijing pressed for 150 Soviet industrial projects, but Moscow reduced them to 91 on the basis of insufficient data provided by the Chinese. ■The economic disarray after China’s civil war and the economic pressures that came with the Korean War influenced recovery and reconstruction in the early years of the PRC. ● Despite the PRC being unable to tap into Soviet economic assistance immediately, mutual trade between China and the USSR nevertheless increased 6.5 times from 1950 to 1956. ● Together with the 50 projects promised by Stalin in 1950, the final version of the First FYP for the PRC included 141 Soviet and 68 East European projects in a total of 649 planned. Three thousand Soviet advisers sent to China in subsequent years were directly linked to the First FYP. ● By 1955, over 60 percent of China’s goods exchange was with the USSR. ● Soviet economic assistance to China added up to the largest foreign development venture in the socialist camp ever. ○ The total number of planned projects amounted to between 300 and 360 projects. ○ However, the number of total finished projects ranged between 134 and 150. ● Transfers of knowledge and expertise were important to China’s economic development. ○ A study on Soviet experts counts 1,445 political advisers and 9,313 technical specialists sent to China until their sudden withdrawal in mid-1960. ■For political reasons, the gradual withdrawal of advisers began after late 1956.By the late 1800s, the Spanish were losing control of Cuba. Concerned about insurrection in the countryside, they moved rural Cubans to “reconcentration” camps where the Spanish claimed they would be better able to protect them. U.S. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee forwarded the following account of the conditions of the camps to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State on November 27, 1897. Lee said the author of the note was “a man of integrity and character.” “[W]e will relate to you what we saw with our own eyes: “Four hundred and sixty women and children thrown on the ground, heaped pellet-mell as animals, some in a dying condition, others sick and others dead. . . . “There is still alive the only living witness, a young girl of 18 years, whom we found seemingly lifeless on the ground; on her right-hand side was the body of a young mother, cold and rigid, but with her young child still alive clinging to her dead body; on her left-hand side was also the corpse of a dead woman holding her son in a dead embrace. . . . “The circumstances are the following: complete accumulation of bodies dead and alive, so that it was impossible to take one step without walking over them; the greatest want of cleanliness, want of light, air, and water; the food lacking in quality and quantity what was necessary to sustain life. . . . From all this we deduct that the number of deaths among the reconcentrados has amounted to 77 per cent.” Source: Unsigned note that was included in a telegram sent by Fitzhugh Lee, U.S. Consul-General in Cuba, to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State November 27, 1897. consul-general: a government official living in a foreign country charged with overseeing the protection of U.S. citizens and promoting trade pell-mell: state of disorder accumulation: pile want: lack reconcentrados: the reconcentration camp prisoners; The following is an excerpt from Albert J. Beveridge’s speech, delivered September 16, 1898. Beveridge gave this speech while he was campaigning to become a senator for Indiana. The speech helped him win the election and made him one of the leading advocates of American expansion. “Fellow citizens, it is a noble land that God has given us; a land that can feed and clothe the world;. . . . It is a mighty people that he has planted on this soil . . . It is a glorious history our God has bestowed upon his chosen people; . . .a history of soldiers who carried the flag across the blazing deserts and through the ranks of hostile mountains, even to the gates of sunset. . . . “The Opposition tells us that we ought not to govern a people without their consent. I answer: The rule of liberty that all just government derives its authority from the consent of the governed, applies only to those who are capable of self-government. I answer, We govern the Indians without their consent, we govern our territories without their consent, we govern our children without their consent. “They ask us how we will govern these new possessions. I answer: If England can govern foreign lands, so can America. If Germany can govern foreign lands, so can America. . . . “What does all this mean for every one of us? It means opportunity for all the glorious young manhood of the republic, the most virile, ambitious, impatient, militant manhood the world has ever seen. It means that the resources and the commerce of these immensely rich dominions will be increased. . . . “In Cuba, alone, there are 15,000,000 acres of forest unacquainted with the axe. There are exhaustless mines of iron. . . . There are millions of acres yet unexplored. . . . It means new employment and better wages for