The government's response to the suffragettes

Mitigation and Adaptation. The Philippines is situated in a disaster risk area where hazards will always be present. The government's response to mitigate and adapt to these hazards is through the creation of hazard maps. Hazard maps are developed to indicate the places where most natural hazards occur or will most likely occur. Identifying these places can aid in informed land-use and the persons-in-charge can create emergency response plans. With the proper knowledge of hazards and the actions to be taken if ever they occur will help in the reduction and mitigation of the dangers of these natural hazards to life and property. In the Philippines, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) created a Geohazard Mapping and Assessment Program implemented by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, which identifies areas vulnerable to geologic hazards or geohazard. They are also responsible for developing the hazard maps. High susceptibility to landslide. • Areas with high susceptibility rating have active/recent landslides and tension cracks that would directly affect the community. Those with steep slopes and drainages that are prone to landslide damming are also highly susceptible to landslides. Moderate susceptibility to landslide. • Areas with moderate landslide susceptibility rating have inactive/old landslide and tension cracks which are located away from the community. These areas usually have moderate slopes. Low susceptibility to landslide . • Areas with low to gentle slopes and lacking tension cracks have low landslide susceptibility rating. High susceptibility to flooding . • Areas with greater than 1-meter flood height. These areas are usually flooded for several hours during heavy rains include landforms of topographic lows such as active river channels, abandoned river channels and areas along river banks; also prone to flashfloods. Low to moderate susceptibility to flooding. • Areas with less than 10-meter flood height. These are usually inundated during prolonged and extensive heavy rainfall or extreme condition. Aside from the development of hazard maps, action plans should be conceptualized to identify the priorities for action and plan for the possible impacts affecting the country. Local programs should be established to help the people who are most affected by natural disasters to recover from their losses. Such programs can include training the people to innovate and think out of the box to come up with ideas or solutions that will be more effective for their livelihood. Education is also a means for people to mitigate and adapt to natural hazards. It can increase mass awareness regarding natural hazards; thus, increasing their chances of survival. It is also a means of promoting access to information and resources that will help individuals be better prepared for natural hazards. Lastly, formal education can empower individuals to be more adaptive with their responses to and recovery from natural hazards. In preparation for natural hazards, information regarding what to do before during, and after a natural hazard is disseminated all over the country. The following are the things to do to be prepared for each natural hazard..

MYTH The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine. FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to force the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than nine million. The British limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine when, in 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some thirty-five thousand square miles—to create a new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine. By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres to Jews. This contradicted Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that “the Administration of Palestine…shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency…close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.”2 Ultimately, the British admitted that the argument about the country’s absorptive capacity was specious. The Peel Commission said, “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled. FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The British restricted Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s “absorptive capacity.” During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease, and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 83,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti-Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one-third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within ten years and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95% of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigration to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936 observed, “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is…due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH The British changed their policy to allow Holocaust survivors to settle in Palestine. FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many smuggled in on dilapidated ships organized by the Haganah. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, sixty-five “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps on Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, and 28,000 remained imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH As the Jewish population grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened. FACT In July 1921, Hasan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa and president of the Muslim National Associations, sent a telegram to the British government in reaction to a delegation of Palestinians that went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Shukri wrote: We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.13 The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non-Jewish population rose by 588,000.14 The permanent Arab population increased by 120% between 1922 and 1947.15 This rapid growth of the Arab population was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37% of the total immigration to pre-state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.16 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.17 The Arab population increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922–1947, the non-Jewish population increased by 290% in Haifa, 131% in Jerusalem, and 158% in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42% in Nablus, 78% in Jenin, and 37% in Bethlehem.18 MYTH Jews stole Arab land. FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. From the beginning of World War I, however, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. About 80% of the Palestinian Arabs were debt-ridden peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins.19 Jews went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap, and—most important—without tenants. In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” He insisted that “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” Instead, he advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”20 Jews only began to purchase cultivated land after buying all the uncultivated territory. