What was the goal of the Marshall Plan initiated by the USA?

To aid the recovery of Western European economies

To halt the spread of communism

To establish the United Nations

To promote military alliances in Europe

Which organization was formed by several Western European countries after World War II to promote economic cooperation?

The European Coal and Steel Community

What does the EU flag symbolize?

Unity and common identity of Europe

What does the Schengen Agreement allow for EU countries?

Free movement without border controls

What was the main goal of the European integration that began after World War II?

To promote lasting peace and prevent future conflicts

To establish a single military force

The common currency used by many EU countries

What significant military alliance was formed in 1949 involving the US and Western European nations?

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

What does the Schengen Agreement allow?

Free movement of people between member states

European Union Intro

Economic integration Population and GDP of ASEAN Countries Population and GDP of ASEAN CountriesThe countries of ASEAN vary widely in population size and income level, yet nonetheless have achieved a high level of economic integration. ASEAN is considered to be one the developing world’s most successful regional economic cooperation zones. Unlike its primary counterparts in the developed world, the European Union (EU) and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), ASEAN has followed a more gradual and flexible approach to integration, accommodating the diversity of its member states. ASEAN has prioritized trade liberalization, sustainable development, and attracting foreign investment over deepening political integration or adopting a common currency. ASEAN’s economic integration efforts began with the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, which successfully reduced tariffs between ASEAN’s first six members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to 0–5 percent by 2002. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia were required to sign the AFTA agreement upon joining ASEAN. Today tariffs between ASEAN countries are close to zero. In 2007 the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint was signed in Singapore with the goal of achieving four objectives by 2015: (1) create a single market and production base, (2) become a highly competitive economic region, (3) promote equitable economic development within the region, and (4) fully integrate the region into the global economy. The AEC was implemented in 2015, although approximately 20 percent of measures toward achieving a single market remain in progress and have been deferred to a new deadline of 2025. The ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) was implemented in 2008, and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) was implemented in 2010. In 2020 ASEAN joined Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea in signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest trade agreement in history. Get Unlimited Access Try Britannica Premium for free and discover more. Significant challenges remain for ASEAN’s economic integration, including pervasive nontariff barriers, restrictive investment measures, and vast disparities in GDP per capita. Domestic issues such as political instability and corruption in member states exacerbate these challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic created severe economic disruption in sectors such as industrial production and tourism; nonetheless, ASEAN coordinated a regional response to align economic recovery strategies and maintain open trade routes. Ultimately, ASEAN has demonstrated an exemplary and ongoing commitment to strengthening cooperation and integration and maximizing the region’s economic potential.

Plăcile de rețea (Network Interface Cards-NICs) conectează un echipament la rețea. Plăcile de rețea Ethernet sunt folosite pentru o conexiune cablată, în timp ce plăcile de rețea WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network) sunt folosite pentru wireless. Un echipament cu utilizator final ar putea include unul sau ambele tipuri de plăci de rețea. De exemplu, o imprimantă de rețea poate avea doar o placă de rețea Ethernet, așadar, trebuie să se conecteze la rețea printr-un cablu Ethernet. Alte echipamente, precum tabletele sau telefoanele pot conține o placă de rețea WLAN și trebuie să folosească o conexiune wireless. Layer-ul Fizic Layer-ul fizic de la OSI furnizează mijloacele de transport a biților care realizează un frame de data link în mediul de rețea. Acest layer acceptă un frame complet de la layer-ul data link și îl codifică sub forma unor serii de semnale care sunt transmise în mediul local. Biții codificați care comprimă un frame sunt primiți fie de un echipament final, fie de unul intermediar. Procesul prin care trec datele de la nodul sursă la nodus destinație este: • Datele utilizatorului sunt segmentate de layer-ul transport, plasate în pachete de către layer-ul rețea, iar apoi încapsulate sub formă de frame-uri de către layer-ul data link. • Layer-ul fizic codifică frame-urile și creează semnalele undelor electrice, optice și radio care reprezintă biții în fiecare frame. • Aceste semnale sunt trimise în mediu pe rând. • Nodul destinație preia aceste semnale individuale de la nivelul fizic, le transformă în reprezentare binară și transmit biții la nivelul superior, data link, sub forma unui frame. Mediul layer-ului Fizic Există trei forme de bază ale mediului de rețea. Layer-ul fizic produce reprezentarea și gruparea biților pentru fiecare mediu, după cum urmează: • Cablu de cupru: Semnalele sunt modele ale pulsurilor electrice. • Cablul cu fibră optică: Semnalele sunt modele de lumină. • Wireless: Semnalele sunt modele ale transmisiunilor cu microunde. Figura afișează exemple de semnalizare pentru cupru, fibră optică și wireless. Pentru a activa interoperabilitatea layer-ului fizic, toate aspectele acestor funcții sunt guvernate de organizațiile de standardizare. Standardele Layer-ului Fizic Protocoalele și operațiile layerelor superioare din OSI sunt efectuate în software proiectat de ingineri și oameni de știință. De exemplu, serviciile și protocoalele din suita TCP/IP sunt definite de Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) în RFC-uri așa cum se arată în Figura 1. Layer-ul fizic constă în circuite electronice, mediu și conectori dezvoltați de ingineri. Așadar, este corespunzător ca standardele care guvernează acest hardware să fie definite de orgnizațiile relevante din domeniul ingineriei și electronicii. Există mai multe organizații naționale și internaționale diferite, organizații guvernamentale de reglementare și companii private implicate în stabilirea și menținerea standardelor layer-ului fizic. De exemplu, hardware-ul layer-ului fizic, mediul, codificarea și standardele de semnalizare sunt definite și guvernate de către: • International Organization for Standardization (ISO) • Telecommunications Industry Association/Electronic Industries Association (TIA/EIA) • International Telecommunication Union (ITU) • American National Standards Institute (ANSI) • Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) • Autoritățile de reglementare națională a telecomunicațiilor, inclusiv Federal Communication Commission (FCC) din USA și European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ESTI) Pe lângă acestea, există grupuri de standardizare a cablărilor regionale precum CSA (Canadian Standards Association), CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization) și JSA/JSI (Japanese Standards Association), care dezvoltă specificații locale. Figura 2 listează contribuitorii principali și câteva standarde relevante ale layer-ului fizic.