every laboring man in the Union. . . . Growing up in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, a small city surrounded by endless plains, I've found unexpected echoes of home in China's smaller towns — from the warmth of locals in Huaihua, Central China's Hunan province, to the quiet charm of Yangshuo, South China's Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region. With an itch to see more of China's lesser-visited regions, I began planning a trip to the northwest with seven friends — five Americans, one Pakistani, one Zimbabwean, and one Colombian. We bought round-trip tickets from Shanghai to Yinchuan, Ningxia Hui autonomous region, for less than $120 each. From there, we planned to rent a car and drive to Xining in Qinghai, then on to Qinghai Lake, and finally to Lanzhou, Gansu. To make that possible, several of us applied for Chinese driver's licenses, a process that involved translating our US licenses into Mandarin and passing a short test on traffic laws. Within a day, we were licensed. As we piled into two rental cars in late March to begin our eight-day journey, it became clear that this wasn't just a road trip — it was the culmination of our four years in China, the Mandarin we had so diligently studied, and our ongoing effort to contribute to US-China people-to-people relations. Right away, we drew curious reactions. At the Yinchuan airport, taxi drivers offered us rides into the city, only to stare in astonishment when we told them we had rented cars. "You're driving? In China?" one driver asked, visibly surprised. It was a reaction we'd encountered multiple times during our trip, as foreign drivers are rare in China, especially in remote regions. In Yinchuan, we stocked up on snacks and adjusted to the chilly desert air. From there, we headed west, navigating wide highways framed by dramatic landscapes: arid plains, jagged mountains, and occasionally, a herd of sheep crossing the road. The vastness of the Northwest was humbling — and as someone who grew up on the wide-open prairies of South Dakota, it felt oddly familiar. One of the highlights of our trip was camping by Qinghai Lake, the largest saltwater lake in China. A few summers ago, Santiago Solano, one of my classmates from the US, cycled from Xi'an in Shaanxi to Urumqi in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region over the course of a month and met many kind strangers along the way. One of them was Geng San, a Tibetan lamb herder who managed a piece of land right next to Qinghai Lake and graciously invited us to camp there. "That's what China is — it's the people. The quiet generosity of an old Tibetan nomad who, years after we first met, still offered us a place to rest on his land," said Solano, who is also part of the group on this trip. But apparently, we underestimated just how cold it would be to camp next to Qinghai Lake in late March. It was deathly freezing. In preparation for the trip, we had ordered two tent kits and eight sleeping bags. However, when the temperature eventually dropped to — 10 C, all of us piled into the cars and turned the heaters on. So much for camping. From Qinghai Lake, we drove to Lanzhou, where we visited many food markets and tried every type of noodle on offer. Since we are college students, we rented a gaming hotel room — something I've only ever seen in China. At night, instead of attending local parties as we had before, we stayed in the hotel and gamed late into the morning. For me, the trip was as much about the journey as it was about the destinations. Driving through Northwest China gave us a unique perspective on the region's natural beauty and its people. At gas stations, shopkeepers greeted us with curiosity and kindness, often offering recommendations for nearby attractions. At roadside carts, we sampled local specialties, grabbing a quick skewer and a mango for the road. And at every stop, we were touched by the warmth and hospitality that make traveling in China so rewarding. As an American who has lived in China for several years, I'm often asked about my experiences here. Trips like this one remind me of the similarities between the two countries, despite their differences. Just as road trips are a quintessential part of American culture, they've become my favorite way to explore China. Whether it's driving through the rolling hills of South Dakota or the deserts of Ningxia, there's something universal about the freedom and camaraderie that come with having complete control over where you end up. Written by Charlie Howes, a 22-year-old American who has lived in China since 2019. He completed his final year of high school at Beijing No 80 High School and is currently studying at New York University Shanghai. He has founded a company in China focused on facilitating US-China trade and plans to continue living in Shanghai long term. He enjoys road trips, cycling around the world, learning languages, and meeting new people.Late 19th Century (Perspectives, Unification and Imperialism) Late Victorian seaside photographsLate Vocab Quiz #1Late changes and Managed services Late Night Women's Hour