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.21 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed, “They [the Jews] paid high prices for the land and, in addition, they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”22 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness for the British government and offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80% were ruled invalid by the government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the government land offer.23 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by local Palestinian leaders who were later joined by Arab volunteers led by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.24 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased…There was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”25 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living, and ample employment opportunities.26 It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original). —Transjordan’s king Abdullah27 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938 (which began in April 1936 with the murder of two Jews by Arabs and the subsequent murder of two Arab workers by members of the Jewish underground28), the British high commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.29 The Jews paid exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”30 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 were acquired from the mandatory government, 30,000 were bought from various churches, and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73% of Jewish plots were purchased from large landowners, not poor fellahin.31 Many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, and the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem, and s sold land to the Jews. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews.32 MYTH The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews. FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini first began to organize fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. El-Husseini hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.33 Arab radicals gained influence because the British administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they began a revolt against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later chief political officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” The British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the military administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with el-Husseini in 1920, a few days before Easter, and told him that “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world…that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine administration but in Whitehall.” He added that “if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General [Louis] Bols [chief administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General [Edmund] Allenby [commander of the Egyptian force, 1917–19, then high commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”34 El-Husseini took the colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of el-Husseini’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. He escaped, however, and was sentenced to ten years in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon el-Husseini and to appoint him Mufti (a cleric in charge of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places). By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years. They were released a few months later.35 Samuel met with el-Husseini on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left forty-three Jews dead.36 El-Husseini consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools, and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute that “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”37 The Mufti’s henchmen also ensured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians who discussed cooperation with the Jews from rival clans. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, el-Husseini did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.38 The Arabs found rioting an effective political tool because of the lax British response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British prevented Jews from protecting themselves but made little effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: The Arabs feared being displaced by the Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs learned they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging riots. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy.”39 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was an excuse for their attacks on Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by economics, the radical Islamic views of the Mufti, and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs convinced the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic still used today to incite violence). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a pretext for rioting by Arabs against Jews, which spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British administration made no effort to prevent the violence, and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, most of Hebron’s Jews had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.40 After the riots, the British ordered an investigation, resulting in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the mandatory government’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy.”41 This meant it was necessary to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. MYTH The Mufti was not a Nazi collaborator. FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler fifteen drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. He also asked the Axis powers to “accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the interest of the Arabs, and by the same method that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”42 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches.” He added, “The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely…the Jews.” Hitler told the Mufti he opposed the creation of a Jewish state and that Germany’s objective was destroying the Jewish element in the Arab sphere.43 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting twenty thousand Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut where he died in 1974. MYTH The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a deliberate terror campaign against civilians. FACT British troops seized the Jewish Agency compound on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were arrested. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. In response to the British provocations, and a desire to demonstrate that the Jews’ spirit could not be broken, the United Resistance Movement planned to bomb the King David Hotel, which housed the British military command and the Criminal Investigation Division in addition to hotel guests. The Haganah pulled out of the plot and left it up to the Irgun. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties and the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed on July 22, 1946, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. The call to the hotel was received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying, “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”44 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the main part of the hotel were injured.45 For decades, the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament provided the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.46 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which Arab leaders hailed as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.47 1 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172

“There’s No Such Thing as Sound Science” by By Christie Aschwanden was a lead science writer for FiveThirtyEight. FiveThirtyEight, Science, Dec. 6, 2017 Science is being turned against itself. For decades, its twin ideals of transparency and rigor have been weaponized by those who disagree with results produced by the scientific method. Under the Trump administration, that fight has ramped up again. In a move ostensibly meant to reduce conflicts of interest, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt has removed a number of scientists from advisory panels and replaced some of them with representatives from industries that the agency regulates. Like many in the Trump administration, Pruitt has also cast doubt on the reliability of climate science. For instance, in an interview with CNBC, Pruitt said that “measuring with precision human activity on the climate is something very challenging to do.” Similarly, Trump’s pick to head NASA, an agency that oversees a large portion the nation’s climate research, has insisted that research into human influence on climate lacks certainty, and he falsely claimed that “global temperatures stopped rising 10 years ago.” Kathleen Hartnett White, Trump’s nominee to head the White House Council on Environmental Quality, said in a Senate hearing last month that she thinks we “need to have more precise explanations of the human role and the natural role” in climate change. The same entreaties crop up again and again: We need to root out conflicts. We need more precise evidence. What makes these arguments so powerful is that they sound quite similar to the points raised by proponents of a very different call for change that’s coming from within science. This other movement strives to produce more robust, reproducible findings. Despite having dissimilar goals, the two forces espouse principles that look surprisingly alike: Science needs to be transparent. Results and methods should be openly shared so that outside researchers can independently reproduce and validate them. The methods used to collect and analyze data should be rigorous and clear, and conclusions must be supported by evidence. These are the arguments underlying an “open science” reform movement that was created, in part, as a response to a “reproducibility crisis” that has struck some fields of science.1 But they’re also used as talking points by politicians who are working to make it more difficult for the EPA and other federal agencies to use science in their regulatory decision-making, under the guise of basing policy on “sound science.” Science’s virtues are being wielded against it. What distinguishes the two calls for transparency is intent: Whereas the “open science” movement aims to make science more reliable, reproducible and robust, proponents of “sound science” have historically worked to amplify uncertainty, create doubt and undermine scientific discoveries that threaten their interests. “Our criticisms are founded in a confidence in science,” said Steven Goodman, co-director of the Meta-Research Innovation Center at Stanford and a proponent of open science. “That’s a fundamental difference — we’re critiquing science to make it better. Others are critiquing it to devalue the approach itself.” Calls to base public policy on “sound science” seem unassailable if you don’t know the term’s history. The phrase was adopted by the tobacco industry in the 1990s to counteract mounting evidence linking secondhand smoke to cancer. A 1992 Environmental Protection Agency report identified secondhand smoke as a human carcinogen, and Philip Morris responded by launching an initiative to promote what it called “sound science.” In an internal memo, Philip Morris vice president of corporate affairs Ellen Merlo wrote that the program was designed to “discredit the EPA report,” “prevent states and cities, as well as businesses from passing smoking bans” and “proactively” pass legislation to help their cause. The sound science tactic exploits a fundamental feature of the scientific process: Science does not produce absolute certainty. Contrary to how it’s sometimes represented to the public, science is not a magic wand that turns everything it touches to truth. Instead, it’s a process of uncertainty reduction, much like a game of 20 Questions. Any given study can rarely answer more than one question at a time, and each study usually raises a bunch of new questions in the process of answering old ones. “Science is a process rather than an answer,” said psychologist Alison Ledgerwood of the University of California, Davis. Every answer is provisional and subject to change in the face of new evidence. It’s not entirely correct to say that “this study proves this fact,” Ledgerwood said. “We should be talking instead about how science increases or decreases our confidence in something.” The tobacco industry’s brilliant tactic was to turn this baked-in uncertainty against the scientific enterprise itself. While insisting that they merely wanted to ensure that public policy was based on sound science, tobacco companies defined the term in a way that ensured that no science could ever be sound enough. The only sound science was certain science, which is an impossible standard to achieve. “Doubt is our product,” wrote one employee of the Brown & Williamson tobacco company in a 1969 internal memo. The note went on to say that doubt “is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’” and “establishing a