1.1945-1949: The immediate years after the Second World War ● At the end of 1945, Mao Zedong had come to see the USA as the greatest threat to his aspirations. a. He understood that East Asians were looking to the USA as the true liberator from Japanese imperialism. b. The USA’s support for the Kuomintang(KMT) and the restoration of U.S. authority in formerly Japanese Manchuria clashed with the CCP’s plans to use the region for its own needs in the impending civil war between the CCP and the GMD. ■ To compound matters, while the KMT was recognised internationally as the official government in China, Mao and the CCP saw the party as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. ● While Mao saw the USA as the greater threat to the CCP’s plans, Soviet actions also frustrated him. a. The USSR provided minimal and incoherent support for the Chinese Communists in Yan’an and Manchuria. b. Stalin also attempted to extract territorial and economic concessions from the Guomindang government in the Friendship and Alliance Treaty China signed in August 1945 under American and Soviet pressure in exchange for Soviet entry into the Second World War against Japan. ● The emerging superpower conflict over Europe and over American intervention in the impending civil war in China led to Mao’s ideological perception of the 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 8 USA as an aggressive imperialist power that was hostile towards other countries, especially the USSR and China. ● In 1946, Mao promoted the theory of the intermediate zone, which envisioned a global united front against American imperialism. a. Mao saw the emerging superpower conflict as an American-Soviet contest for the intermediate zones, the capitalist, colonial and semi- colonial countries of West Europe, Africa, and Asia. b. Mao believed that the USSR was the defender of world peace. c. The intermediate zone, which included China, would not be part of the socialist camp. d. Despite the tremendous potential that U.S. aid held for China’s reconstruction, Mao’s ideological worldview and the impending civil war against the Guomindang prevented him from seeking normalised relations with the USA. In 1949, Mao decided to lean towards the side of the USSR despite two decades of unreliable support from them. e. Mao saw the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East Europe as evidence that China should isolate capitalist-bourgeois forces within it.2 f. Stalin had expelled Yugoslavia from the socialist camp as its leader, Tito was seen to have directly challenged Stalin’s authority. ■ Mao thus saw it as imperative to stress close unity to the USSR lest he was seen as a second Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, Mao sought a loose partnership with the USSR because Mao believed that China should preserve a high measure of self- reliance and zili gengsheng (自力更生) (regeneration through one’s own efforts). ● When the People’s Republic of China was formed on 1 October, 1949, relations between China’s and the USSR’s communists had improved substantially. a. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was also aware that the USSR never treated Chinese interests as a priority. What the CCP failed to fully understand was that Stalin ruled East Europe much like it was his empire and how this would have implications for China. b. In Mao’s first visit to the USSR in December 1949, Stalin was non- committal regarding the interests raised by the Chinese, and treated Mao as an underling as he feared that closer relations with the PRC would cause the USSR to lose privileges gained from the KMT. _________________________ 2 What Mao did not realise at that point was that the anti-bourgeois campaigns in East European countries were part of Stalin’s intentional design to consolidate the power of communists in them. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 9 A note on Sino-American relations 2. Early 1950: The USA’s hands-off policy towards Taiwan begins to change ● By early 1950, the Truman administration had written off Taiwan and believed it was only a matter of time before the island fell to the PLA. ● Two events in early 1950 changed the USA’s position on East Asia. ○ The formation of the USSR-PRC alliance in February 1950 ○ The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 3. 1950: The Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty ● Signed on 14 February, 1950. 3.1Implications for Sino-Soviet relations ● Stalin saw it as a means to get concessions that he had failed to get from the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1945. ● For Mao and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC), the alliance would provide security against U.S. imperialism and allow the PRC to get economic aid for reconstruction from the USSR. ● The Chinese realised soon after the 1950 treaty had been signed that the Soviet Union was intent on exploiting the agreement in its own favour. 