Number and Number Sense

Module 5: Number and Number Sense

Quarter 1 Week 6 Module 8 *Number and Number Sense

Numbers and Number Sense

Introduction to Number Sense and Numeration - Starter Quiz

Introduction to Number Sense and Place Value - Starter Quiz

Fed. 51: To the People of the State of New York: TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE. PUBLIUS.

Chapter 7 - Review Data and Decision Making *Glow bus due at midnight, name and student number: answer questions using content in class People have created wonderful things for centuries, and management Management can be traced as far back as 500 bc when the ancient Sumerians used written records to improve government and business activities Why is it important to lean from the past Not to repeat our mistakes Classical management approaches Scientific management Administrative Principles Bureaucratic organisation Behavioural Management Approaches Follett’s Organizations as communities The Hawthorne studies Maslow’s theory of human needs Mcgregor’s Theory x and Theory Y Argyris Personality and organisation Modern Management foundations Organises as systems Contingency thinking Quality management Quantitative and analysis and tools Evidence-based management Contributions Frederick Taylor - Father of Scientific management He noticed that workers often did their jobs with wasted motions and without a constant approach. His resulted in inefficiency and low performance He believed the problem could be fixed if workers were taught to do their jobs in the best ways and ten were helped and guided by supervisors Four guiding principles of scientific management Rules of motion, standardized work and proper working conditions Select workers with the right abilities Train workers and give them incentives Support workers by planning and smoothing the way as they do their work Frank and Lillian Gilbreth Pioneered use of motitono studies as a management tool In one famous case, the gilbreaths cut down the number of motions used by bricklayers adn tripled their productivity Contributions from scientific management Make results-based compensation a performance incentive Carefully design jobs with efficient work methods Carefully select workers with the ability to perform the job Trian workers to execute activities to the best of their abilities Train supervisors to support workers so they can perform jobs to the best of their abilities Classical Management Adiminstative principle (Henro Fayol) 1919, after a career in French industry, Henri F published “adminisration Industrielle et Generale” (General and industrial management) in which we out like his views on the management of organiztion and workers Rules and duties in management Foresight - to complete a plan of action for the future Organization - To provide and mobilize resources to implement the plan Common- to lead, select and evaluate workers to get the best work toward the plan Coordination- to fit diverse efforts together and ensure information is shared and problems solved Control- to make sure things happen according to plan and to take necessary corrective action Classical management Bureacratic organiztion (Max Weber) Max weber (Bureaucrativ organization) - late 19th century German political economist who had a major impact in the fields of management and sociology Bureaucratic Organization An ideal, intentionally rational adn very efficient form of organization Based on the principles of logic, order and legitimate authority Characteristics of BO Clear division of labour Clear hierarchy of authority Formal rules and procedure Impersonality Careers based on merit What are some disadvantages of bureaucracy Takes a long time for problems to become solved bec there are procedures and there is a chain of people in command Having the power Rules have to follow Excessive paperwork or “red tape” Slowness in handling problems Rigidity in the face of shifting needs Resistance to change Employee apathy Behavioural Management Approaches (focus on understanding the elements that affect human behaviour in organisations) Follett’s Organizations as communites Mary park follett contributed to the transition from classical thinking inot behavioural management Groups and human cooperation Groups allow individuales too combine their talents for a greater good Organizations are cooperating “communites” of managers adn workers Managers job is to help people copperate and achive an integration of goals and intrests Forward-looking managment insight: Making every emploee an owner creates a sense of collective responsibility Prescursor of employrr ownership, profit sharing and gain sharing Buniess problems invovle a varity of inter realted factors Prescursor of systems thinking Private profits realtive to public good Precursor of managerial ethics and social respinsibility Hawthorne studies Took place at western electric chicago plan, a tran led by Harvards Elton Mayo set out to learn how econmic incentives and workplace conditions affected workers output Maing objective Intial study examined how ecomoin incentives adn physical conditions affected worker output (productivity) No consistent relationship found During experientmetn they had 2 groups The expertiant groups (impoved wokring ocnditions ) The control group ( no changes to original working conidtions) No consitant relationship found, perfomance in both groups increased even after removing incentives Social setting and human relations Concluded New “social setting” led workers to do good job Good “Human relations” = higher productivity The contect - The Great Depression (1929-1940) Employee attitudes and groups processes Osme thinsf satisifed some workers but not others People resticited output to adhere to groups norms (Avoid layoffs) Lessons from he hawthrone stufirs Social and human concerns are keys to prductivity Hawthrone effect - People who are singled out for special attention perform as expected Maslow’s Theory of human needs Human needs The work of psychologist Abraham Maslow in the area if human “needs,” also has had a major impact in the behavioual apporach to management Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs Self actualization needs Higherst level: need foe self fulfillment to grow and use abilites to fullest and most creative extent Esteem needs Needs fro esteem in eyes of others need for respect, prestige, recognition; need for self esteem, personal sense of competence, mastery Social needs Need for love, affection, sense of belongingness in ones relationship either other people Safett needs Need for security, protection and stability in teh events of day to day life Physiological needs Most basic of all human needs: need for biological maintence; food, water and phydical well being Principles Defict principle: A satidifed need is not a motivator of behaviour Progress principles: A need becomes a motivator once the preceding lower-level need is satisfied Both principles cease to operate at self actulilzation level McGregor’s Theories Thepry x assumes that workers; Dislike work Lack ambition Are irresponsible Resist change Prefer to be led Theoyry y assumes that workers are Willing to work Willing to accept responsibility Capable of self control Capable of self direction Imaginative and creative According to McGregor, Managers create: Self fulfilling prophecies Implications of Theory x and y Theory x managers: Create situations where workers become dependent, passive and reluctant Theory y managers create situations where workers respond with initiative and high performance Central to notions of empowerment and self management Argyris’s theory of adult personality Classical management principles and practices inhibit worker maturation and are inconsistent with the mature adult personality Management practices should accommodate the mature personality: Increasing task responsibility Increasing task variety Using participative decision making Modern Management Foundation Quantitative analysis and Tools Analytics: the use of large data bases and mathematics to solve problems and make informed decision using systematic analysis Organization as systems System Collection of interrelated parts that function together to achieve a common purpose Subsystem A smaller component of a larger system Open systems Organisations that interact with their environment Contingency thinking Tires to maths managerial responses with problem (situation) No “one best way” to manage The “appropriate way to to manage depends on the situations Quality management Qality anc competitive advantafe are linked Total quality managment (TQM) Comprehensive approach to contiou impovment on teh entire organization ISO certification Gloval quality management standards Refine and upgrade quality to meet ISO requirments Evidednce Based Managment Making management decision on “hard facts” about what really works

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