controversy.” These strategies for undermining inconvenient science were so effective that they’ve served as a sort of playbook for industry interests ever since, said Stanford University science historian Robert Proctor. The sound science push is no longer just Philip Morris sowing doubt about the links between cigarettes and cancer. It’s also a 1998 action plan by the American Petroleum Institute, Chevron and Exxon Mobil to “install uncertainty” about the link between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. It’s industry-funded groups’ late-1990s effort to question the science the EPA was using to set fine-particle-pollution air-quality standards that the industry didn’t want. And then there was the more recent effort by Dow Chemical to insist on more scientific certainty before banning a pesticide that the EPA’s scientists had deemed risky to children. Now comes a move by the Trump administration’s EPA to repeal a 2015 rule on wetlands protection by disregarding particular studies. (To name just a few examples.) Doubt merchants aren’t pushing for knowledge, they’re practicing what Proctor has dubbed “agnogenesis” — the intentional manufacture of ignorance. This ignorance isn’t simply the absence of knowing something; it’s a lack of comprehension deliberately created by agents who don’t want you to know, Proctor said.2 In the hands of doubt-makers, transparency becomes a rhetorical move. “It’s really difficult as a scientist or policy maker to make a stand against transparency and openness, because well, who would be against it?” said Karen Levy, researcher on information science at Cornell University. But at the same time, “you can couch everything in the language of transparency and it becomes a powerful weapon.” For instance, when the EPA was preparing to set new limits on particulate pollution in the 1990s, industry groups pushed back against the research and demanded access to primary data (including records that researchers had promised participants would remain confidential) and a reanalysis of the evidence. Their calls succeeded and a new analysis was performed. The reanalysis essentially confirmed the original conclusions, but the process of conducting it delayed the implementation of regulations and cost researchers time and money. Delay is a time-tested strategy. “Gridlock is the greatest friend a global warming skeptic has,” said Marc Morano, a prominent critic of global warming research and the executive director of ClimateDepot.com, in the documentary “Merchants of Doubt” (based on the book by the same name). Morano’s site is a project of the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, which has received funding from the oil and gas industry. “We’re the negative force. We’re just trying to stop stuff.” Some of these ploys are getting a fresh boost from Congress. The Data Quality Act (also known as the Information Quality Act) was reportedly written by an industry lobbyist and quietly passed as part of an appropriations bill in 2000. The rule mandates that federal agencies ensure the “quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information” that they disseminate, though it does little to define what these terms mean. The law also provides a mechanism for citizens and groups to challenge information that they deem inaccurate, including science that they disagree with. “It was passed in this very quiet way with no explicit debate about it — that should tell you a lot about the real goals,” Levy said. But what’s most telling about the Data Quality Act is how it’s been used, Levy said. A 2004 Washington Post analysis found that in the 20 months following its implementation, the act was repeatedly used by industry groups to push back against proposed regulations and bog down the decision-making process. Instead of deploying transparency as a fundamental principle that applies to all science, these interests have used transparency as a weapon to attack very particular findings that they would like to eradicate. Now Congress is considering another way to legislate how science is used. The Honest Act, a bill sponsored by Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas,3 is another example of what Levy calls a “Trojan horse” law that uses the language of transparency as a cover to achieve other political goals. Smith’s legislation would severely limit the kind of evidence the EPA could use for decision-making. Only studies whose raw data and computer codes were publicly available would be allowed for consideration. That might sound perfectly reasonable, and in many cases it is, Goodman said. But sometimes there are good reasons why researchers can’t conform to these rules, like when the data contains confidential or sensitive medical information.4 Critics, which include more than a dozen scientific organizations, argue that, in practice, the rules would prevent many studies from being considered in EPA reviews.5 It might seem like an easy task to sort good science from bad, but in reality it’s not so simple. “There’s a misplaced idea that we can definitively distinguish the good from the not-good science, but it’s all a matter of degree,” said Brian Nosek, executive director of the Center for Open Science. “There is no perfect study.” Requiring regulators to wait until they have (nonexistent) perfect evidence is essentially “a way of saying, ‘We don’t want to use evidence for our decision-making,’” Nosek said. Most scientific controversies aren’t about science at all, and once the sides are drawn, more data is unlikely to bring opponents into agreement. Michael Carolan, who researches the sociology of technology and scientific knowledge at Colorado State University, wrote in a 2008 paper about why objective knowledge is not enough to resolve environmental controversies. “While these controversies may appear on the surface to rest on disputed questions of fact, beneath often reside differing positions of value; values that can give shape to differing understandings of what ‘the facts’ are.” What’s needed in these cases isn’t more or better science, but mechanisms to bring those hidden values to the forefront of the discussion so that they can be debated transparently. “As long as we continue down this unabashedly naive road about what science is, and what it is capable of doing, we will continue to fail to reach any sort of meaningful consensus on these matters,” Carolan writes. The dispute over tobacco was never about the science of cigarettes’ link to cancer. It was about whether companies have the right to sell dangerous products and, if so, what obligations they have to the consumers who purchased them. Similarly, the debate over climate change isn’t about whether our planet is heating, but about how much responsibility each country and person bears for stopping it. While researching her book “Merchants