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 10 ● The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially directed against Japanese militarism and its allies, especially the USA. ● The Sino-Soviet alliance comprised three elements: party, military and economic relations. ○ Party: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was included in the customs of communist party internationalism, such as regular exchange of party delegations to congresses of the fraternal parties in Stalin’s socialist camp. ■ This move was meant to bring the PRC’s ideological beliefs about communism into greater alignment with the USSR’s. ○ Military: The alliance was supposed to provide the newly formed and weak PRC with a strategic deterrent and military aid against the USA on three fronts: Guomindang-held Taiwan, divided Korea, and Vietnam where France attempted to reestablish its colonial control. ■ Convinced that the USA would aggressively seek ways to undermine the CCP-led PRC through Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam, Mao sought an active defence. ● While in Moscow, Mao unsuccessfully asked Stalin to provide military assistance for the liberation of Taiwan. ● At the beginning of 1950, the PRC delivered large-scale military aid to Hanoi. The PRC was the first country to grant the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam diplomatic recognition on 18 January 1950; Mao persuaded Stalin to do so on 30 January 1950. ● The PRC committed itself to North Korea, where Mao saw the commitment to North Korea both as a defence against U.S. imperialism and as support for a fellow communist country. ○ Economic: During Mao’s first stay in Moscow, Stalin had personally promised the delivery of fifty projects for primary industrialisation. ■ The agreement also led to a series of supplementary ones, such as a US$ 300 million loan that the PRC would repay with a mixture of strategic materials, rubber, agricultural products, goods for daily use and hard currency. ■ Significantly, Stalin used Soviet military and economic aid to extract concessions similar to those he failed to get from the Guomindang government in 1945. ■ The USSR and PRC would disagree on the pace and extent of the PRC’s planned development. ● In the last five weeks of Stalin’s life in early 1953, he attempted to pressure the PRC to reduce the planned 8838/01 H1 History Paper 1 Theme II: The Cold War and East Asia (1945-1991) \ Page | 11 development speed to a mere annual growth of 13-14 percent, and to plan individual projects in detail beforehand. These moves would potentially result in the PRC’s economy growing at a slower rate than initially projected. ● However, after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the PRC’s Zhou Enlai decided to use his visit of condolence to the USSR to press forward negotiations. ○ When talks resumed in 1 April 1953, Beijing pressed for 150 Soviet industrial projects, but Moscow reduced them to 91 on the basis of insufficient data provided by the Chinese. ■ The economic disarray after China’s civil war and the economic pressures that came with the Korean War influenced recovery and reconstruction in the early years of the PRC. ● Despite the PRC being unable to tap into Soviet economic assistance immediately, mutual trade between China and the USSR nevertheless increased 6.5 times from 1950 to 1956. ● Together with the 50 projects promised by Stalin in 1950, the final version of the First FYP for the PRC included 141 Soviet and 68 East European projects in a total of 649 planned. Three thousand Soviet advisers sent to China in subsequent years were directly linked to the First FYP. ● By 1955, over 60 percent of China’s goods exchange was with the USSR. ● Soviet economic assistance to China added up to the largest foreign development venture in the socialist camp ever. ○ The total number of planned projects amounted to between 300 and 360 projects. ○ However, the number of total finished projects ranged between 134 and 150. ● Transfers of knowledge and expertise were important to China’s economic development. ○ A study on Soviet experts counts 1,445 political advisers and 9,313 technical specialists sent to China until their sudden withdrawal in mid-1960. ■ For political reasons, the gradual withdrawal of advisers began after late 1956.

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The European Union

European Studies | Subject Focus 5: European Union - Origins, Development and Institutions

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