United States of America

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United States of America v. Georgia

The United States of America

South West Region of the United States of America

Foundations of Government in the United States of American

The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Por- tuguese: Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa; abbr.: CPLP), also known as the Lusophone Common- wealth (Portuguese:Comunidade Lusófona), is an inter- national organization and political association of Luso- phone nations across four continents, where Portuguese is an official language. The CPLP was created on 17 July 1996 by Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde,Guinea-Bissau,Mozambique, Portugal and Sao Tomé and Principe.In 2002, after gaining indepen- dence, Timor-Leste was welcomed as a member country. In 2014, Equatorial Guinea became the organization's ninth member. The population of its member countries adds up to approximately 270 million people. How many member states constitute the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP)? Let's discover four American symbols of freedom and the meanings behind them. The rose earned its place as America's national flower in 1986 due to its symbolic nature of life, love, and devotion, as well as of beauty and eternity.The American bald eagle was adopted as the national bird symbol of the United States of America for its majestic beauty, great strength, long life, and because it's native to North America. In 2004, the oak was designated the national tree of the United States. The oak tree is the most widespread hardwood tree in the United States.Although commonly called “buffalo” since the late 1700s,American bison is the correct name of this animal (a close relative of the European bison). A mature male bison can weigh up to 2000 pounds and stand 6-foot tall at the shoulder - undoubtedly the largest land animal in North America. Which of the following national symbols of the USA is not correct?

Fed. 51: To the People of the State of New York: TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE. PUBLIUS.

If we look at the United States on a map today, it is very difficult to imagine that where we see borders, cities, and states, there once existed nothing but open land, uncharted mountain ranges, and miles of untouched wilderness. North America was a highly desired destination for exploration and settlement for Europeans. In the early 1500s, expeditions from Europe to North America were funded by Europe's kings and queens in hopes of expanding their territories across the world. The voyages were treacherous with unknown dangers and many attempts to settle in this new land were faced with failure. In the early 1600’s however, the settlers of Jamestown and Plymouth survived the harsh conditions and established the first two permanent English settlements in North America. Jamestown Colony in Virginia Jamestown was founded in 1607. Of course, its colonists did not know it would go on to become the the first permanent English settlement in the Americas. The settlement was located along the James River off Chesapeake Bay in modern-day Virginia. Life in Jamestown was very hard, and nearly 80% of the first settlers died in the first year due to disease and starvation. The region was warm and had fertile soil, making it a perfect place for growing crops, specifically tobacco. Sponsored by a joint stock company known as the Virginia Company of London, Jamestown was originally established as a profit-making enterprise. The first settlers looked for gold and other natural resources that could bring a profit to the company's investors. After several very difficult years, the colonists were eventually able to grow tobacco that was popular in England and it became a valuable cash crop. Jamestown's colonists were primarily all supporters of the Church of England and felt a strong connection to their homeland. Many, like John Smith, returned to England, or would move back and forth between the two locations. Being that Jamestown was founded by a corporation looking to make a profit, it began using enslaved labor in 1619. Indentured servants and enslaved Africans made up much of the workforce on the growing tobacco and cotton plantations. The system of using enslaved Africans for the profit of American plantations has been described as America's "original sin". About 400 miles to the north of Jamestown, a group of Pilgrims seeking religious freedom established Plymouth in 1620 as the second English colony in North America. Located in modern day Massachusetts, the colder climate and rocky soil made farming and agriculture more difficult. Instead of growing cash crops, settlers turned to lumber, shipbuilding, and fishing for trade. Unlike the settlers of Jamestown, the Pilgrims of Plymouth Colony were dissenters from the Church of England. They came to the New World so that they could freely practice their religion without fear of persecution. Although their reasons for settling were different, the settlements had many similar experiences. Jamestown and Plymouth both faced harsh and demanding climates and struggled with hunger, disease, and death. In their first years they had much difficulty establishing housing and finding a sustainable source of food. Plymouth Colony in New England While the settlers in Jamestown used the House of Burgesses as a legislative body for laws and decisions, the Pilgrims in Plymouth wrote and agreed to the Mayflower Compact as a set of rules for self-government. Both helped maintain the rule of law in new places far from the courts and tradition of England. Settlers of both colonies experienced complicated and, at times, violent relationships with local Native Americans that owned the land. While some American Indian groups offered help to the new settlers, oftentimes both sides needed to defend themselves from attacks. Nevertheless, the settlers of Jamestown and Plymouth persevered through these difficulties and maintained their establishments, providing inspiration for future colonies and settlers in search of a new life in the New World.

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