of Doubt,” science historian Naomi Oreskes found that some of the same people who were defending the tobacco industry as scientific experts were also receiving industry money to deny the role of human activity in global warming. What these issues had in common, she realized, was that they all involved the need for government action. “None of this is about the science. All of this is a political debate about the role of government,” she said in the documentary. These controversies are really about values, not scientific facts, and acknowledging that would allow us to have more truthful and productive debates. What would that look like in practice? Instead of cherry-picking evidence to support a particular view (and insisting that the science points to a desired action), the various sides could lay out the values they are using to assess the evidence. For instance, in Europe, many decisions are guided by the precautionary principle — a system that values caution in the face of uncertainty and says that when the risks are unclear, it should be up to industries to show that their products and processes are not harmful, rather than requiring the government to prove that they are harmful before they can be regulated. By contrast, U.S. agencies tend to wait for strong evidence of harm before issuing regulations. Both approaches have critics, but the difference between them comes down to priorities: Is it better to exercise caution at the risk of burdening companies and perhaps the economy, or is it more important to avoid potential economic downsides even if it means that sometimes a harmful product or industrial process goes unregulated? In other words, under what circumstances do we agree to act on a risk? How certain do we need to be that the risk is real, and how many people would need to be at risk, and how costly is it to reduce that risk? Those are moral questions, not scientific ones, and openly discussing and identifying these kinds of judgment calls would lead to a more honest debate. Science matters, and we need to do it as rigorously as possible. But science can’t tell us how risky is too risky to allow products like cigarettes or potentially harmful pesticides to be sold — those are value judgements that only humans can make.

Key Word Definition Aid Assistance in the form of grants or loans at below market rates. For example, the UK provided aid to Nepal after the 2015 earthquake to help with reconstruction efforts. Barriers to Trade Government constraints on the flow of international goods and services, such as tariffs and quotas. For example, the European Union imposes tariffs on certain agricultural products to protect its farmers. BRICS An acronym for an association of five major emerging nations: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. For example, BRICS nations often meet to discuss economic cooperation and development strategies. Demographic Aging The rise in the median age of a population. For example, Japan is experiencing demographic aging, with a significant increase in the elderly population. Economic Core Region The most highly developed region(s) in a country. For example, London is considered an economic core region in the UK due to its high level of development and economic activity. GNP (Gross National Product) GDP plus overseas earnings, also known as GNI (Gross National Income). For example, the GNP of the United States includes the value of goods and services produced domestically and the income earned by its citizens abroad. HIC (Higher Income Country) A country with a high level of income and development. For example, Germany is classified as a higher income country due to its high GDP per capita and advanced infrastructure. NEE (Newly Emerging Economy) A country that is experiencing rapid economic growth and industrialisation. For example, China is an example of a newly emerging economy, having rapidly industrialised and grown economically over the past few decades. LIC (Lower Income Country) A country with a low level of income and development. For example, Malawi is considered a lower income country, with a low GDP per capita and limited access to healthcare and education. GDHI (Gross Disposable Household Income) The amount of money that households have available for spending and saving after taxes and social contributions. For example, in the UK, the GDHI varies significantly between regions, with London having one of the highest levels. Gini Coefficient A measure of income inequality within a population, ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). For example, South Africa has a high Gini coefficient, indicating significant income inequality within the country. Trade Unions Organisations that promote trade between member countries, such as the East African Community (EAC). For example, the East African Community (EAC) works to promote economic integration and trade among its member states. Fair Trade A movement aimed at helping producers in developing countries achieve better trading conditions and promote sustainability. For example, Fairtrade coffee ensures that farmers receive a fair price for their product and work under safe conditions. FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) Investment made by a company or individual in one country in business interests in another country. For example, Toyota's investment in manufacturing plants in the UK is an example of foreign direct investment. Debt Relief The partial or total remission of debts, especially those owed by developing countries to external creditors. For example, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative provides debt relief to eligible countries to help them achieve sustainable development. International Aid Voluntary transfer of resources from one country to another, often in the form of financial assistance, goods, or services. For example, the UK provides international aid to various countries through its Department for International Development (DFID). Top-Down Development Large-scale development projects led by national governments or international organisations. For example, the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China is an example of a top-down development project. Bottom-Up Development Small-scale development projects led by local communities or NGOs, focusing on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable. For example, WaterAid's installation of hand pumps in rural villages in Africa is an example of a bottom-up development project. Urbanisation The increase in the proportion of people living in urban areas compared to rural areas. For example, rapid urbanisation in India has led to the growth of megacities like Mumbai and Delhi. Geopolitics The study of the effects of geography (human and physical) on international politics and relations. For example, the geopolitics of the Arctic region involves disputes over territorial claims and access to natural resources. Quality of Life The general well-being of individuals and societies, outlining negative and positive features of life. For example, Scandinavian countries are often ranked high in quality of life due to their strong social welfare systems and high levels of happiness. Poverty Cycle A set of factors or events by which poverty, once started, is likely to continue unless there is outside intervention. For example, lack of education and healthcare can trap families in a poverty cycle, making it difficult for future generations to improve their living standards. Sustainable Development Economic development that is conducted without depletion of natural resources. For example, the use of renewable energy sources like wind and solar power is a key aspect of sustainable development. Humanitarian Aid Material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to crises including natural disasters and man-made disaster. For example, humanitarian aid was provided to Haiti after the devastating earthquake in 2010 to help with immediate relief efforts. Economic Growth An increase in the production of goods and services in an economy over a period of time. For example, China's economic growth over the past few decades has lifted millions of people out of poverty. Social Indicators Measures that describe the well-being of individuals or communities, such as health, education, and income. For example, life expectancy and literacy rates are common social indicators used to assess development. Environmental Sustainability Responsible interaction with the environment to avoid depletion or degradation of natural resources and allow for long-term environmental quality. For example, practices like recycling and conservation of natural habitats contribute to environmental sustainability. Infrastructure The basic physical and organisational structures and facilities needed for the operation of a society or enterprise. For example, good infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and schools, is essential for economic development. Globalisation The process by which businesses or other organisations develop international influence or start operating on an international scale. For example, the globalisation of technology companies like Apple and Google has led to their products being available worldwide. Microfinance Financial services provided to low-income individuals or groups who are typically excluded from traditional banking. For example, microfinance institutions like Grameen Bank provide small loans to entrepreneurs in developing countries to help them start or expand their businesses.

Agriculture Agriculture is the main source of livelihood in every country in the region except Brunei and Singapore. Agricultural employment, however, has been declining. More than two-thirds of the workforces of Cambodia and Laos practice agriculture. As the economies of the ASEAN countries have been restructured toward growth in industry and services, there has been a corresponding decline in the proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) derived from agriculture, most significantly in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Agricultural output in Southeast Asia has increased significantly since 1970. There are wide variations in this growth across the region, with the greatest gains in Malaysia and Thailand and little or no increase in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Hunger and malnutrition are problems in pockets of even the most developed countries, but they have been especially serious in Cambodia because of crop failures and internal strife. The condition of the rural population everywhere is clearly related to limited access to land, the landless experiencing greater poverty and poorer health. Landlessness is perhaps most serious in the Philippines. The dominant form of agriculture in the region is wet-rice cultivation. Where conditions permit, two crops typically are planted each year. Other food crops such as corn (maize), cassava, and pulses (legumes) frequently are grown in drier areas where there is too little water for a second planting of rice. Rice production requires a reliable water supply. Thailand and the Philippines rely heavily on rain-fed systems, while Indonesia utilizes irrigation to a large extent. Irrigation or some other form of water control is especially critical in the cultivation of the high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice that have been introduced since the 1960s. The spread of the so-called Green Revolution—in which HYVs and chemical fertilizers and pesticides are utilized—has brought mixed results. There is little doubt that production has increased because of the higher yields of these hybrid strains and because their more rapid maturation increases the possibility of multiple annual crops. Frequently, however, poorer farmers are not able to take advantage of these strains, because of the high cost of their use. The goal of rice self-sufficiency has been difficult to achieve for most countries. A large variety of cash crops are grown for the local and export markets, both on large commercial estates and by individual growers or smallholders. Tree crops are the most important in terms of value, although the area devoted to them is limited largely to equatorial areas. Rubber and palm oil are significant in Malaysia, Indonesia, and southern Thailand, while coconuts and sugar are important in the Philippines. Other major export crops are cacao, coffee, and spices, while crops grown largely for local and regional consumption include chilies, sweet potatoes, peanuts (groundnuts), and tobacco. The cultivation of opium poppies is important in parts of Myanmar and Thailand. The emphasis on rubber and palm oil production is in response to a considerable (though fluctuating) worldwide demand for these commodities and because of a nearly continuous harvest period that provides year-round employment. Foreign corporations once dominated production, but, as the region’s countries gained independence, much of the production was nationalized. Government ownership continues to predominate, with increasing private ownership. Fishing contributes only a token amount to the GDP of Southeast Asian countries, but it is an important livelihood in certain areas and supplies a significant portion of the local diet. Marine output has gradually expanded with new technologies. The maritime nations of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines all have globally important fishing industries. Shrimp catches are especially in demand in the world economy. Aquaculture has become increasingly important in the region, such species as shrimp, carp, and grouper being raised in excavated ponds.

Measuring the Effectiveness of police strategies and operations Clearance rates Def: The proportion of incidents known to the police that result in teh identification of a suspect Crime Displacement Def: relocation-due to the effective crime prevention, crime response initiates criminal activity from one local to another Professional Model of Policing Model of police work, reactive, incident driven and centred on random patrol Three Rs: random patrol, rapid response and reactive investigation Community policing Def: policing centred on police-community partnership and problem-solving The three ps: prevention, problem solving and partnership with the proactive role Community-based strategic policing Def: The model incorporates community policing with prevention, crime response and crime attack approaches Community engagement, police services strategic in their policies and operations Crime Analytics Sophisticated programs, and crime maps, provide intelligence to police officers in patrol and investigative units Intelligence-led policing: guided by collection, and analysis of information informs police decision-making Compstat: Increase effectiveness, and efficiency of police service while holding police personnel accountable for crime reduction Predictive policing: statistical analysis, identify time and location likely to occur Limited analytical capacity and not able to provide their officers with real-time information Biased policing certain areas, or persons, being identified as important for police attention in predictive policing How Predictive Policing Software Works The Police and the community Public Attitudes toward and Confidence in the police Community-based strategic policing: Recruitment, and deployment of volunteers in community police stations, storefronts Foot and bike patrols Team policing Restorative Justice Approaches Alternative for addressing, and resolving crime, needs of victims, offenders and the community Victim offender meditation Circle sentencing Community holistic healing programss Family group conferences Crime Prevention and Response Strategies Crime Prevention progemas Aimed at reducing crime, generating community involvement and heightening citizens; perceptions of safety Primary crime prevention programs opportunities for criminal offences and alter those conditions Secondary crime prevention programs focus on areas that produce crime and disorder Tertiary crime prevention programs are designed to prevent youth and adults from reoffending The Broken Windows Approach If minor crimes are left unaddressed in an environment, more serious crimes will emerge (originated in New York City in the 1980’s) “The exictsnce of unchecked and uncontrolled mirror incivilites in a neighbourhood- for example, panhandling, public drunkenness, vandalism and graffiti-produces an atmosphere conducive to more serious crime.” R.H. Burke Zero tolerance policing Zero tolerance policing: Strict order maintenance approach- specific area, coupled with high police visibility and presence Quality of life policing: Increased police visibility improves conditions in an area by targeting disruptive and annoying behaviour Problem Oritented policing (POP) Strategy, the idea that police should address teh cause of recurrent crime and disorder Root causes of recurring problems Solutions to problems Collabortaion with community SARA (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) problem-solving model helps officers identify, and respond to problems with the assistance of agencies, organizations, community groups The Police and Vulnerable/ At risk groups Persons with Mental Illness Patrol officers encountering more and more persons with mental illness (PwMi) Number of these end trragically Number of incidents increased significantly following deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill - in 1960 and 1970 De facto (in fact) mental health workers, first responders Crisis intervention training (CIT) Assertive outreach teams Assertive community treatment (ACT) teams Indigenouse, Vulnerable, and Marginalized women Sexual assault one of most underreported crimed. 1 in 20 incidents report to police. Many Women Do not want to deal with police Believe police would not take allegation seriously Language, cultural barriers Distrust the police Fear repercussions Missing and Murdered Indigenous women Canada, unknown number of missing and murdered indigenous women 2016, federal government announced National inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigennouse women and girls Three goals of MMIWG 1. Finding the truth 2. Honouring the truth 3. Giving life to the truth as a path of healing

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